THE
GERMAN ARMY
GUERRILLA WARFARE
POCKET MANUAL 1939-45
CHARLES D. MELSON

THE GERMAN ARMY GUERRILLA WARFARE POCKET MANUAL 1939–45

Compiled and Edited by Charles D. Melson

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FOREWORD

The German attitude to guerrilla war was far more complex than the stereotypical brutality for the sake of brutality. Indeed, the crucial factor appeared to be the nature and intensity of partisan warfare itself. Historically, because of their geographic position in the middle of Europe, Prussian and German military leaders emphasized rapid wars brought to a quick conclusion. As a corollary of that posture, since they would tend to extend wars both in terms of time and military effort, they viewed irregular or guerrilla wars with particular abhorrence. In both 1871 and 1914, for example, German military authorities had acted ruthlessly to stamp out resistance in occupied areas of France and Belgium, on the grounds that initial harshness would intimidate the local population into passivity, and thus in the long run both German and civilian lives would be spared. Ironically, the restrictions placed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles following World War I forced German military leaders in the 1920s – at least temporarily – to rethink their ideas on guerrilla war. The treaty had left the *Reichswehr* barely a second rate force, unable to guarantee that a Polish or Czech invasion could be repulsed, to say nothing of a French incursion. Aware that they led what amounted to little more than a domestic security force, German military leaders spent much of the 1920s thinking of and planning for the "war of the future". Crucially, most either began with, or quickly arrived at, the assumption that conflict was inescapable: for Germany to regain its status as a great power, the Versailles system had to be broken. Having embraced the basic premise, German officers also accepted the extreme consequences; professionalism and radicalism thus fit together quite well.

The first effort to rebuild the army, undertaken in the early 1920s by General Hans von Seeckt, imprinted the gospel of mobility on the new *Reichswehr*. While working to reestablish a formal military structure, Seeckt emphasized skill-oriented training as well as a modernized and mechanized army. Above all, he stressed the efficacy of a small, elite motorized force proficient in fighting a combined arms battle. With a firm belief that its very immobility had played a major factor in the development of positional warfare, and thus the loss of the Great War,

he downplayed the importance of a mass army. Instead, he emphasized the vital role a small elite force would assume in a future war. By exploiting the advantage of *Auftragstaktik* (mission-oriented tactics) in orchestrating a mobile defense, it would set the stage for a quick, wide-ranging, and decisive counter-blow against any invader. Seeckt's operational notions, though, not only assumed an army that did not exist but his operational fixation on quick victories close to its borders provided little assurance of any ultimate victory. Moreover, notions of *Auftragstaktik* focused more on the tactical than strategic level. A basic deficiency lay at the heart of his operational thinking: Seeckt hoped through skill and cleverness to attain hegemony without having an adequate economic, military, or political power base.

The *Reichswehr*'s inability to hinder the French occupation of the Ruhr in January 1923 and the reality of budgetary limitations that would not permit a comprehensive motorization program quickly caused Seeckt's vision of the future to lose much of its shine. The stark fact of German weakness, enshrined in the suffocating restrictions of Versailles, forced military planners to think in unconventional, often radical, fashion. Among the first to tackle this problem and, by rethinking all aspects of war, to attempt to reconcile the gulf between hope and actuality were a group of young officers led by Joachim von Stülpnagel and Werner von Blomberg (the future Minister of Defense under Hitler). In his *Thoughts on the War of the Future*, issued in February 1924, Stülpnagel began from the commonly accepted premise that the German goal had to be restoration of great power status, which would require a conflict with France. Rejecting Seeckt's rather quixotic views, Stülpnagel realistically assessed the current limited abilities of the *Reichswehr*. Its seven divisions, he noted caustically, had only enough ammunition to fight for about an hour. The operational experience of the Great War thus provided no guide.

Instead, combining elements both of Germany's War of National Liberation in 1813 and the larger lesson of World War I, Stülpnagel developed the concept of a *Volkskrieg* (people's war) to be fought in the border areas of the Reich. As in the World War, all powers of society, including, crucially, the will of the people, had to be mobilized to carry out a guerrilla war against an invader. The initial aim would be to harass and disrupt an advancing army – especially its supply lines – so thoroughly that the military leadership would have time to mobilize all available human and material resources in defense of the nation. In theory, this would enable the *Reichswehr* to strike the enemy an annihilating counter-blow with a strong armored force. *Volkskrieg* would, Stülpnagel thought, in an echo of Moltke the Elder, lead to a radicalization of war, rising national hatreds, and brutalities of all kinds. It would be a war of no rules, of terrorist actions and general destruction – a self-inflicted scorched earth operation that would leave the country in ruins. It might also, he conceded, amount to no more than a "heroic gesture," since in the mid-1920s Germany had neither the will nor the resources to fight such a war.

Still, in embracing *Volkskrieg*, Stülpnagel had outlined a radical new vision of war. Domestic unity, an absolute national will to fight (and sacrifice), and the integration of technology in the form of mobile, mechanized units formed the essential prerequisites for successfully fighting such a war. Given this potent mix, the Clausewitzian battle of annihilation could easily transform into a war of annihilation. Still, this vision, although emotionally potent, had its limitations. Younger officers associated with Stülpnagel and Blomberg grudgingly came to accept, by the end of the decade, that their ideas had hit a dead end, not least because the notion of *Volkskrieg* assumed a level of national unity that simply did not exist. In addition, the results of two war games in the late 1920s also proved devastating. German forces, unsurprisingly, had been destroyed in a simulated two-front war, but they had been unable to check even a Polish invasion. Despite these depressing results, and with dreadful consequences for the future, younger staff officers, foremost among them Blomberg, simply ignored the relationship between means and ends that Clausewitz had considered of vital significance, and defined future war only in terms of the means to be used. In thus separating political and economic concerns from military planning, they turned inward, focusing almost exclusively on technocratic, operational matters, with little interest in larger questions of strategy. Instead, they would be the functional instruments of a larger policy, the military experts who correctly implemented operations on behalf of a strategy determined by others.

In many respects, this functional approach continued to define German attitudes to the developing partisan war in the USSR. Thus, German commanders generally emphasized four criteria for recognition of an enemy force as a proper combatant, subject to the rules of war:

1. the enemy force could not be a wild horde, but had to be subject to clear leadership;
2. they had to wear recognizable markings;
3. they had to carry their weapons openly; and
4. they had to uphold the laws and customs of war.

It was the violation of this last point by the partisans in the USSR, in particular, that rankled German military leaders, since according to Articles 42 and 43 of The Hague Convention the legal use of force in occupied areas rested with the occupying authority, while the civilian population had no inherent right of resistance. Indeed, the same convention provided for a "right of repression" in order to compel irregular forces and the occupied civilian population to abide by the rules of war. To this dubious "right" belonged hostage-taking and reprisal executions which, although they were supposed to be connected with specific atrocities committed by the enemy and governed by principles of proportionality, gave German commanders a sense of leeway and legitimacy in their actions.

Implicit in the German attitude was a curious sense of honor. German leaders viewed guerrillas as unworthy opponents since they defied the rules of proper combatant status, failed to fight "honestly" in the open, and relied on stealth, deception, surprise, and treachery. In contrast, German commanders believed themselves to be upholding the soldier's code against the forces of barbarism. Moreover, and this seemed a key consideration from the German point of view, in the vast expanse of the USSR they saw themselves as the beleaguered party, with the initiative lying with the partisans, who determined the nature and timing of their own actions. Army commanders in rear areas, charged with pacifying vast areas with inadequate forces, thus believed themselves caught in a spiral of action and reaction. Given the inherently inhumane nature of both Nazi and Soviet totalitarian systems, and the pervasive German preconception of the communist system as insidious, it was a short step to believing that overwhelming violence and retribution were the only means to deal with these alleged criminals. The Germans certainly acted harshly, but their harshness often seemed to stem from a cold and mechanical implementation of a previously established procedure.

From the *Wehrmacht*'s perspective, then, the particular virulence of the partisan war in the USSR resulted from the fact that the Soviet regime had unleashed an "illegal" war against German occupying authorities, that the partisans fought in a manner that violated the rules of war, and that their disregard for the laws and customs of war meant the partisans had no claim on any rights under the rules of war. In general, then, in their response to the escalating violence behind the front lines the Germans fought the partisans with a shocking harshness, but with a rationale different from that of the extermination commandos of the SS. *Wehrmacht* security divisions sought to stop certain actions of the enemy; the SS *Einsatzgruppen* aimed to eliminate whole categories of people arbitrarily deemed the enemy, regardless of their actions. In addition, the partisan war followed a markedly different trajectory, as initial restraint was succeeded by increasing cruelty in response to partisan actions, followed by an attempt by Army leaders on the spot to moderate the harshest measures, if only for pragmatic reasons of reducing partisan support among the local population.

The Army security divisions in the rear areas of the USSR, then, by and large responded to a partisan war that they saw as illegal with harsh but what they regarded as legally correct measures grounded in the "right of repression". Once the cycle of escalating partisan violence and savage German reprisals began, though, the guerrilla war whirled out of control in an upward spiral of brutality. In the occupied areas of the USSR, a domain of conflicting interests between military authorities, SS efforts to extend its power and influence, population and resettlement

policies of the Nazi Party, economic objectives, and a racial war of extermination, Army leaders had precious little influence on Hitler. The Army leadership thus chose to focus narrowly on front-line operations and the securing of the immediate rear areas of occupation, the latter a functional task that harkened back to the notions of *Volkskrieg* raised in the 1920s. The difference, of course, was that it was now those occupied by the Germans engaging in a radical new form of war in defense of their nations, not the Germans defending their own land. The result, though, was as predicted: a *Volkskrieg* of steadily escalating violence and brutality, a war of no rules that resulted in horrific destruction and loss of life.

Stephen G Fritz
East Tennessee State University
Author of *Ostkrieg: Hitler's War of Extermination in the East*
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011)

EDITOR'S PREFACE

In recent years, some of the most enduring interpretations of World War II have been subject to revision. Indeed, military historians are using innovative and often inter-disciplinary methods to answer original questions, and offer new perspectives in established debates. With advances in Holocaust studies and departures from the evidence presented at Nuremberg, this allows German occupation policies to be reconsidered. Conditions that were specific are separated from general circumstances in occupation campaigns. New background in German experience in suppressing rebellion in World War II is presented. With the understanding that Clausewitz saw defense as stronger than offense, it can be argued that this was behind a preference for conflicts of annihilation and destruction, particularly in dealing with rebellion. This Pocket Manual considers:

1. Background (1831–1932) from Clausewitz and experience up through World War I;
2. Doctrine (1933–1944) from what was available in N-S Germany; and
3. Practice (1942–1944) from specific examples, in this case by revisiting operational history in one tertiary theater: Yugoslavia, the Southeast Theater.

Central to this effort is the presentation of two German guerrilla war "classics" that have long been out of print or neglected. This includes the 1935 *Kleinkrieg* (Guerrilla War) by Arthur Ehrhardt and the 1944 *Bandenbekampfung* (Fighting the Guerrilla Bands) by *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*, the German Armed Forces High Command. Together these two publications show how guerrilla war was analyzed and how it evolved almost a decade later as military doctrine.

While small wars were not new, as Ehrhardt points out, how they can be fought by a modern industrial nation was still a question to be answered. One solution evolved in the German Armed Forces in World War II. Rediscovered and presented in English, these classics are made available to a new generation

of guerrilla and irregular war fighters in the West. They are presented as a counter-point to Casemate's previously published *Partisan Companion*.

These were edited for layout and style to make them readable to an English speaking audience (that is, the translations were modified rather than the original text). For example, *Umlauts* for A (a), O (o), U (u) are indicated by an added e. Documentation reflects the notes in the German edition, expanded with informational material, but not checked for accuracy or completeness (Ehrhardt in particular cited sources that are obscure to today's US soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines). Another style artifice is that participants are referred to in the text by their full name at first reference, while most commenters or authorities have their last name used alone. The text was prepared with the help of library of the US Army Heritage and Education Center, the US Marine Corps University Gray Research Center, and the Library of Congress. US Marine Corps History Division intern Jeffrey M Horton worked on the transcription, translation, and comments, along with Douglas E Nash, Sr, while John P Moore provided Ehrhardt's service record. Additional advice and support came from Dr Nicholas Schlosser, Dr. Wray R Johnson, Dr Bruce Gudmundsson, Dr Andrew J Birtle, and Dr Frank L Kalesnik. The editorial expertise of Casemate's Steven Smith, Tara Lichterman, and Libby Braden is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks also to the Casemate UK team of Hannah McAdams, Mette Bundgaard, and Clare Litt for making a manuscript into a book.

Portions of the introduction and afterword were previously published in the peer-reviewed *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* and the *Journal of Strategic & Military Sudies*.[1] Ehrhardt's publication had no illustrations while the *OKW Merkblatt* 69/2 had the diagrams which are reproduced. The illustrations provided here were adapted from contemporary N-S police and military (*Polizei* and *Jagdeinheiten*) orders and directives and are the best quality available. These are used with permission by Paladin Press, Boulder, Colorado. All new artwork is created by visual information specialist W Stephen Hill, Hill Design. Photographs courtesy of the US Army and the Imperial War Museum.

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CHAPTER 1

GERMAN COUNTERINSURGENCY REVISITED

"Against an open foe fight with chivalry,but to a guerrilla extend no quarter."

German Tactical Doctrine[2]

Wars great and small

By way of underlying concepts: regular (external) war is between nations using the entire spectrum of the people, army and state; in irregular (internal) war some parties are neither independent states or state sponsored actors. This can be in the case of rebellion against a foreign occupying power. This can also be conflicts within a nation such as with revolution or civil wars. Regular and irregular conflicts can take place together, separately, or even on a sliding scale. I would add that subversion, sabotage, terrorism, partisan or guerrilla fighting are techniques and are not ends in themselves. All were regarded by Clausewitz as tactics and the ultimate school of the soldier.[3]

To begin the discussion the old fashioned way, I will "name the parts" using terms of 70 years ago or earlier, to keep the perspective of participants. A German view of the nature of guerrilla warfare is needed before dealing with the topic of how they countered resistance during the course of World War II. Of note, is that the term guerrilla war was defined as *Kleinkrieges*, *Kleinerkrieg*, or small war. This could either involve partisan (*Partisanen*) or people's (*Volks*) warfare, one involving the support to military actions, the other being political in nature.[4] With clear aims, small war assisted political and military struggles and hindered an enemy's war effort "through military subsidiary actions" particularly during long conflicts or periods of social upheaval.[5] The means by which guerrillas

succeeded was through tying down enemy forces; destroying their supplies, transport, and communications; eliminating collaborators; and supporting conventional military "reconnaissance, intelligence, and espionage." Success depended upon small units, independently deployed, but with a central command or common goal. Considered was that guerrilla war was waged in stages dependent upon the strength of the opposing forces, the terrain, and the support of the population. This would begin with "passive resistance" and end with a "general uprising."[6] According to German field service regulations, the response against enemy partisan parties operating in the rear area was that: "they should be surrounded and destroyed. Detailed mopping-up in the rear area may be necessary, but stronger forces are usually required for this."[7] The focus on military or "kinetic" efforts was a historic characteristic of the German approach.

I argue that Clausewitz's supposition that defense (including so-called people's war) was stronger than offense was behind a German preference for annihilation or destruction, particularly in dealing with resistance or rebellion.[8] Because all available force would be used for the main effort or attack, security in the rear was left to minimal supporting troops who relied on extreme measures to insure order and clear lines of communication. To analyze this, German sources of doctrine were reviewed, along with revisiting operational history in a tertiary arena: Yugoslavia, the German Southeast Theater, and the example of the 7th Prinz Eugen SS-Mountain Division. Of note is that Bennett used the Southeast experience as a case in point ("which is worth describing in more detail as an example"), while Lieb thought the situation there to be to fraught with contradictions ("it involved too many players").[9] This intricacy is present in the complex insurgencies of the current day. Advances in holocaust studies and departures from evidence presented at Nuremburg allow German occupation policies to be reconsidered.[10] The former Allies have now had more than a half century of their own experience with revolutionary wars and counterinsurgency campaigns since the end of World War II to draw upon for perspective.[11]

With these terms and concepts in mind, how did they relate to the German suppression of rebellion in occupied territories during World War II? As such, I propose to discuss first the background from Clausewitz through the World War, then the doctrine that was available in Nazi Germany, and finally the practice from examples in Yugoslavia. To some extent, my focus is more on "what" rather than "who, when, or where". I have used "reverse engineering" to understand final doctrine and experience rather than strict chronological development. Provided was a tool to consider specific cases of internal conflict during the present "global" war. This gave a number of relevant conclusions for further discussion.

War by detachments

As with most German military thought and practice, it helps to start with Clausewitz, a Prussian officer and thinker more appreciated in later years than in his own time.[12] *On War* contains an interesting chapter about "The People in Arms" that dealt with the subject of small wars.[13] For Clausewitz this was based on examples from North America, Vendee, Tyrol, Silesia, and particularly the French occupation of Spain, the source of the terms small war, partisan, and guerrilla (the Russian campaign was not long enough for an insurgency to emerge though partisans were used).[14] It was in conflicts between regular and irregular "detachments" that small wars were won or lost. While partisan was the preferred name for detached troops, guerrilla (*guerillero*) also meant a bandit fighter (*Bandenkaempfer*) and referred to the enemy. This ambiguity of "ends and means" or "guerrilla and counter-guerrilla" was a thread that continued through subsequent German thought and actions.

According to Clausewitz, for resistance to succeed or "be effective," conflicts had to be fought in the interior of the country; not dependent upon a single successful engagement; the area of operations had to be fairly large; the terrain must be relatively inaccessible (forests, marshes, or mountains); and the population's "national character must be suited to this type of war."[15] Along with strengths ("resistance will exist everywhere and nowhere"), the physical and psychological vulnerabilities of these irregular forces were also considered. Resistance failed if fighters concentrated in populated areas, if the guerrillas assumed fixed positions, if too many regular troops were with the partisans, if the bands were inactive, or suffered from inordinate fear of being captured and killed.

In the cited chapter, Clausewitz attempted to describe the problem but not the solution. Clausewitz, of course, was making an argument for the people in arms (People's War), rather than prescribing the suppression of rebellions and uprisings by conquered populations. To counter threats in the rear, conventional forces in Clausewitz's time used escorts to protect convoys, as well as guards on bridges, defiles, and stopping points. Well established practices existed that dealt with the suppression of rebellious populations regardless of intellectual theory.[16] Population centers were garrisoned, "or even looted and burned down as punishment." If resistance increased, larger forces were involved in this security effort.[17] Occupation forces could be significantly weakened by losses of men and material to protect lines of communications with garrisons or detachments, and containing rebellion centers or borders. This explains the German preference for total destruction in the practice of security campaigns. According to Paret and Shy, modern tasks for countering irregular forces were to defeat militarily the irregular force (partisans or guerrillas) of whatever size, to separate the irregulars

from the population, to maintain social order and governance authority.[18] The Germans historically focused on these with a vengeance.

To Citino, the "German way of war" called for "short and lively" and "total" campaigns fought through the violent encirclement of the enemy, at times by equal or smaller sized German forces. Moves to the flanks and rear promoted confusion and opportunities that the Germans benefited from and their opponents did not. The aim was the quick annihilation of the enemy's forces because the Prussians, then the Germans, could not afford to wage drawn out wars of attrition. Citino defined this as a preference for maneuver rather than positional warfare. In practice, this applied to irregular as well as conventional opponents.[19] The German Great General Staff (*Grossgeneralstab*) also believed the customs of warfare on land allowed for the relatively off-hand execution of irregular fighters without trial.[20] In this, the German armed forces insisted they were within their legal rights, although Hull considered it to be founded on a military culture of "absolute destruction" inherent in Imperial Germany.[21]

The German way

German anti-guerrilla methods began with the formation of the German Second Empire and the German-French War (1870–1871). While the French army was defeated in three months, some quarter of the German troops were left guarding their rear areas against French guerrillas (*Franctireur, Freischaerler*). This led to German demands at subsequent Hague conferences that hostage taking and execution by occupying powers were allowed, as well as the summary killing of captured "irregulars," confiscations, and fines. Colonial practice took place in China (1900–1901), Southwest Africa (1904–1906), and East Africa (1905–1907) with a lack of restraint that European conflicts appeared to have. A similar "scorched earth" approach to small wars was seen in other European and American examples.[22] These actions were further developed in World War I (1914–1918) in response to resistance real or imagined as German forces moved through Belgium to attack France. The German occupation of the Ukraine provided a short-lived example of the needs of an occupying power for an effective counterinsurgency campaign against communist resistance.[23] Also during the World War, General Paul E von Lettow-Vorbeck's effort in Africa was a masterful instance of successful small wars campaigning based upon German colonial experience.

With perceived betrayal at home, war in the rear loomed large in the German psyche. Despite humanitarian and legal criticism, the German approach to suppressing resistance carried over into the volunteer corps (*Freikorps*) containment of upheaval in Germany proper in the post-war period where the methods used abroad worked domestically as

well. Later Order Police and Armed Forces continued these practices. This was convoluted by political and military concerns in a seemingly unique fashion in the Third Reich that saw existing beliefs and doctrine amplified by the prism of National Socialism with victims pre-selected based upon ideology. Gutmann felt that a belief that European culture and civilization were under threat from Anglo-American liberalism and Soviet bolshevism, with the broader fascist faith in the regenerative qualities of violence, motivated the German severe response to any resistance.[24] But Bennett observed Imperial *Schrecklichkeit* and Nazi *Abschreckung* were the same policies, "which could only succeed if backed by overwhelming force" and, with hindsight, responding to perceived rather than actual threats.[25] Modern scholarship recognized that this was across the spectrum of the people, army, as well as state and not just limited to isolated elements of society.[26] Included was a broad definition of the measures used to suppress dissent – basically accepting that the power of life and death resided with the state alone.[27]

Experience was gained in 1923, with resistance to French occupation in the Ruhr. In 1928, the War Ministry called for similar action in the future. A 1932–33 police manual (*Polizeifibel*) discussed open and urban terrain techniques to deal with "partisans, insurgents, and rebellious rioters and dissidents." These were based on encirclement and splitting or compressing the resulting cordons.[28] The same techniques and procedures were used by the SS (*Schutztaffel)* and Higher Police first internally then externally. Army High Command field service regulations (*Truppenfuehrung*) of 1933–1934 considered partisan or small war to be "combat under special conditions" the same as fighting in cities, forests, mountains, crossing rivers, and at night or in fog. This was by exception and to be avoided if possible. Small scale military raiding parties conducted these operations on the enemy's front, flank, and rear in support of a military main effort.[29]

Thus Arthur Ehrhardt entered the discussion in 1935 when his book was first published as *Kleinkreig* (literally small wars but used here as guerrilla war).[30] The US Army Command and Staff School was interested in this topic enough to have it translated from German into English in 1936.[31] Laqueur believed that this was a contribution worth noting about the theory and practice of guerrilla war and terrorism in the modern era when he wrote:

> Ehrhardt was almost the only German author in the interwar period to concern himself with the prospects of guerrilla warfare in modern conditions. He pointed out that aircraft and motorized columns would make for armies being able to advance far more rapidly than ever before. But this meant that their supply lines would be much more extended and that the advancing units

> would be infinitely more dependent on supplies, above all of fuel, ammunition and spare parts. Long and vulnerable supply lines would be an obvious target for enemy partisans. Ehrhardt also calculated that the average modern airplane was much too fast to be of help in combating guerrillas and that special aircraft would be needed for this purpose. He envisioned the possibility of enemy partisans landing in the German rear, and of motorized guerrilla units. He even weighed the potential use of chemical weapons by guerrillas, or in the fight against them, but dismissed this as impractical. These however, were only the views of an outsider, the German military command remained uninterested: among the hundreds of books and the thousands of articles on military topics published in the 1920s or 1930s one looks in vain for any serious discussion of guerrilla warfare.[32]

Arthur Ehrhardt was born 21 March 1896 in Hammers, Thuringia. He was described as a German officer, military writer, translator, and political activist. He graduated from gymnasium in 1910 and then trained as a school teacher. He was also active in the Free German Youth and Boy Scout movements. Eighteen years old when World War I began, he served with Bavarian Infantry Regiment 19 of the Imperial German Army. He ended the war a reserve lieutenant, a company commander, and had been wounded in action six times.

After the war in 1919, he taught elementary school in Coburg. Ehrhardt was also involved in the effort to deal with the various external and internal conflicts in the turbulent post-war period in Germany. This led to *Reichswehr* service between 1919 and 1932 for the training and arming of units of the *Freikorps*, *Stahlhelm*, *Bund der Frontsoldaten*, and the *Sturmabteilung* (SA). As these organizations consolidated and merged, Ehrhardt joined *SA Standarte 81* and served on the eastern border until the murder of SA leader Ernst Rohm in 1934 led to dissatisfaction with the regime. It is not clear if he was a Nazi party member. Ingrao would comment: "In any case, while holding a party card did not neccesarily mean that one was a political fanatic, we have to admit that not having one did not imply – far from it – any absence of support for Nazi anti-semitism. In short, belonging or not to the *NSDAP* is not a definitive criterion, unless it is set back in the context of these men's entire activist career."[33]

Ehrhardt then worked for the publisher Ludwig Voggenreiter in Potsdam as a translator and editor of the so-called "grey" library with the military writings of JFC Fuller, Basil Liddle Hart, Charles de Gaulle, and even George C Marshall. In 1935, he published the first edition of *Kleinkrieg*. In it he examined the background of what was known as small wars from the German perspective and experience with guerrillas and partisans. But these insights were largely ignored as the *Wehrmacht* was established and expanded.

Photograph reproduced courtesy of the US Army (317962)

Ehrhardt based his examination on the evidence he had at hand from the past and contemporary experience. The examples of guerrilla warfare analyzed ranged from the campaigns in Spain and Prussia, through the 1870 and 1914 campaigns in France and Belgium. Further afield were incidents in the Balkans and Russia. From these, speculation as to the impact on future operations were provided that have been played out in conflicts since the 1940s.34 While capable in many places of using "academic voice," Ehrhardt did not refrain from editorializing, for example the section on Belgium, or lionizing, as in the section on the Prussians against Napoleon, in manner that can distract from his analysis.

Ehrhardt continues to be of interest and value to practitioners of insurgency and counter-insurgency. He examined what in today's special warfare would be called unconventional warfare and direct action missions. In the 1930s and 1940s, there was no dichotomy that modern counter insurgency discussions have regarding the difference between commando-raider-ranger small units behind-the-lines actions and the activities of partisan bands or popular uprisings against occupying or invading forces. And where would irregular forces or warfare, however defined, fit into this conversation? Ehrhardt addressed both insurgency and its counter in his discussion as neither took place in a vacuum.[35] The context in which this book was

written – by a German, in the interwar period, with a publisher that had links to the N-S government – was taken into account.

During World War II, Ehrhardt was with the *Abwehr*, or the intelligence service of the *Wehrmacht*. He served in Southeast Europe as a captain when the new edition of *Kleinkrieg* was published in 1942. He was transferred to the *Waffen*-SS with similar duties and was promoted to major (of interest is that this occurred prior to the dissolution of the *Abwehr* with the 20 July assassination attempt on Hitler). He was considered an expert in "bandit fighting" at Himmler and Hitler's headquarters. A final edition of *Kleinkrieg* came out in 1944, as he worked with the SS and Armed Forces to develop native resistance forces in occupied German territory. The war's end witnessed his effort with the stillborn underground movement.[36]

CHAPTER 2

KLEINKRIEG: LESSONS FROM THE PAST AND POSSIBILITIES OF THE FUTURE

Kleinkrieg: Geschichlich Erfahrungen und Moglichkeitnen

By Arthur Ehrhardt

Translated from the German by the US Army Command and General Staff School (Registry Number 61656).[37]

Ehrhardt's preface to the 1935 edition

In recent years – due to our still very unfavorable military political situation – the slogans about "popular uprisings being the last means of expressing a nation's will to resist" and that "guerrilla war is the means used by the weak against the strong as a way of continuing the struggle" have been repeatedly thrown around. To accept such slogans without careful consideration is dangerous for such a serious issue. The following analysis therefore seeks to clarify these terms and will attempt to show both the chances of its success as well as the limits on the conduct of guerrilla warfare.

Our work in this rather arcane field of study has been comprehensively supported by well-known experts. I would like to take this opportunity to thank them again. In particular, I would like to express my respectful thanks to Herr General Hugo Kerchnawe of Vienna for his critical help.

Ehrhardt's preface to the 1942 edition

As this second edition goes to print, a vast defensive battle is still raging in the East, while at the same time guerrilla warfare-like conditions exist throughout vast sections of the rear area, forcing both our leadership and men to face difficult challenges.

This edition, of course, cannot yet provide the lessons for those who want to study the experience of combatting guerrilla warfare in the East. Additionally, the experiences of waging counter-guerrilla warfare in the Balkans can only be recorded and carried out after the final victory is complete and will be presented in a second volume. A rounded, comprehensive depiction of guerrilla warfare from the early 19th Century until the day of our final victory will then be completed as the fruit of joint work.

It is expected that the conclusions, lessons and suggestions of the first volume will not dramatically change in the interim.

Ehrhardt's preface to the 1944 edition

This third edition provides no substantial changes. May this little book continue to provide useful service!



Map 1: Kleinkrieg locations addressed in the text, 1808 to 1921. (WS Hill)

Ehrhardt's introduction

Guerrilla warfare is conceded to be the form of warfare which must be used by weak forces against an adversary too strong to face in the usual manner. A simple definition of the term guerrilla warfare is hardly possible since the distinction between accompanying actions with large operations and actual guerrilla warfare are often hazy, especially when we have to do with combats beyond the front lines of an army. In most cases, however, we can classify combat operations behind the front, as 1) assaults carried out by small forces against the flanks of an army and 2) defense action against such assaults, as guerrilla action.

As a distinguishing characteristic, it may be further stated that guerrilla warfare requires great craftiness, cunning, caution and secrecy, but that, however, extreme tenacity of purpose and reckless bravery are required at times. All this is demanded, of course, by every country and of all its soldiers, but it is especially to be emphasized in the definition of the concept of guerrilla warfare.

The field of activity of guerrilla warfare is very extensive, covering security of one's own troops, billeting places, camps and roads; the harassing of the enemy's flanks and especially his rear lines of communication; the delaying of the movements of superior enemy forces especially in border defense action and lastly, and the most difficult of these missions, resistance of the enemy in territory already seized by him. In view of the great difficulty of these missions, it may be seen why they were left to elite troops, for more than a century.

It is, therefore, quite untrue, that such missions can be assigned to poorly led and equipped forces. And yet it is true that guerrilla warfare, that type of warfare whose demands in the case of each individual involved are so extremely exacting, has often been the last recourse of a poorly armed nation whose existence appeared threatened.

It has always been, therefore, the last desperate recourse, when the army organization of the threatened nation was too poorly developed to give the best form to nation's will to resist, namely, that of efficient well trained armies. Experience has proven that as a tactical form for such uprisings of the people, guerrilla warfare is always better suited than the assembling of untrained bodies of men into great, unwieldy units.

Hurriedly assembled armies frequently go to pieces of their own accord as the result of harmful, internal friction and as a rule, are valueless for combat purposes. History shows a great number of wars, however, which although fought by poorly armed and untrained men, nevertheless had a successful termination. If circumstances are favorable, such insurrections of the people can succeed in wresting victory from a vastly superior foe, by the methods of guerrilla warfare.

Guerrilla warfare has proven itself to be more than a tactical form adapted to national insurrections. Regular forces proved themselves to be even more successful in their operations, as far back as the Napoleonic era.

Behrenthorst's[38] well-known statement that Napoleon had put an end to guerrilla warfare cannot, therefore be accepted as unqualifiedly true. As evidence of this, let us cite the very effective work of the combat forces under Thielmann, Tschernitscheff, Marwitz and Colomb[39] in the German War of Freedom,[40] the events in Italy in 1848, in 1849 in Hungary and experiences on secondary fronts during the World War.

A series of unquestioned victories were won in guerrilla operations over adversaries who, in the matter of equipment and numbers were far superior.

Actual final victory, however, could be obtained only in those rare cases where the nature of the terrain and the particularly good political relationships worked to the advantage of the partisan forces. In addition to this, we are impressed by the fact that in all ages, guerrilla warfare has aroused in both ignorant and visionary men who either balked at the strict discipline of the army or the harsh experiences of war, the most exaggerated of hope. But in spite of this, it would be a mistake to disregard its possibilities and reject completely a type of warfare, merely as a matter of principle, which many cases has been proven effective and, in desperate cases, indispensable.

The very sober judgment of an expert, Lieutenant Colonel Albrecht Karl von Boguslawski, makes the true statement: "There is not even one category of war which can be neglected without paying the consequences. Any army which refuses to consider guerrilla warfare, either through principle or indifference, when confronted by another army which is practiced and versed in it soon has reason to notice the disadvantage with which it is working and the degree to which its movements are hampered."[41]

How advantageous is it, on the other hand, after forces have mastered this type of fighting also, was shown in Italy in 1848 when the Austrians suppressed the guerrilla operations of the Italians in very short order, although circumstances favored the latter. Major General Hugo Kerchnawe[42] assured the author that the excellent manual, *Guerrilla Warfare* which was published in 1840 on the recommendation of Radetzky,[43] contributed materially to the success. Also according to him, the Austrian army was the only one which possessed such a manual. We also should remember that Clausewitz[44] by no means minimizes the effectiveness of a resolutely conducted guerrilla warfare which skillfully creates its own mode of action. Above all we should not forget our duty, we should not forget that in an extremity it may be imperative to leave nothing undone that would assist in one's defense for "There will be plenty of time left in which to die and since it is a natural impulse for a drowning man to grab at a straw, it is

a matter of the natural order of the moral world that a people should try its only possible means of rescue when it finds itself forced to the edge of the abyss. No matter how small and weak a state may be in comparison with its enemy, it must not fail to make these last efforts or it will be said of it, 'There is no more life in it.'"

In addition to this, many things of recent years, especially the final events of the World War and the events of the following years, impel us to the serious study of the results that may be expected from guerrilla warfare and the dangers inherent in it. If it is true that the end of a war determines mostly the forms of combat with which the next war will begin, the fact seems worth considering, that on many of the fronts, the World War ended with many bitter and stubbornly contested clashes between small forces. Besides, guerrilla action has played a surprisingly important role in all war developments since 1918.

In the second part of this study, we speak briefly of the supposed causes of the phenomenon before attempting a study of the possible forms which the guerrilla warfare of the future may assume. Our first task, however shall be to call to mind a few lessons from the past and in this, we shall confine ourselves to the appraisal of a number of important events of guerrilla warfare in the 19th and 20th centuries. Particular attention will be given in these studies to the guerrilla activities in Spain, the partisan activities in the War of Freedom, the activities of French bands and partisans in the rear of the German army in 1870–1871; lastly, various events of guerrilla warfare from the Balkan campaign of our own times and a few experiences from the World War. And even though these latter cases offer us little in the way of profit, still we should guard against drawing false conclusions with regard to the future. The World War brought about developments in more than on respect which probably also came to an end with it. Future campaigns will give greater freedom of action for the development of guerrilla warfare. This supposition is based, as we have already mentioned, on the last events of the war, on the last activities and employment of those masses of men and equipment. It will be more firmly established further on.

Guerrillas, 1808–1813

The Spanish and Portuguese word "guerrilla" has become a concept. It signifies the tactically correct form which a popular uprising assumes and which is able to off-set, to a very large extent, the military superiority of regular troops.

The history of war is unable to report any other such magnificent victories of guerrilla warfare. The greatest military power of that time, the most capable leaders, the genius of Napoleon,[45] in fact, was not able to bring the poorly armed and in part, poorly led partisans of the Iberian Peninsula to their knees.



Figure 1: Some fundamental small war concepts for the offense (1a, b, c, d, e, f). Deployment used for assault and raid operation (1g, h, i). Deployment used for defense and delaying operations (1j, k, l). (Polizei)

(f)


Surrounding the enemy
River

(g)


Assault from deployment for movement

(h)


Position of readiness for assault
Reserve

(i)



(j)



(k)



(l)



(Continued)

After stubborn fighting, the conquerors were obliged to abandon the country when in the rest of Europe, the desire for freedom occasioned uprisings which eventually brought about the liberation of the peoples involved. The heavy sacrifices of the French and, unfortunately, of the German regiments which were aiding them, had been in vain. Of over 670,000 men and 520 cannon which had crossed the Pyrenees into Spain, but 250,000 men and 250 cannon returned. The peninsula had become a grave for entire armies. No nation probably ever gained such great victories with such miserable resources. The glory of the accomplishments cannot be dimmed by the assistance given them by the English, effective as it was.

Hence, the history of the Spanish War of Liberation is a source of very valuable information with respect to the factors involved in guerrilla warfare and the possibilities of this type of operations. In our examination of the subject, we follow the reports of an expert, the Prussian Colonel Andreas Berthold von Schepeler, who lived in that period.[46] He shows to us the valuable services rendered, the inside occurrences and general lessons which were learned during those bloody years, with especial clarity. Thoroughly and clearly, with the certainty of an experiment, these events reveal to us the prerequisites without which it would have been impossible for the people to resist with such glorious success.

Clausewitz has already called attention to the fact that guerrilla warfare can succeed only in the case of nations with a burning will for freedom, unquenchable love of battle, extreme hardihood and the power of accommodation to any circumstances. We can easily imagine that in making these utterances he had in his mind the guerrilla activities in Spain, for, in very truth, these people possessed all these qualities to a greater degree than almost any other people.

A burning will for freedom animated peasants and burgers, the impoverished clergy and, in part, the nobility who had an additional reason for revolting, caring more for their position than the nation.[47] An unconditional and boundless desire for freedom took possession of Spanish hearts as hundreds of striking instances show. The way this desire for freedom is expressed at times, strikes one as being almost childish. When in 1808, they became excited at Murat's[48] proclamation; a burger heard that the French demanded the abdication of the hereditary king and the payment of a large sum of money. On being assured by a bystander of whom he had made enquiry, of the truth of the rumor, he seized a knife and, running out into the street, wounded every Frenchman he met. When brought into court, he stated naively, that he believed it was the duty of every Spaniard to do likewise and kill as many Frenchmen as possible.[49]

The unrestrained and unbounded will of the Spaniards to defend themselves against the foreign yoke with knives, fists and teeth, was able

to obtain a brilliant victory in the siege of Saragossa and in the wild street fighting connected with it. It will be profitable for us to study this briefly, for at this time for the first time in the Spanish war, the suffering of the people manifested itself in a wild and universal frenzy. The results of the first siege of Saragossa, show plainly enough what demoniacal and resistless forces engendered by hate, blood lust and unyielding defiance existed to maintain resistance for years, in spite of all reversals.

The sequence of events was as follows. In June, 1808, the French general, Lefebvre[50], headed for Aragon with the view of subduing the province. After certain initial successes, the French approached the capital city, Saragossa, the seat of General Palafox,[51] leader of the King's faithful. The situation of Saragossa was desperate, but not in the eyes of the Spaniards! The city was open and no preparations had been made for defense, von Schepeler reports. It was surrounded only by weak garden walls and the gates were of no value except for police purposes. There were no officers schooled in the arts of defense. Two artillery lieutenants and one engineer were the only ones whose technical knowledge was of any help. On top of all this the engineer was seized by the excited peasants as he was looking over the possibilities of defense, given cudgeling and lodged in prison. The commandant of the city was an object of hatred; the higher officers of this staff were regarded as traitors. In short, conditions appeared proper for precluding all possibilities of success.

But in spite of all this, not a person thought of capitulation, everyone was feverishly preparing for defense. It is true that defense preparations went forward in dreadful confusion, yet when the test came, proved in part to be quite proper. It should be particularly emphasized that not much thought was given to the construction of trenches in the direction of the approach of the enemy. Here the people planned rather to stop him with knives, stones, clubs, muskets and a few ancient cannon.

Through correct impulse or as the result of experience in earlier minor battles in the province, the insurrectionists took pains to protect the rear approaches of the city so strongly with trenches that a detour by the enemy and an attack from the rear could easily be warded off. This greatest danger for the unskilled and poorly led defenders was thus averted.

The French anticipated no difficulties. They counted fully on a brilliant entry into the open city. In fact they had neglected all measures for security in their march. But as their columns approached Saragossa in parade formation, they were greeted by a charge of shrapnel from a cannon located under the arch of the city gate. The French quickly recovered from this first surprise, and deployed to attack the city from the west side. They shot the city gate to pieces and fought desperately to force an entrance into the place. But the stubbornness of the Spaniards and gun fire from adjoining houses drove the

French back. A sudden and skilfully executed flanking movement against the Spaniard's rear also failed. The hard headed burgers and peasants knew nothing of flank attacks or the danger of being cut off from the rest of their comrades and the valor of the French made no impression on them as long as they were able to see walls about them.

The Carmen and Portillo gates were threatened from the rear, but none of the Spaniards who were fighting there retreated, although the thought: "We are being licked by farmers!," made the French wild. After a few hours, the Spaniard's ammunition played out. No one had so much as thought of giving any orders about the matter. But women and children hurried to supply the need. Some brought powder from the magazine and others hurried from house to house collecting nails and old iron for shrapnel. Still others cut up articles of clothing brought to make shrapnel bags or cannon wadding. Women of all classes brought refreshments to the fighters, wine and water. The poor classes were especially noticeable, offering their small supplies of bread, cheese and nuts.

A last attack in the evening was repulsed with the same wild spirit. The insurrectionists had won. The French withdrew at all points. This day's victory was of great significance. It showed the country at large what can be accomplished by a determined will to fight even against battle seasoned troops. Schepeler is right in regarding this as the starting point of many heroic deeds of later years.

Even in the siege which followed the first unfortunate assault, we are repeatedly amazed at the way the people were able to off-set pitiful lack of armament, training, and above all leadership by the ardor of their sacrificial spirit coupled with a sort of mad bravery. And really, both leadership and training were unbelievably bad. In the midst of the battle, "the alcaldes and city deputies informed Calvo, a subordinate officer (assuring him at the same time of their own trustworthiness), that the people had no confidence in the town lieutenant, Colonel Bustamente." The tactful Calvo experienced considerable difficulty in avoiding a mutiny and saving his superior officer from death at the hands of the mob and succeeded only by promising to counter-sign all orders issued by the colonel.

At a time when matters were in the terrible states, General Palafox, the leader of the revolting Aragonese, left the city "to get reinforcements" without the people's being in the least disheartened by this peculiar interpretation of his duty as a leader. Time and again, they gained breathing spells for themselves by some foolhardy deed of daring, stealing cannon by night out of the enemy's lines, capturing runners and lone cavalrymen in a sort of commando operation called by themselves "*hombres esforzados*" and engaging in combat in the open. To be sure, they were always beaten in these latter encounters, as was to be expected; yet the French were never able to gain any permanent advantage from their victories.

None of the numerous cases of open treason on the part of high officials, no failures or defeats however great were able to break their will to resist. Let us hear what von Schepeler says: "A great disaster, which usually would result in capitulation in the case of fortified works was very bad for the defenders. On 22 June, a powder cart caught fire. Its explosion cost the lives of several men." Shortly afterward "the whole magazine went up. The detonation was terrific. The whole of the city of Saragossa was shaken and smoke and dust shut out the light of the sun. The inhabitants rushed from their houses and stared at one another pale and trembling till they learned what had happened. But thoughts of the enemy were uppermost in their minds and it seemed the news of what had happened gave them strength to enquire: 'Have we any more powder?' Haste was made to remove the wounded."

With the information that there was still plenty of powder, all was quiet again. The ruins were still smoking and flames were bursting up from them from time to time, when early in the morning of 28 June the French made a general attack accompanied by the fire of a battery from the castle, which had already been taken. They were soon convinced by the violent resistance of the Aragonese, however, that their courage had not been weakened by the unfortunate event of the preceding day.

Neither were they any more discouraged on 30 June by a bombardment with incendiary bombs. While the men prepared to repel the assault, "women, children and old men took over the task of the former occupants of the houses and when the French finally penetrated into the streets, many were the acts of heroism and many died the death of martyrs." On several occasions French assaults broke when this last line of resistance was reached.

Tirelessly, especially by night, guerrilla attacks continued in the environs of the city, interfering with the French supply lines, with fords and bridges and with the movement of lesser French forces. The Spaniards worked ceaselessly in the city reconstructing barricades and trenches destroyed by French gun fire and by means of ruthless demolition created fields of fire for themselves and turned every house into a fortress. On several occasions the French broke their way completely into the city in assault attacks but each time after a bitter and bloody fight, their actual gain was very small.

The lack of powder continued to grow more serious. On every hand, as enquiry was made by the leaders concerning the ammunition supply, the courageous reply was heard: "It won't make any difference. We will work more with the bayonets!" But in spite of this, in the long run, the lack of powder would have won over courage.

But at this point, the reinforcements which had assembled in the province came hurrying, made great rejoicings, into the corpse littered and smoking ruins of the city. During the night between 13 and 14 July, they forced

the exhausted French to lift the siege and begin their retreat, followed and hemmed about by raging guerrilla fighters.

Von Schepeler rightly places the name of Saragossa alongside those of Numantia and Sagunt and is of the belief that no living people can claim the glory of an equal deed of valor. "This defense was not accomplished by regular soldiers. Peasants and burgers who knew nothing of the rules of the art which condemns such an exploit, undertook the task and carried it to a successful conclusion. It was a task which was necessary, in order that the Spaniards might be shown what could be accomplished by their stubbornness and their will not to be conquered."

We admire the same reckless fighting spirit on innumerable occasions during the years which followed. We may suppose that the war was conducted later on with far less casualties than occurred among the bloody ruins of Saragossa, because the partisans gradually learned to take advantage not only of their terrain but they learned to employ their particular form of combat to the best advantage.

Of the host of wonderful accomplishments we shall mention but a few, from which tactical lessons of lasting value may be learned. At the same time that Saragossa was throwing discredit on all rules of siege conduction, the inhabitants of Jaca were demonstrating the principles of combat on secondary fronts. This city was situated at the only good pass leading from France to the revolting province of Aragon and for this reason the guerrillas assumed the protection of the frontier against the powerful French army which threatened on the other side of the mountains with all its equipment and forces. The leader of the Spaniards, Marin, had nothing but miserably armed peasants at his disposal, while across the border in France, more and more regular troops were being collected. But in spite of this disadvantage, Marin not only prevented the early invasion of the enemy, but took the initiative with his own forces in France. His guerrillas threw all peace offers to the wind, made deep incursions into the enemy's territory, took prisoners, seized whole herds of grazing cattle and blocked the pass far more effectively by their reckless action, than they would have been able to by means of resistance alone. "One of the most important events of this guerrilla war was the destruction of the French iron works at Urdous, three miles from the border. The Spaniards, though numerically inferior, acted with such boldness and their operations were so well planned, that they overpowered the French guards and destroyed everything before the French could assemble and drive them out. Five warehouses, all other buildings, machines, etc., were burned and the Spaniards carried much valuable booty back as supplies for their own army. Although attacked by the French on the way back, they held them off till all their booty was safely across the border." The manner in which the Jaca guerrillas discharged their task can be taken as an example of the correct means of defending a frontier, that is, by carrying out repeated attacks on the threatening enemy.

In connection with this account, we state the tactical lesson to be deduced from it: namely that all attempts to hold terrain by defense tactics alone, by means of technically faultless cordons of guards – we should call it delaying action today, are practically always doomed to failure. It is not at all strange that French picket lines proved utterly worthless for blocking off a revolting province, since the insurrectionists had the advantage of being acquainted with the terrain. It was not hard for them, therefore, to slip through the guard lines at night, or to overpower the guards. But the remarkable fact is, that guerrilla guard lines established by regular Spanish officers in agreement with the tactical plans in vogue at that time, were penetrated and destroyed without exception and without great difficulties whenever the French made a resolute attack on them. But in contrast with this, the guerrillas were invincible whenever they were permitted to fight independently without being hampered by some system foreign to their nature and the material at their disposal, that is, free to travel about in small bands versed in every sort of cunning and masters of their own terrain.

In the Franco-Spanish border war, the energetic and clever French general, Suchet,[52] was busy for many months, for instance, trying to put an end to guerrilla attacks, opening passes time and again and maintaining at least partially successful lines of communication with France. This necessitated the withdrawal of large forces from operations in the interior of the country and yet, in spite of it, the mountains often remained impassable for weeks, for weaker units, transportation units or couriers. The attempt to block the frontiers by regular guard lines would doubtless not have succeeded nearly so well with regular Spanish regiments or improvised formations as by means of the bands of the stubborn leaders, Miguel Sarasa, Juan Martin, and innumerable others who were really nothing but daring robbers without military schooling. It was the guerrillas who made all operations so terribly difficult and who neutralized every victory won in battle by their pernicious work in connection with the supply lines. No unaccompanied mounted officer, no supply, baggage or ammunition train, no courier was safe from them. They were a constant menace even in the immediate environs of garrisons. The French scarcely had time to gain a breathing spell and return to their quarters after a successful sortie before they were again virtually in a state siege, themselves. "A constant guerrilla war was waged about them. Red caps were seen from the beginning of the war to the end of it on hills and mountains and, where one of these caps appeared, the French might look for the enemy." They operated clear to the gates of Madrid and almost succeeded in a surprise on "Pepe bottles" himself, on "*Buddeljosef*,"[53] the hated king, the brother of Napoleon in the park of the royal residence. The difficulties of rationing the army, maintaining its ammunition supplies, of evacuation of numberless sick and wounded, were

greatly multiplied and, especially for the common soldier, Spain became a regular hell.

All attempts to get control of the situation by cruel reprisals were unsuccessful and only resulted in inflaming the Spanish mind still more. It was utterly useless to nail captive partisans to the doors of their houses, to torture prisoners in frightful manners or hold women and children as hostages. Whole sections of the country crumbled in ashes and ruin. The guerrillas disappeared but reappeared as soon as the punitive forces turned their backs, and poured gun fire into their ranks from every hill. On several occasions strong formations barely succeeded in gaining the shelter of their garrison after a reprisal operation. Even on the march, battalions and larger formations were frequently attacked in favorable terrain, and had great difficulty in defending themselves. In judging the success of guerrillas, it must also be considered that their activities followed no regular plan of any sort and that they received virtually no support either from the Spanish generals or their allies the English. Doubtless, the guerrilla war would have been much more effective if the regular army had recognized its possibilities. But instead of this, victims of the tactical views of their time and full of the desire to fight battles, they attempted time and again to collect the men of the country into great bodies which they moved against the enemy in awkward columns. The result was almost without fail a costly surrender. The only victory won in open fighting, at Bailen, our author Schepeler designates as fateful, for as a result of it a false hope was raised of winning laurels of victory in open battle, with incompetent troops. The narrow-mindedness of the generals "degenerated into pure madness, and they frequently neglected the greatest of opportunities to carry out a murderous war of positions, the defense of cities, houses, towers, etc., in which their troops really possessed great superiority, to lose entire provinces in the much longed-for open battle." The generals would have won fame in such guerrilla warfare also and it would have prepared them for open battles. But they preferred to get thoroughly beaten and we may well call many of them tenderers of victory or losers of battles.

It is surprising that even a general of the caliber of Wellington or Sir Arthur Wellesley[54] regarded guerrillas as of quite secondary importance, indeed, as an undesirable phenomenon, although today, we are able to see that without the hindrances offered by the guerrillas, Napoleon and his capable generals would have swept the broken Spanish army as well as their English allies into the sea. Although no systematic cooperation ever developed between the field army and the guerrillas, these two naturally supported one another even without any previous understanding, for the Spaniards fought incessantly. "The whole nation served, in a certain sense, as outposts and light formations through which

the enemy was forced to fight his way to the organized Spanish army which from time to time appeared and either maintained or restored equilibrium." Von Schepeler calls our attention in his statement to a matter which we should not overlook in formulating our judgment of guerrilla warfare and its possibilities: the support which the guerrillas provided for the army in a strategic sense, even when tactical cooperation was not considered owing to ignorance of such matters on the part of the guerrillas and pride on the part of the generals. Like support was also furnished by the English navy which was able to land various supplies, weapons and ammunition along the extended coast line for the regular troops, but which were often seized by the guerrillas.

A longing for freedom, love of battle on the part of the revolting people and support by the army would alone not have resulted in successful guerrilla war operations. An inherent peculiarity of the Spaniards of that period reveals itself as an essential which was equally as indispensable: their absolutely unbelievable hardihood and ability to accommodate themselves to straitened circumstances. "While outsiders were tormented by thirst, the Spaniard could go the whole day long in the burning heat without drinking. He needed nothing but arms and ammunition, therefore, to wage an eternal guerrilla warfare in his own country. For he is able to find all the necessities of life here, which any other European either would be unable to find or would refuse to eat. Roots and berries satisfy the Spaniard and a handful of acorns is too much for him." Schepeler gives some wonderful examples of this hardihood and ability to accommodate themselves to circumstances. One of their leaders once voiced his grief at being unable to give his men any better ration than a few miserable beans and peas and a few handfuls of unground wheat. But one of his men said to him: "Don't worry about that, sir. If we have no flour we'll eat unground wheat and if there is no wheat, we'll eat wood!" This ability to get along with almost nothing, gave the guerrillas an advantage over the softer outsiders who, weak from deprivations and suffering, cursed the miserable land in which there was not even enough bread and water for them.

The characteristics of the Spanish terrain helped the guerrillas quite as much as the character of the people. Over the whole interior of Spain, we find great plains broken only by valleys and depressions of such a nature as to remain unnoticed except on very close approach. The low areas are well suited for the concealment and operations of small bodies of fighters yet are not of such a nature as to actually divide the terrain into separate areas and serve as advantageous points at which to post regular army sentinels to guard against raids. The mountains are very rough and steep and passable almost everywhere for the light Spaniards who are always able to find shelter in them. Although there are a great number of smaller streams in the mountains and plains and which in the winter are often greatly swollen, they do not constitute a barrier

for partisan formations. All small streams, yes, even the larger ones may be forded in various places, especially in the summer time.

Hence, Spain seems almost as if made to order for a long and extensive guerrilla war. So, according to these accounts, all things which make for a long and successful war were to be found in Spain:

1. The guerrillas are fighting in their own country.
2. The war is of long duration.
3. The guerrillas had a large area over which to operate.
4. The character of the people, the Spanish passion for freedom, their love of combat and extreme ability to accommodate themselves to straitened circumstances, helped them in the struggle.
5. The guerrillas were favored considerably by the nature of the terrain.
6. They were supported by a strong field army and the English fleet, which had complete mastery of the sea.

This unusual combination of circumstances must be considered if we expect to understand this victory of a people who were almost without arms, over a military power which was seeking to crush them and which, at that time, as today, was the most powerful on the continent. When we consider the greatness of the victory, we must not forget, either, what a bloody price was paid and the awfulness of the accompanying events. Alongside unwavering loyalty, we find shameless treason, alongside the unselfish spirit of self-sacrifice, we find the spirit of bloody banditry. Roughness and brutality were rampant. Rivers of blood flowed while whole provinces went up in flames and Spain was facing annihilation. But in spite of all these horrors, the glories of the Spanish Insurrection will shine throughout all time. It became the victorious struggle for freedom of a people driven to desperation by insolent oppression. Considered from a purely practical point of view, the history of the Iberian struggle is also, even today, a source of valuable and useful lessons.

Partisan formation in the war of freedom or independence

It is surprising that popular accounts of the activities of the War of Freedom either scarcely mention or make no mention at all of the important and extensive operations of certain partisan bands; but in contrast with this, the story of Lutzow's[55] wild chase is still loudly proclaimed although its practical results were very small indeed. Opponents of guerrilla warfare and partisan formations have frequently called attention to various unbelievable features of the stories of partisan bands, which used to delight our boyish hearts. And they are right: a closer examination of the stories of the "Black Chasseurs" would



Figure 2: Underground foxholes used by guerrilla fighters to conceal themselves until carrying out a surprise attack. (Jagdeinheiten)

yield, from beginning to end, only information with respect to how partisan groups must not be constituted and how guerrilla wars cannot be conducted. We will omit going into details, for even legends have their value. Besides, in this case, there is hardly any practical reason for destroying them, for at the same time that Lutzow's bands were operating, the valiant partisan groups under Generals von Dornberg, Tschernitscheff and Thielmann, Colonels von Tettenborn and von Marwitz, Captain von Colomb[56] and innumerable others, were riding against the enemy and their successes show the effectiveness of

guerrilla warfare clearly enough. The experiences of these partisan bands are still valuable to us today and will be in the future since the war operations of this period resemble strikingly those which the present day advocates of motorized and mechanized units, of the "*Schnelle Truppen*" and long-range operations regard as correct and of permanent value. The French maneuvers of 1934, the great Italian maneuvers and, above all, the English maneuvers of the same year, confronted the formation with tasks which remind us very strongly of the situations and events of the years 1813 and 1814. Of the great number of events of that time, a few particularly striking ones merit closer consideration.

The general situation at the beginning of the War of Freedom, is well known. The remnants of the shattered *Grande Armée* were pouring back from Russia. Napoleon had hurried on into France and had handed over control in Germany to Prince Eugene,[57] Vice-Regent of Italy. The latter retreated, engaged in delaying action, from the Weichsel to the Oder, then from the Oder to a position along the Spree. The Prussian and Russian armies, which had been operating together since 27 February 1813, followed with inexplicable slowness. Really, the credit for the fact that the defensive lines established by Prince Eugene were broken through time and again, and the enemy forced to retreat, can be given only to the bold partisan bands under the Russian Cossack leader Tschernitschew and German partisans in the Russian service.

These guerrilla formations were not strong. Their operations were greatly favored, however, by the condition of the hostile troops, by the lack of serviceable cavalry on the part of the French and by the secret or open aid given by the population. The unbelievable boldness displayed by them in their tasks, is attested by their assault on Berlin. On 20 February, the three combined partisan groups under Tschernitschew, Tettenborn and Benkendorf,[58] altogether scarcely 3,000 cavalry troops and six cannon, attempted to take the capital city which lay far behind the front and which was occupied by 6,000 infantry troops with 40 cannon. A few bands of Cossacks fought their way far into the city, but, in the street fighting, were driven out again. They remained in possession of the country round about the city, however. Prince Eugene was forced to place 26,000 men in and around Berlin to protect it, thus weakening the main line of resistance. About 1 March, when the pressure of the slowly advancing armies was beginning to be severe, he abandoned Berlin and withdrew beyond the Elbe. Prussia, which at that time only extended to this point, was thereby freed of enemy troops.

The allies were now faced with the task of wresting the remainder of Germany from Napoleon or, at least, the task of making him all the trouble possible in his exploitation of the confederated Rhine states and the French North Sea provinces. Scharnhorst[59] ordered that the military and political activity should be assigned to partisan formations which he proposed to organize for that

purpose. In a record dated 1813, he had developed the following plan: "While *Landwehr* and *Landsturm* troops are being conscripted all over the nation, a central nucleus must be created for the patriotically-inclined portions of the provinces under the French dominion. The creation of guerrilla units will be necessary for this purpose. Light partisan units sent into the various sections of the country can best secure cooperation in the common cause."

Even in an operational plan he had called attention to the fact that Germany on the left of the Elbe "should be patrolled by several partisan groups." These groups should everywhere: get rid of officials who were in favor the French, incite the people to revolt, and enlist men who were willing to fight. As Scharnhorst had already announced, they must be entirely independent and able to operate with connection with the larger bodies of troops. They were, therefore, each of them composed of from 1,500 to 2,000 mounted men, 500 to 600 foot soldiers and six light cannon. Half of them were Prussians and half Russians. Light is cast on the type of combat they were ordered to engage in by a group of detailed directives given by Scharnhorst to Major von Lutzow:

> The infantry detachment of the partisan formation (1,000 men in strength) will use the Upper Harz as their main rendezvous and from there send out detachments onto the highways which pass through Elbingrode, Hasselfelde, Günthersberg, Seesen and Herzberg. It will immediately dispatch groups to the Hube near Einbeck. These troops will have the Hube forest which extends to Lauenstein in the vicinity of Wicken Lake and Scharfoldendorf.
>
> The infantry detachment which is to go to the Solling forest will leave the Harz forest during the night, pass Stauffenburg and remain in the vicinity of Echte hidden in the woods, during the day, the following night will pass Hollenstedt, cross the Leine and reach Lauenburg where the Solling forest begins and the most uninhabitable region is. The roads over which bands will be sent are, in this area, those passing Dransfeld, and those passing through Höfeler and Holzminden. The detachment assigned to the Solling forest must maintain detachments in the Reinhard forest near Sababurg, in the Schwalenberg forest and in the Lippisch forest near Detmold. The Sievershäuser peasants are good game poachers and part of them will join the partisan corps.
>
> The corps cavalry (two squadrons), will divide its time between the regions around Göttingen or Nordheim and Seesen, etc. The Weser has fords and quite a number of bridges. If the enemy approaches and pursues, a retreat is always to be made in the direction of Westphalia, never to the rear toward Saxony. The retreat is to be executed by all detachments separating and going in all directions.

The fact will not have escaped the notice of the thoughtful reader that Scharnhorst has made the mistake here of going too much into detail, a mistake which has its basis in the particular type of mind responsible for it and which but endears the great to us the more. It is obvious that his patriotism,

perhaps even an unconscious feeling of homesickness drove Scharnhorst, in the midst of his creative period, to issue such detailed instructions relative to partisan operations in the beloved region where he has passed his youth.

In any case, however, it was wrong practice to bind the leader of a partisan group so by rules. The directives, as given, were never carried out. The Sieverhäuser peasants, those farmer-hunters, never to my knowledge, joined the corps. In spite of this, however, Scharnhorst's instructions are of great value from the purely tactical point of view. They show the value which that clear thinker and astute strategist attached to guerrilla operations. Additional instructions for the conduct of operations, which he gave in his work, "Instructions for Raiding Detachments," which are of particular value and reported by our authority [Colonel Georg Cardinal von Widdern],60 in summarized form, that follow:

> Movements preferably at night. Rest daytimes in forests or small isolated villages. Take guides along who know the region. Do not release them till it is impossible for them to do any harm to you, and always mislead them as well as the population with respect to the next objective. Always maintain security when resting, not by means of single sentinels but by means of small groups of about three men and trustworthy inhabitants. Also keep posted by the same means with respect to activities on the highways. Employ scouts for obtaining information. Change regions, and within the same region, change the location of your camp, constantly. Never remain in a place longer than one night. Say nothing of where the next night is to be spent. Departure from localities to be sudden and unexpected by population and latter to be deceived with regard to direction which is to be followed. Several points are to be designated to detachments which are sent out, where they are to gather later. Large highways and towns were to be avoided in marches. The people were to be deceived with regard to the strength of the groups which occasionally were to announce themselves as the advance guard of a large formation. If a very superior enemy is encountered, the forces are to scatter in various directions, but a place must be announced where they shall reassemble. …
>
> The detachments must never engage in combat with an adversary of great superiority. Their purpose is to attack or annihilate war supply or ration trains, small enemy detachments either on the march or encamped, to capture or disperse the horses of remount depots and columns, seize couriers, etc., and make the roads generally unsafe for travel. These should be watched, first in one place then in another by the peasants themselves so that nothing can move on them without the fact's being known.

Scharnhorst's instructions are not suited to one epoch alone. They impress one as being written for operations such as occurred at the outbreak of the World War, in the Ukraine, around the Baltic, in Upper Silesia, also in Budjonny's[61] cavalry expedition through Poland.

Several operations of the year 1813, carried out with small forces, produced far-reaching political repercussions, and their effects would have been still greater if Scharnhorst had had more cooperation, for example: the attack of Hamburg by Tettenborn and the expedition of Tschernitschew and Dörnberg into Hanoverian territory deserve mention; also the operations of Colonel von Marwitz which were carried out after the armistice, against Braunschweig; also the operations of Tschernitschew against Kassel. After the allied forces had entered Berlin, it was necessary from a political and strategic point of view to learn the mind of the peoples west of the Elbe, to learn the situation at Hamburg and, above all, to block the way of General Morand[62] to the lower Elbe region. The latter task could be best accomplished by inciting the peoples of the North Sea provinces and Westphalia to revolt.

As a result of this Colonel von Tettenborn with about 1,500 mounted troops and two cannon was sent against Hamburg. The first success of his band of partisan troops consisted of bring about the secession of Mecklenburg from the Rhine confederacy and obtaining the support of the Mecklenburg battalion of grenadiers. At the same time, Tettenborn learned from messengers sent from the city of Hamburg that the French had left Stralsund and planned to withdraw across the lower course of the Elbe. In spite of all the haste he was able to muster, he was unable to block the retreat of the French. They had just managed to make their escape to the left bank of the Elbe when he arrived, but without their cannon which, up to the last moment, had covered their retreat.

Amid great rejoicings, on 18 March, Tettenborn's guerrilla fighters were received in Hamburg (Tettenborn was originally an Austrian officer). The liberation of this great commercial city, at this time, the richest city on the continent, gave great encouragement to the people who were still under the control of the French. In spite of the hesitation of the men in control of the city government, the people of Hamburg declared themselves formally free from the French, in accordance with Tettenborn's desires, and reestablished the old order of things. Also, Lubeck joined on the following day and a beginning of a Hanseatic League was made. Unfortunately, on account of the non-military proclivities of the people of these commercial cities, a general popular uprising was not produced.

The main reason was that the city officials hesitated at the last and extreme measures, the arming of the masses and mobilization of the wealth of the city. Even Tettenborn was partly responsible for the politically-unsatisfactory outcome of the matter. He had appealed to the city officials of Hamburg instead of to the people themselves and it was a fact which we have already observed in the case of the Spanish uprisings, those who possess property or privileges were often the most fearful of making momentous decisions. That was true in the present case. The men in control of the city government

would have gladly have accepted freedom as a gift from the crowned heads and they shared also with modesty and decorum, the finer emotions of the popular agitation. But they closed their eyes at the thought of the serious and difficult features of the task. This made them in a certain sense co-responsible for the harsh fate which General Davout[63] meted out to the city when it was later occupied and which justly affected the rich with particular severity.

To begin with however the success of the allied peoples was considerable. The whole broad region of the right of the Elbe, with its rich resources, was no longer available for the equipment of Napoleon's forces but was at the disposal of the Germans. With the taking of Hamburg, the road to the sea was opened and deliveries of English arms poured into the country. The people to the left of the lower course of the Elbe revolted of their own accord. If Tettenborn had not looked upon his task as at an end with the liberation of Hamburg, if he had pushed on energetically in his work instead of limiting himself to securing the gains which he had already made, the French dominion would have probably have been shaken clear to the Rhine.

The calls to revolt, which he issued from his headquarters in Hamburg, to the people on the left bank of the Elbe, a few operations by weak guerrilla bands, did produce lesser uprisings in many places, – but the Germans of those days were not Spaniards. Accustomed to obedience, as they were, through centuries of changing rule of princes, nobles or municipal authorities, they were unable to muster their strength without the support and leadership of regular troops, to stop the French drive, which started in April of that year, by means of determined guerrilla interference.

We must, however, not fail to consider one famous example of resistance, – the brave stand at Luneburg. In this place, the citizens had immediately driven the French out, as soon as the Prussian and Russian forces had appeared and, under the Hanoverian Lieutenant Colonel von Estorf, had established a *Landsturm*. The newly organized formations succeeded in beating a few smaller, French cavalry groups. On 1 April, however, General Morand, attacking with vastly superior forces, again took Luneburg.

A few brave citizens who had fought in the defense of the city were executed by the firing squad and others led away as prisoners. The resistance of the people was not broken, however and, when on 2 April, the partisan bands under Tschernitschew and Dörnberg were approaching for an attack on Luneburg, they succeeded in overwhelmingly defeating the French, thanks to the effective tactical help of the peasants and burgers. General Morand fell on the field of battle during this action. Over 2,000 prisoners and 12 cannon were brought to the left bank of the Elbe by the Luneburg *Landsturm* and the volunteer cavalry forces.

Such victories would have been possible everywhere in lower Germany if the popular revolt could have been supplied with proper support and leaders. The bad reverses which led to the armistice of 4 June, were a part of the

results of the half-hearted measures with which they contended themselves, unfortunately. Napoleon's come-back which, if Scharnhorst's plans had been energetically followed, could doubtless have prevented, brought about great and bloody sacrifices, later on in the war, before final victory could be won.

The cause of the mistakes, of the neglect which is evident, of the half-hearted measures, was, doubtless, interference of a political nature. The old authorities, as we have stated, had no desire for a War for Freedom. All they desired was a modestly conducted War of Liberation. They were opposed to a War for Freedom, for which the time was ripe and which the mass of the people would have enthusiastically have engaged in, and which in the spring of 1813, at the time of Napoleon's greatest weakness, would have swept the French off their feet.

A revolt requires the spirit from which is born of reckless and whole-hearted decision. Half-hearted revolt merely irritates the adversary but to no avail, and leads to great loss of blood and energy on the part of the people with no corresponding gain. The fact that the half-hearted measures of 1813 did not result in worse consequences, must be credited to Russian help. History has left us much which shows us the kind of thoughts with which the clear-sighted, capable and bold leaders with which the Prussian army of that day so abounded must have viewed the wrecking of the plans and proposals which they offered.

But now, let us turn to a pleasanter record. To an exploit which succeeded which taught us valuable lessons and, besides, by the energetic and clear-cut manner of its execution, will delight the heart of every soldier. We refer to the guerrilla operations of Captain von Colomb with 92 mounted men of Saxon Vogtland, by which the enemy's lines of communications were badly disorganized over a period of five weeks and pressure on the front doubtless relieved to a very considerable extent.

When Colomb planned his operations, the situation was very bad. After the failure at Gross-Gorschen of 21 May, the armies of the allies found themselves forced to retreat. They were pursued by Napoleon across the Elbe. Captain Colomb, as he later stated, was deeply affected by the poor progress of the War for Freedom. On 8 May, as he was pondering over the unexpected failure of the army, by the camp fire at Meissen, he conceived the daring idea that relief might be secured on the front by guerrilla action against the enemy's rear. "It appeared feasible," he later wrote, "to cross the Elbe into Saxon Switzerland with my cavalry squadron, follow the ridge of the Erz mountains along the Bohemian frontier as inconspicuously as possible up to about the neighborhood of Auerbach, in Vogtland. … I planned to leave the mountains at this point and proceed toward the Saale River, stations ourselves in the small wooded mountains between that river and the Orla and Roda, and from this point, cause trouble on the highways leading from southern Germany and down from the Rhine to Mainz."

Gneisenau[64] obtained Blücher's[65] approval of Colomb's plan. With these words, "If he wants to go to the devil, let him go," Blücher finally let him. He did not permit Colomb, however, to take this whole squadron along, but let him have altogether only two lieutenants, six sergeants, 72 mounted chasseurs and 11 hussars, all carefully picked men, however.

On the night of 10 May, Colomb crossed the Elbe on a ferry which was then sunk, successfully slipped through the French guard lines with his little band, between the fortress of Königstein and Struppen and, when dawn finally came, had reached the Bohemian frontier in the Erz Mountains. The plan to slip along the frontier, from this point, into the enemy's zone of communications, had to be changed, since Colomb kept running into enemy cavalry patrols and sentinels and concluded that the Saxon and Bohemian frontiers were closely guarded. He therefore left the border and turned sharply to the North toward Dippoldiswalde. As a rule, he travelled only at night. During the day the band hid in woods and on isolated farms. As a rule, the men obtained their food by requisition, about noon, when dinner was ready in the various farms.

Although the band was really travelling in hostile territory – Saxony and Thuringia belonged to the Rhine Confederation – the people gladly supported Colomb to the best of their ability. They brought the men more provisions than they were able to use, warned them of the presence of hostile troops, told them of objectives which it would be advantageous for them to attack and did all in their power to be of service to the brave troops. In spite of all this, Colomb was cautious enough to keep his intentions and objectives to himself, not confiding them even to this own troops. As a rule, also, any carelessness in the matter of security was avoided. The success of his operations is due only to this caution and the strict handling of his troops. Colomb, himself, points emphatically to the fact that: "Discipline is especially necessary in a partisan group." Also, he was just the person to handle such situations with masterful firmness.In six hard night marches, the corps arrived immediately in the vicinity of Reichenbach, where it was planned to begin the activities against Napoleon's supply lines. On 17 and 19 May, several French officers who were on their way to the front were seized. These and the many other later prisoners could not be taken along with the troops. Colomb was so sympathetic that he regularly turned them loose, after exacting certain promises from them on their word of honor, although he ran considerable risk in doing this.

On 20 May, shortly after these initial exploits, Colomb was operating over the highways between Gera, Jena, and Saalfeld. The little wooded mountain close to Neustadt offered many hiding places to him. He was able to remain there quite a while and made many successful sorties. But let us first hear what Colomb himself has to say about it, how he was in the habit of securing his marching column and his camps, etc:

> While on the march, I seldom made use of advanced and rear guards. I used only a double point, equal liaison guards to the front and rear of my troops and a few men as lateral patrols to the right and left. Aside from these, we all marched together in one body. At first I did this to prevent separation of the troops and for the purpose of keeping the as-yet inexperienced men firmly in hand; later on because I was convinced that this was the best way of assuring the immediate execution of any decision which might be dictated by the circumstances of the moment. At night, I kept away from the men, in the vicinity of the point, in order to avoid the interference with hearing caused by the noise of the men on the march. During the day time, I often climbed to the top of the hills along the highway, for observation. We did no post outposts when we halted, but sent out "*vedettes*" that is, single men on horseback, who were stationed in the immediate neighborhood of our billet. When possible, I chose a wood situation on a high point, permitting a view of the whole region. My greatest security was in night marches, and frequent change of location. I made use of the first in order to remain unobserved as long as possible. I used the latter to keep the people in a constant state of uncertainty with regard to my whereabouts.

Colomb never remained more than eight or 10 hours in any one place and when the enemy learned of his whereabouts and attempted action against him, he was nowhere to be found.

On 23 May, Colomb learned that an enemy squadron was billeted in two nearby villages of the region. The guerrilla band stole up on them in the night and attacked one of the billets. In his bewilderment, the French commander thought it was merely some formation playing a bad joke on him, till he saw all of his men being led out of their quarters as prisoners. On 25 May, Colomb attacked a supply column coming from Jena, dispersed the guard or took them prisoner and captured 12 wagon loads of clothing and food. He distributed all this among the inhabitants of the adjoining villages, destroyed the wagons and disappeared again in a distant forest hide-out. After other minor exploits, his greatest feat was performed on 27 May, which by itself made the establishment of the partisan band worthwhile. On the supply route near Zwickau, Colomb seized a large cannon and ammunition convoy which was on the way to the front. His horsemen fell suddenly on the convoy guard, put a detachment of French cavalrymen who came to their rescue, to flight and then, in six hours of labor, destroyed all the plunder. The neighboring peasants, who collected by the thousands, helped in the work, with shouts of joy. Eighteen cannon, six howitzers, 36 wagon loads of ammunition, four extra gun carriages, and a few other wagons – altogether, 72 vehicles and 398 horses were seized and the guard, six officers and 300 men were taken prisoner. The partisan corps, consisting of less than one hundred men, lost one man killed and several lightly wounded in the engagement.

The further course of the guerrilla activities, the clash with the less clever and successful partisan band under Lützow at Orlamünde, and a few smaller successes, are of lesser significance, in comparison with this masterful exploit. We must mention the fact, however, that the armistice of 4 June, which was announced to Colomb by the French, put an end to one of this excellent leader's plans, which was much more daring and far-reaching, viz, a trip straight across southern Germany for the purpose of attacking an enemy artillery park. Colomb had planned this expedition so well, that success would have been almost certain. The armistice put an end to all his plans. Hard pressed by the perfidious enemy, Colomb now barely succeeded in reaching the Elbe. His men owed it solely to his strict and superior leadership that the sorry fate of Lützow's band was not also theirs. Also, further along in the campaign, Colomb, with a band double the size of his former one, again distinguished himself with guerrilla activities in the rear of the retreating enemy as described by General Kerchnawe.

Guerrilla activity as practiced by Colomb can be accepted as a pattern for guerrilla activity directed at the enemy's supply lines. Their great success is due in part to the fact that the combat group, thanks to Blucher's lack of generosity, was very small and able to take advantage of all available shelter. Success was also due to the fact that Colomb understood how to slip into the very center of the communications zone where he was absolutely unlooked for and was therefore able to make surprise attacks on the lines. Lastly, the help given them by the people was of real consequence. His success was considerable. During whole crucial weeks, the supplies for Napoleon's armies were tied up on three important routes. The enemy was forced to make use of strong detachments in order to assure security. The commandant, von Erfurt, ordered that no supply train was to take the highway without a guard of from 1,000 to 1,500 men. In addition to this, Colomb was able, at various times, to send very important information to the high command of his own army. One of Colomb's reports: "Since I have been in this region, there has been a constant movement of troops on the military highway. There is a great deal of cavalry with them, but it has all been recruited lately and is remarkably unskilled."

Colomb's partisan operations, contrary to Scharnhorst's original conception of the sphere of activity of partisan formations, had a direct influence on the fighting on the main front. During the succeeding phases of the war, weak bands had similar though less striking success in crippling relatively much greater formations by threatening their supply lines and rear, thereby relieving pressure on the front. For instance, Helwig's partisan corps operated in this manner during the Battle of Leipzig; also Hilmann's corps in the same place and Tschernitschew's band at Hagelberg.

Also, far-flung drives whose purpose was to stir up the people to revolt in the regions to the rear of the enemy and which were dominated by him, succeeded several times after the armistice. They were directed against those regions where

the greatest number of discontented people were to be found and at least changed the attitude of the people toward the hostile authorities so greatly that the measures instituted by Napoleon for the recruitment of reserves and feeding of the army, met with passive resistance and gradually reached the stage where they had to be abandoned. Tschernitschew's expedition against Kassel and Colonel Marwitz's attack of the same city were especially successful in this respect.

Napoleon's increasing anger against the "brigands" in his zone of communication is not hard to understand when one remembers what great effects were produced by these brigands with the scantiest of means. Although Napoleon had his hands full with operations on the front, yet he was compelled time and again to shift his attention to putting down the guerrilla activities in his communications zone, to issue detailed orders with regard to this and to engage strong forces here. The claw of the lion is evident in the orders Napoleon gave to his generals for putting down guerrilla activities. He condemned in no uncertain terms the practice of fortress and garrison commanders of limiting themselves to defense. Instead he is emphatic in his insistence that the partisan bands be dealt with by means of the same tactics employed by them, that mobile bands of various strengths remain constantly on their trail and be ready at any opportune moment to attack them. "We must make use of the methods of partisans wherever partisans are to be found," he commanded on 12 September, addressing General Lefebvre, and in his directives of 25 September, Napoleon established principles for this combat of partisan formations which claim attention even today:

> If we man four stations along the supply routes with only 1,500 men and four cannon each, that will be tying up 6,000 men and 16 cannon uselessly. They would not help at all in the security of our supply trains on the highways for, in such cases, the enemy will attack our trains, two or three miles from the stations. Merseburg, however, must always be occupied by troops and must be so fortified that 1,500 men will be able to hold out a whole month against an army. Halle, Weissenfels, and Naumburg are to be protected by mobile formations composed of infantry, cavalry, and artillery.
>
> It is my plan to abandon the system of stationary formations for guarding convoy stations and replace them with a system of mobile formations which will cooperate in the protection of certain stretches of highway, if the situation calls for it. The advantage of these formations lies in the fact that they can be now in Halle, now in Weissenfels, now in Naumburg, depending on the particular situation, but be in some entirely different point on the following day. This is our only means for cleaning up the zone of communications and ensuring freedom of movement in it.

In an order of 26 September, he goes on to say, "Send spies out in all directions and keep informed by means of them of all movements of hostile partisans.

Issue instructions warning your patrols against capture by committing the mistake of passing a night in a village."

In all of Napoleon's orders, we repeatedly encounter his admonition to give heed to the particular characteristics of guerrilla warfare, to make full use of mobility, surprise, deceit, and resolute boldness, and to beat the opponent with his own methods. Napoleon's directives for defense as well as Scharnhorst's instructions for offensive guerrilla operations contain truths which merit attention not only at the present time but will still merit it in the future.

"La guerre à outrance," 1870–1871

Our consideration of German partisan operations in 1813 was instructive, both from the point of view of the few indispensable prerequisites for this type of warfare, as well as from the point of view of the sphere of operations proper to the type. We learned that military ability and tactical victories on the part of a few scattered groups of fighters do not suffice to give to guerrilla operations that intense character peculiar to the Spanish type and which, under favorable circumstances is able, as a strong acid, to dull the edge of the oppressor's sword to the point where it ceases to be effective. Regardless of the effectiveness of guerrilla activities in many situations, from the tactical point of view, no matter how useful they may be for supplementing, furnishing security for or



Figure 3: Small camouflage net used on a guerrilla fighter for individual concealment. (Jagdeinheiten)

even supporting larger operations, they become of decisive significance only when they develop into general uprisings of the people.

The arousing of the masses, clear-sighted direction of the national soul and kindling of the will to fight, are indispensable prerequisites. This is the sort of thing which raised the abject spirits of the people to such heights in the Spanish revolt and which we are accustomed to designate today by the hollow-sounding and hollow term of "propaganda." The skillful employment of forceful propaganda is able to accomplish much, but only when the actual conduct of the fighting is in the hands of men of military ability who plan the actual fighting with the necessary boldness and select combat objectives from practical points of view.

Even in cases where the revolt assumes the form of guerrilla warfare exclusively, particularly in such cases, in fact, there is need of capable leadership. The popular uprising, "*la guerre à outrance*," which was very skillfully conducted by the "National Defense Government" in 1870, was not permanent in its results – owing to the fact that it lacked capable leaders and a staff of subordinate commanders suited to the task at hand. But there was no lack of will to destroy the hated invader and the measures employed by the French mob of that day may be regarded still as efficient and worthy of adoption. Even the famous call to arms, issued by Gambetta[66] from Tours on 10 October, was of the highest value as propaganda.

He described in it the heroic resistance of the capital, Paris, then continued:

> Our situation requires great sacrifice. You must put all other things behind you since you are now called by a higher duty, war, even hand-to-hand fighting. Every other activity must stop. I have the task, with the help of all available forces, of compensating for the deficiencies in our situation without permitting myself to be stopped by difficulties or resistance … We are not lacking in men. What we have lacked so far, is determination, fixedness of purpose, especially, as well as the energetic execution of plans decided on. …
>
> So far we have lacked even arms, after the shameful capitulation at Sedan, but we have now made arrangements for the purchase of all the available rifles on the face of the Earth. We must take every advantage of the inexhaustible resources of our country, arouse our people from their lethargy, spread our partisan warfare everywhere and combat an enemy who is so clever in the matter of surprise assaults and ambushes by constantly harassing him, by stabbing him in the back and in the end, bring about a general revolt. In accordance with the traditions of the Republic, we shall give you young leaders. Then Heaven itself will cease to be gracious to our enemy. The autumn rains will ruin him. Marooned in our capital city, the Prussians now so far from their home country, everywhere worried by our revolting people, frightened and driven out by our arms, by hunger, by the specter of our weather, will be weakened.

> No! The spirit of France cannot have departed forever. It can never be true, that this great nation has given up its place in the world, as the result of the incursion of 500,000 invaders. Let us all arise as one. Let us die, rather than endure the same of dissolution.

Gambetta's fiery call awakened warlike echoes everywhere. Ernest Lépine, *Paris Journal*: "Whoever attacks France, shall die on her dung-hills! A German shall hang from every tree limb! Don't wait any longer to sweep out such filth." Lacausade, *Poems*: "Burn everything in front of them and behind them; make a wilderness of the country! Fire and pestilence, for these greedy hordes! May they perish with hunger! To arms, in a bush and hedge ware against them! Hunt them down; surround them! Let us give ourselves over to a campaign of insatiable blood-thirstiness against." Victor Hugo: "Roll rocks onto them! Tear up the pavements for barricades! Make battleaxes of our plow shares; turn the furrows of our fields into trenches; fight them with everything you can lay your hands on, … worry them; fire over their heads; take advantage of shadows and darkness, partisans; creep like snakes up gullies; slip up on them; aim, fire upon them, exterminate them." These forceful expressions represent a choice collection from popular French authors of that time. To be sure, they seemed quite amusing or even offensive to our serious-minded grandparents who were not accustomed to their type of expressions, but it cannot be denied that they stirred the French soul to its very depths. Even the official orders for the execution of Gambetta's call-to-arms against the invaders, which for the greater part originated with the adjutant, Frencinet, show a noteworthy appreciation of the essentials of a popular uprising.

In all the departments threatened by German troops, defense committees were organized. They consisted of five members, the eldest presiding with the rank of commanding general. Besides engineer, artillery, and general staff officers, there was a government highway construction engineer and mining official who were available for consultation and for the planning and direction of demolitions and repairs. The committees had the authority to do anything that would harm the enemy. They also had power over the civil population in case of necessity.

The subordinate authorities did everything in their power to carry out the plans of the government. Thus, in a bulletin to the chief magistrates of the towns under his jurisdiction, on 24 October 1870, we find the following from the prefect of the department of Côte d'Or: "What we need at present is determined men who are ready to face the continually-advancing enemy, to barricade every narrow road, bridge, and path, and stop his advance." And on 21 November, he again announced the tasks of the partisan warriors: "Our country does not desire that you should assemble in masses and face the enemy openly. It does expect, however, that from every community, three or four determined men will go to some place where they

can watch for and fire upon the Prussians. … I will confer a reward on such men and publish their heroic deeds in the official publication."

On 20 October, the prefect of the department of the Ardennes, issued the following order for the purpose of ensuring cooperation with the Mezières fortress:

> Give your support to the fortress. I am not asking for any regular fighting – this is for the army. What I desire is partisan warfare which is so troublesome to the large army units.
>
> At the first sign of the approach of the enemy, all men who are willing to cooperate will hasten to the woods. There in hiding places, they shall take council, make plans and divide up the work of harassing the enemy. The unit for every town will fight independently of every other, yet they must all support one another, villages as well as men.
>
> After requisitions have been made by the Germans, they are to lie in wait for the enemy as he withdraws and they will find here the opportunity for tightening the noose around his neck. I have been told that there are persons who report their own people to the enemy, who show respect to him. If you hear of any such despicable creatures who out of fear of reprisals are capable of such baseness, just let me know of them. Such a person, as an accomplice of the Prussians, as a traitor, should be court-martialed.

The commanding general of the 7th Military District at Besançon, sent a notable bulletin to the magistrates of all communities, "instructions" for the conduct of guerrilla warfare:

> On the approach of the enemy, the armed national guards of the partisan committees will leave their dwellings and betake themselves to the forests or mountains and, operating from these points, conduct guerrilla warfare in the neighborhood of their cities or villages. Any contacts between these armed men and the unarmed inhabitants must be made only under cover of darkness. All communities are to store food sufficient for three or four days in forest or mountain hiding places and leave it under the guard of armed men. Also, as regards cattle, goats, etc., in order to keep them from the enemy, they should be driven into hiding places or to regions beyond the reach of the enemy.
>
> Young boys who have not yet been called to arms, are to be used as unarmed scouts or for the purpose of bringing food to the national guards in the field. They may also participate in the work of destroying roads and in defense operations.
>
> The armed groups of neighboring communities, on account of common interests, must have mutual understandings and must agree on visual signals with which to notify one another of the approach of the enemy. Every community and every National Guard detachment must keep guards posted continually. If the enemy is reported to be approaching, he must be treated to

> gunfire from previously chosen places of concealment. But open engagements are to be avoided unless dictated by large numerical superiority.

Also the voices of many amateur strategists were heard during the course of these weeks. As varied in tone as the music of frogs on a May night, war cries and wild plans for exterminating the enemy resounded throughout the length and breadth of the land. The fact that some of the more valuable ideas and plans did not meet with better success, can be attributed to the "terrible friction,"[67] an element of war which they had overlooked and which suddenly and mercilessly clipped the wings of their brave flights of fancy.

There was, for instance, a certain M de Barracque of Epinal who, in a detailed memorandum of 30 October 1870, urged, with unusual correctness of logic, that the "national resistance" be changed to "national attack." During a single night he planned the destruction of the tunnels and bridges on the lines of communication of the German force before Paris, in all some 900 kilometers (about 550 miles) in length. Also for the same night, he proposed the attack of all supply route stations and the slaughter of all the soldiers in their quarters occupying these stations. "*Tous, tous les Prussiens y seraient en une seule nuit!*" With undeniable wisdom, he warned against assembling the National Guards in large bands and risking open combat. He preferred much more to see them organized as guerrilla bands under wise leadership and engaged against the enemy from the rear: "Twenty thousand men broadly scattered in the rear of the enemy are worth more than two hundred thousand men in Paris." He closed his memorandum with the earnest request that the tree of French liberty be fertilized with the dead bodies of the military Prussians! We must not omit to state that poor personal work prevented the execution of the dangerous ideas contained in his confidential note. In short, he had the misfortune of falling into the hands of reckless Bavarians who sent him off as a prisoner to Germany, thereby bringing his career as a field marshal to an untimely end.

But not all cases of resistance to the limit were as harmless as the efforts of M de Barracque. Much trouble was caused for the German army, because most of the ideas and plans were correct in themselves in spite of the awkwardness of the execution. They impeded and slowed down the German offensive operations exceedingly, and in a few instances were known to have crossed the plans of the high army command. Strong forces had to be engaged in an effort to suppress the activities of the partisan bands and provide security for the lines of communication and establishments in the rear. Toward the end of the war, for every four rifles in the hands of the troops in the front lines, there was one rifle in the hands of the occupational troops. Supply column troops are not counted in this either. The losses from partisan operations also: more than one thousand dead, wounded and missing, were not by any means

inconsequential. A state of general insecurity was occasioned in the rear by the innumerable small operations of the guerrilla formations. "*C'est une guerre terrible que cette guerre de partisans*" (This partisan warfare is terrible) declared an official announcement of that time:

"Our partisan warfare is producing terrible effects on the Prussian forces since they realize that every bush may hide a sharpshooter, every piece of woods may hide a group of partisans ready to fight to the death. Every house may serve him as a fortress and the number of fortresses with which our troops are opposed, is continually increasing." That, of course, was a pretty big statement, but there is no doubt that the guerrilla operations did become very troublesome.

A whole series of more important operations is particularly worth noting. It is not an accident that the particularly successful one were carried out under army control and some of them even by formation which had left the army yet in spite of this still were well disciplined. There were innumerable attacks on supply columns carrying food, munitions and money, and on prisoners, even on marching troop formations. They were successful only when the marching detachments allowed themselves to be surprised or when they limited their response to mere defense. They ended regularly in failure, however, when the attacked formation quickly and resolutely turned the tables on them and launched an attack against the brigands.

As an unhappy example of how disastrous the effects of a lack of foresight, resolution and courage are on the part of the command in guerrilla warfare, we must relate the unfortunate experience of a half company of *Landwehr* troops who were on the way to Stenay, when they met a band of guerrilla fighters which was scarcely superior numerically to their own formation. The half company, some 90 men in strength, had sent a group on ahead as security and this group in turn had sent out a three-man point ahead. They advanced through the deeply-eroded and close terrain without any lateral security. Scarcely a hundred meters to the left of the highway was the edge of the Weevre forest which, as it may be understood, could not be searched through its entire extent. The bunch of troops and their commander did not have the remotest thought of the possibility of an attack. The *Landwehr* troops had not even removed the muzzle protector and sight leaves, our chronicler, Colonel Widdern, relates.

About 1600, when the point was only about two and a half miles from Baalon, it suddenly stopped. A man came running back and called to the company commander: "A bunch of French with rifles ahead of us in the ditch along the road!" The company commander rode up to them and only then, commanded: "load!" The first group had not yet carried out this order when they were caught by the fire of a hundred rifles from the hills ahead of them. Soon after this, the enemy advanced for the attack with his widespread wings pushed far to the front and closing in, like pinchers. Rifle fire could be heard from the edge of the woods.

The remainder of the company whose commander had gone ahead to the group which was acting as security, was taken completely by surprise. In the events which followed, the commander had his hands quite full with his shy horse whose tactical mobility was quite too great for him! Instead of putting the guerrillas to flight he drew them back over the highway to the company. There, he gave the command to deploy. The first groups, however, were so pressed by the fire with which they had suddenly been caught, that they did not execute the order but sought cover in the ditches. The rear groups even retreated behind a rise in the ground a few hundred meters to the rear. The company commander tried to slacken their speed by the signal, "halt", but unfortunately, the bugle was shot from the lips of the bugler. The French rapidly advanced, firing still more rapidly and threatened to surround the groups that were still with the company commander. These too began then, to run toward the rear, and the company commander joined them. He was not able to get on his horse. "*Il était très gros*!" (He was very fat!), the French account relates. He still considered it his duty to drive the butting and slugging Gaul back off his highway. He finally received such a blow in front and in the lower part of his body, that he dropped in a faint, and when he regained consciousness, the French rifle troops had him by the collar.

The officer next to him in rank succeeded in reaching the protecting edge of the woods with about 20 men and by their lively fire, enabled the rest of the company to break contact with the enemy. Twenty-four men, however, and the company commander remained in the hands of the French. The total casualties of the company consisted of one officer and 37 men, more than a third of their strength. The baggage wagon, whose horses had also become frightened, likewise fell into the hands of the enemy. The French had no casualties at all.

The occurrence shows plainly what an unpleasant situation a body of troops gets into when they forget the two fundamental principles of guerrilla warfare: extreme caution, together with limitless daring. When the adversary is suddenly encountered, hesitation or retreat under his fire, will always result in bloody defeat. Even taking up fire from cover is generally the wrong thing to do. But it is nearly always correct to launch an immediate counterattack, especially in close terrain and when the enemy has succeeded in getting close. The commander must succeed in getting his men to attack immediately before they are seized with panic. When opposed by partisans, this procedure nearly always succeeds, as was proven by numerous instances of successful defense by German troops in the War of the *Francstireurs*. Also, as only one example from a host of similar feats, we cite the exemplary action of an army column which, as a result of their resolute courage, successfully foiled an attempted attack by a much larger body of partisans.

On 22 January 1871, a large wagon park column belonging to the Werder Corps was on the way to Dampierre (Doubs). There was a total of 220 wagons,

accompanied by only 38 cavalry troopers under the command of a captain, and our chronicler, Lieutenant Bassermann. Ahead of the wagon train, which was almost an hour's travel in length, rode 14 dragoons, forming the point of the column, and close to the first wagons, Lieutenant Bassermann and a few more cavalry troopers. In the first wagon were seated three infantrymen, all convalescents who were on the way to their outfits. Fortunately, there was a drummer among their number. He rendered good service a little later. The wagon train arrived as far as the divide between Doubs and Ognon without being attacked. There, in the hilly country which is thickly overgrown with trees and brush, the train was attacked. Writing of it in his journal, Lieutenant Bassermann relates the following:

> The point of the wagon train had just reached the foot of the slope when suddenly, there was a burst of fire from the thick underbrush at the intersection with the crossroads. The French had let the point pass undisturbed and directed their attack at the leading vehicles of my wagon column. Three horses dropped mortally wounded. A Prussian non-commissioned officer who was riding beside me had both his hands pierced by two bullets which, however, were aimed at me. I leaped from my horse and turned the first wagon around so that it stood crosswise in the road. I then helped the bugler from under his horse and ordered him to blow "assembly." I made all my mounted men dismount and fire at the French who were afraid to come out of their hiding places among the bushes. The enemy's fire did us no further damage as he was occupying but a corner of the intersection and the wagon turned crosswise in the road prevented him from seeing us. When I had assembled the drivers, who were armed with guns which had been taken from the French, I ordered the drummer to beat his drum, and rushed at the French with a yell. The latter were not able to resist our attack. One of them was shot down, five others taken prisoner and the rest of them dashed away as fast as they were able to go. … Part of the prisoners belonged to Garibaldi's army. Part of them were partisans. The latter were immediately executed. I now formed a chain of men with which I swept the woods.

Unfortunately for them, the fleeing Frenchmen in the woods ran into a company of infantry who had heard the shooting, and were coming to see what the matter was. But, in spite of this, the majority of them managed to escape. There were about two companies of them. In addition, Bassermann relates that after the attack, many of the wagons stood or lay crosswise of the road or in the ditch. This account again, shows how vulnerable a horse-drawn train is to such ambuscades. The conduct of the young officer was exemplary. He showed that in guerrilla warfare a daring and energetic personality is able to achieve success, and that in the case of a surprise encounter, the proper thing to do is to take the lead in the situation. It is certain that the unskillful conduct of the French lightened his task in defending his train against them.

But under a more hesitating commander, and in view of the great superiority of the enemy, the fight would have probably have turned out more seriously.

During the course of the operations back of the German front, there occurred innumerable attacks on isolated billets, sentries and guards. Attacks were even made on strongly-occupied stations along the supply routes. The attacks on Stenay, Chatillon sur Seine, Auxon, and Chateau Vilain, were especially worthy of notice and only one of them, the attack on Chateau Vilain, failed, thanks to the alertness of its occupants as we shall later learn. The surprise attack of Ricciotti Garibaldi on Chatillon sur Seine, in November 1870, has acquired a certain fame.

This city, located on the upper course of the Seine and to the Southeast of Troyes, belonged in the zone of communications of the Second Army. On account of its importance as a junction for several highways and railroads and because it was the most important in the northern part of the department, Côte d'Or, the German inspectorate of the zones of communication had sent a fairly large body to Chatillon, namely, a battalion of Westphalian *Landwehr* and a squadron of hussars, altogether 11 officers and 460 men of the infantry, and five officers and 90 men from the hussars. The relatively strong garrison was expected to keep the population from rising in arms, over a considerable area and make it possible to open the railway line between Chaumont, Chatillon and Troyes, for operations shortly.

The commandant, Colonel von Lettgau, arrived at the city with the garrison, a reinforced battalion, in the afternoon of 17 November. Although the situation was very uncertain since the removal of the 10th Army Corps, which up to that time had been located at Chatillon, the soldiers were distributed about over the city and in the houses of the people. Only the commander of the hussars kept his men together in some large farm buildings. An assembly place in case of alarm had not been clearly announced to the men of the *Landwehr* organization. In the city hall there was a guard for security inside the city of one non-commissioned officer, one of the musicians and 24 of the men from the *Landwehr.* This bunch of guards placed double guards at the entrances to the city. Since it was reported that the city of Dijon was occupied by the enemy, the commanding officer also stationed pickets on the highway leading to this place, and in addition, three or four kilometers beyond, a patrol of hussars. These outer securities had received the very indefinite orders, to return again to the city with "the coming of dawn."

The night between 17 and 18 November passed quietly. To understand the situation, it is important to know that during the afternoon the battalion answered roll call on the market square, without their rifles, and that the ensuing night, nothing but non-commissioned officers were put in charge of the field guards on the highway, and the mounted patrol. There was no disturbance during the second night, either, to start with. At about 0500, long before day break, the mounted patrols and field guards returned to the city. Suddenly scattered firing was heard at all the entrances to the city. These were soon followed by steady firing. Before the

confused guards in the city hall were able to decide what to do, the attack was fully under way, and the enemy had penetrated deeply into the city from all directions.

It was Riccioti Garibaldi who executed this *coup de main* with about 400 partisan fighters, having come from the city of Autun, about 100 kilometers away. From French sources, we have the incomplete account of one of the participants, the ordnance officer, Thiébault, a part of which we can relate, as far as it agrees with the German reports.[68] Garibaldi had come with his partisan fighters from Autun to Coulmiers le Spec in four days of marching. This village is situated only some 15 kilometers to the southwest of Chatillon. There he received from sympathizers valuable information concerning the situation in Chatillon: the manner in which the troops were lodged and information with regard to the security. Garibaldi kept his plans secret, both with respect to the inhabitants and his own men, until the last moment. In addition to this, he took strict measures to prevent any one's going to Chatillon and betraying the menacing proximity of the partisan band.

At midnight between 17 and 18 November, all the men of the partisan companies were quietly awakened and ordered to proceed toward Chatillon. The partisans marched at first in column formation in order to decrease the possibility of misunderstandings and disputes. The point of the marching columns was formed by the mountain chasseurs, who had been assigned for operations with them. Toward 0500 in the morning, the partisan formation was drawing close to its objective, and when about 700 meters from the city, they divided into two attacking columns, one of which, the mountain chasseurs, about a hundred in number, was to attack from the south, and was to direct its efforts mainly to the seizure of the hotel where many of the German officers were lodged. The main body of the troops, some 300 partisans, turned to the left and went around the city so as to attack it from the North. Unfortunately, Thiébault gives only a very general description of the fight: "The two attacking columns were made up of a total of some 400 men. We entered the city without the least resistance. We advance slowly and silently on both sides of the Rue du Chaumont, deployed as rifle troops. The highway is still clear. A few inhabitants of the town catch sight of us and stare at us in surprise and fright. Just as the point of the column had crossed the little square in front of the city hall, a few shots are discharged in the rear of the column, immediately followed by fire which is accepted as signal for the attack. An attack on every house is now begun. The doors are broken in. There is fighting on the steps and tile floors of the houses."

From German sources, the following additional details are recorded: The hussars were surprised in their quarters by the partisans, the guards posted at the entrances shot down, and nearly all the troopers taken prisoner. They were not able to defend themselves against the partisans for the reason that they did not have any ammunition which fitted their carbines. A large proportion of

the men of the *Landwehr* organization were taken prisoner in their quarters or killed. In the street battles, the partisans almost nowhere succeeded in gaining the upperhand on the *Landwehr*. In spite of this, however, in view of the confusion and the threatening aspect of things, the commandant decided to evacuate the city. Although, as we might have suspected, it was deserted by Garibaldi, immediately after the termination of his successful coup de main, it was not again occupied till the afternoon, after reinforcements had arrived. On 20 November, the commander even ordered a retreat to Chateu Vilain, some 37 kilometers distant.

Riccioti Garibaldi's success was considerable. With a total loss of but six dead and 10 wounded on the part of the partisan troops, the surprise attack had caused the vastly superior German forces the loss of eight officers, 184 men and 76 horses. The success of the attack, in addition to this, was a considerable blow to German morale and encouraged the partisan forces of the whole region. Also, the resumption of operations on the railway line running through Chatillon was greatly delayed. The French owe their success to obvious and incomprehensible mistakes on the part of the German garrison.

That the troopers should have been kept together was quite alright, but they should not have been lodged in billets with only one exit, where they were practically trapped and helpless. Perhaps they would have been able to repel the attack in spite of all this if they had not lacked ammunition. But since they were lacking in this respect, all preparations should have been made to enable them to use their bayonets or *poignards*. In this connection it is interesting to know, that the "fast arm" of tomorrow, the armored formations, can also get into an equally embarrassing and desperate situation as a result of incorrect disposition of their forces or the wrong choice of quarters in which to rest. During the English maneuvers in September 1934 an infantry brigade succeeded in annihilating, in a surprise attack, a tank formation which had succeeded in breaking into the area to the rear, then had been assembled in too cramped a space in the city of Hungerford.

The peacetime arrangement followed in quartering the men of the *Landwehr*, where they were distributed about in separate and scattered quarters, and the inadequate security were both entirely incorrect. A fundamental principle in the establishment of supporting points, even of those behind the front, must be that only buildings, portions of the city and portions of the terrain be occupied for holding which, there are sufficient forces available. It also turned out to be a bad mistake that no officer was on hand at the critical moment to take control of the situation and launch a resolute counter-attack against the enemy. It is certain that the partisan troops would not have been able to withstand an immediate counter-attack even if it had been made only by a small group of fighters.

A communications zone garrison must be ready for an attack at any time. That was true for those years of war of movement; that will also be true for supporting points in the rear of mobile forces in the wars of the future. It

is possible that the missions given to the Chatillon garrison: the securing of a road network and railway line and the prevention of popular uprisings, might have been carried out much better by mixed and mobile formations. We recall the directives issued by Napoleon, which certainly should have been followed here and in consequence of which Garibaldi would have had a great deal of difficulty in moving about so boldly in the communications zone of the German army. But that even a fixed garrison is able to defend itself successful against an attack by partisan bands if the proper procedure is followed, is shown by the unsuccessful surprise attack by a combined unit from the Langres fortress against the city of Chateu Vilain which was occupied by two companies of the Unna *Landwehr* battalion.

The garrison of this city had an especially difficult task. In the immediate vicinity of the garrison were extensive wooded areas which could not possibly be searched thoroughly and from which surprise attacks might be expected at any time. The region had repeatedly suffered from the bold operations of the partisan leader, Javouhey. This naval captain who was stationed in the Langres fortifications, had equipped a detachment of his naval gunners with rifles, for patrol purposes and in encounters with the enemy, often showed much spirit and skill.

Fortunately, in view of the dangerous situation, effective measures had been taken in the matter of security, by the commander. To be sure, he permitted his men to occupy quarters in the houses of the inhabitants of the city, but only in groups. Every evening, when darkness came on, the entire garrison was assembled in two houses on the market place and which were connected with one another. The doors and windows of these "alarm houses" were so reinforced that the garrison would be able to repel an attack with limited means. Alarm practice had been given. Each man was used to finding his firing loop-hole quickly and surely. For security three out-guards were posted on the edge of the city. The commanders of the formation, old *Landwehr* officers, also acted in a fitting manner in other respects. By means of patrol riding, they kept watch personally over the area immediately around the city and gave conscientious attention to the matter of security.

Their shrewdness and foresight paid for themselves. On the evening of 8 December, as the two companies were going in to the alarm houses, occurred the long-expected attack by the Javouhey partisan formation. Two of the sentinels were able to reach the fortified houses; the third skilfully concealed himself in the terrain, after warning the garrison by firing his rifle. The French tried in vain to reach the center of the city. They rushed at the fortified houses, but after engaging in action with the German troops for a while, from the shelter of adjoining houses, they retreated with heavy casualties, while the garrison had almost no casualties to complain of. Even their attempts to destroy the railway property in Chateu Vilain were carried out with so little skill, that they were a complete failure. It was apparent, however, that with all their shrewd foresight,

the *Landwehr* had made one mistake. The fortified supporting points should have been established where they could have covered the most important objectives with their fire, and, in this case, it was the railway property.

In the French account of the unsuccessful attack, the complaint is made that the three assault formations engaged by Javouhey had not cooperated correctly.[69] Perfect cooperation, cannot be obtained at night, however, except in the rarest of instances. It is to be recommended, therefore, also according to my own experiences as an assault unit commander on the western front, that two different assault groups should never be sent against the same objective. If this principle is not adhered to, night operations will fail automatically. Javouhey's remarks concerning this episode are so significant that I repeat them: "Two of the assault units had been at the railway station for a half hour, when finally, Captain Royes, the commander of the third unit appeared. I learned, now, that the middle column had not advanced. When the firing was heard in the city, the commander of the column had thought the two other columns were being massacred there and that he should be ready to receive and protect them when they retreated! That is the way with improvised officers. Instead of obeying orders, they attempt to discuss them."

Captain Javouhey is wrong when he places all the blame on the commissioned officers. He ought to have counted on the fact in the first place, that the troops who had been assigned to help him were not as dependable as his proven gunners. He also should have stopped to consider the characteristics of improvised officers, and have planned the operations very simply. In guerrilla warfare, the requirement especially important, to avoid misunderstandings and friction by simplicity and clarity in orders.

More important and productive of good results for the French than operations against communications routes and billets, was the task of upsetting the railway movements in the rear of the German armies. It was also clearly recognized, as is shown by numerous examples. That the operations were largely a failure or were not productive of the marked results which were hoped for, is to be attributed to the lack of ability on the part of the partisan fighters, which both hindered and upset the results. Their awkwardness was often greater than the astonishing lack of skill displayed by our *Landwehr* in guerrilla operations. If the tactical ability of the partisan leaders and soldiers had only corresponded a little more to their energy and industry, there is no doubt but that those portions of our army which were dependent on the railways, would have found themselves in a very bad fix.

The number of operations that were carried out during the few winter months is surprisingly great. Attacks on railway bridges occurred at La Roche, Crécy, Buffon, Nuits, Fontenoy, and Liverdun; attacks against railway stations and yards at La Roche, Brienon, Villeneuve and Fontenoy. Attempts were made to damage the tunnel at Lützelburg and Foug. Besides innumerable smaller attacks on construction and railroad units, these partisan formations succeeded in capturing the 3d Field Railroad

Battalion and its protective infantry at Ham. There were also daring attacks on moving trains, for example at Launois, Veuxelles and Chaumont, where our friend, Captain Javouhey gathered his last laurels, but had to be dragged, severely wounded back into the forest by his brave naval partisans. In all these attempts at demolitions, technical mistakes were apparent as well as tactical ones. Explosives went off prematurely in the quarters, wooden bridges refused to catch fire, explosives refused to ignite or else were improperly tamped, rails were removed so unskillfully that even infantry was able to repair the damage. In short, we see even here, that there are certain requirements which must be met in guerrilla warfare, and that only troops who are properly trained from the technical point-of-view are suitable for handling explosives in demolition and for demolition work in general.

In addition to this, the repulse of guerrilla attacks requires energetic and mobile troops. During the course of the war against the *Francstireurs*, it was repeatedly apparent that active troops, who counterattacked energetically in place of engaging in mere defense, were regularly able to gain good results. Also in the guerrilla war of 1870–1871, the old theory was again confirmed that, in guerrilla warfare, a rushing attack is far superior to any other method of procedure. We have the tactical rule, that mobile patrols are more effective against partisan formations than supporting points. The establishment of such supporting points should never be entirely dispensed with; even in future wars they will be indispensable. But it should never be forgotten that in guerrilla warfare, the defender as well as the attacker obtains his greatest victories by a mobile conduct of operations. The operations and instructions issued by all great leaders prove this fact, even Moltke[70] has called attention to the fact that the best protection of small detachments against attack is movement.[71]

Before we draw our study of guerrilla warfare in the years 1870–1871 to a close, it will be fitting to emphasize once again the two main lessons which we have learned: To begin with, the fact that propaganda, the exercising of control over the minds of the people, must provide the necessary support to the operations of guerrilla warfare, but that the conduct of the operations themselves, must be in the hands of tried and particularly clever leaders. Further, we learned with some surprise, that the development of new weapons and arms as much as it has changed actual fighting since 1813, has changed but little the basic truths or principles relating to guerrilla warfare. While the outward forms of ancient tactics disappeared in the rain of fire of the wars of material which were beginning in 1870, guerrilla warfare remained afterwards as before, the field of primitive methods of fighting, the field of the daring and valiant detached combatant with the night, the terrain and surprise, as his tried and dependable allies. Even though in the following chapter we shall have passed on into the next century, we shall be able to see that the nature of guerrilla warfare has scarcely changed.

Komitadschi

The "*Komiten*" wars of the Serbians, Bulgarians, Albanians and Greeks among themselves and against the Turkish overlords, were conducted entirely in the form of guerrilla warfare. The tactical lessons from these operations, however, must be accepted with great caution. Lessons of universal application can scarcely be drawn from them, owing to the fact that conditions in the Balkans at the turn of the century must be regarded as exceptional. The army, which was opposed by the bands of the various nationalities, was made up in part of excellent human material. This army was hampered, however, by lax command and dishonorable administration. The poorly-armed, untrained, ill-fed and ill-clothed troops were faced, however, by partisan troops whose fighting powers were fed by abundant supplies coming from their respective home committees. They had the most modern firearms and explosives at their disposal; they carefully trained according to their national standards and were often led by active officers whose military education was far superior to that of the majority of the Ottoman leaders. The total environment inside the decadent empire of the *Caliphs* favored partisan war so completely, that it immediately evolved into the permanent institution of European Turkey.

The *Komiten* themselves almost never directed their activities against bodies of troops, but generally against the civil organizations of the government and persons belonging to the hostile nationalities. Only when cornered by superior forces of troops would they occasionally direct their attacks against them, in order to fight their way out. An account by the Austrian officer Captain Hubka, who after 1900 was active as an assistant in the restoration of the Turkish gendarmerie, gives us a good idea of their manner of fighting.[72]

According to these reports, the measures adopted by these fighters for security were unlike those regarded as fundamentally correct by the generality of armies. But Hubka is incorrect in calling them "highly inadequate." They were, in fact, correct for small groups of partisan fighters for whom far flung outposts and extremely advanced points constitute a menace rather than "security." We recall the very limited security sent out in the case of Colomb's formations and which proved so effective. Captain Hubka reports an entirely similar practice in the case of the *Komiten*. On the march, their security was limited to an advanced guard of from four to 10 men sent on ahead in the direction of the march. They paid absolutely no attention to lateral security, but made up for it by taking advantage in a "reptilian-like" manner of every favorable feature of the terrain. When resting, their favorite practice was to leave their security in the hands of friendly inhabitants: preferably, women working in the fields, or playing children. Security of this kind attracted no attention and usually was very dependable.

Figure 4: Right and wrong consideration of back and underground for guerrilla fighters avoiding detection from ground observation (a). Using shadows as camouflage from air observation (b). (Jagdeinheiten)

The bands usually travelled by night and, as daylight came on, hid themselves in woods, canyons, cornfields or even in farm buildings belonging to their confederates, as was done by our partisan bands in 1813. The necessary support of the civil population was gained by active propaganda and maintained by bloody acts of terrorism against traitors and indifferent persons. Excellent military organization and equipment, fanatical fighting spirit, severity and freedom from want, made the *Komiten* dangerous. Discipline in the formations was frightfully strict. It is remarkable that very frequently soldiers who had committed misdemeanors, deserters, and criminals who could not accommodate themselves to the order of their own country or army,

entered the formations as volunteers, and fought in them in an altogether dependable, brave, and obedient manner. Social outcasts in the formation, when the going really got hard, often proved to be exemplary fighters. Even our German history gives us good examples of this. Let us recall the "Wild Merseburger," the outlaws to whom wise Henry I granted a free state in the Ostmark in the year 924 and who, in the subsequent bitter strife, thanked him and the people with their blood.

As already mentioned, the bands of their own accord attacked regular troop formations only when they were unable to obtain their objective in no other way. As a rule, they attempted to plan their operations, attacks on villages and bands of the hostile population in such a way as to avoid clashes with the Turkish troops. If, however, they were unable to avoid a clash with companies or battalions of the Turkish army who had been sent out in pursuit of them, they usually limited themselves to delaying action, and escaped as soon as possible from the enemy – at the latest, as soon as night covered their movements. "There was no planned conduct of operations," remarks Captain Hubka, and by this he means, conduct of operations in accordance with the tactical rules and field service regulations of that time:

> The Komitadschis limited themselves, when surprised, to defense, generally, taking instinctive and unprecedently-skillful advantage of the favorable features of the terrain. They tried to break up the formations of the Turkish troops by well-aimed fire at short range. When this was hopeless, owing to numerical superiority on the part of the enemy, then, immediately before the threatened attack, they disperse and retreated to positions to the rear, or to a previously agreed-on rallying place. In these withdrawals, they made very good use of hand grenades (bombs), throwing them at the attacking or pursuing enemy …
>
> Rocks and brush offered excellent cover for the army and, in addition, the bands of partisans made use of the old trick of placing their fez or kalpak several paces to one side of them …
>
> The discovery that the bands often intentionally made long pauses in their firing, for the purpose of creating the belief that they had already left the position, made it extremely hard for the Turkish officers to decide when the moment had arrived to cease fire and enter the decisive stage of close combat.

The bands were particularly hard to handle when defending themselves in some massive stone structure, cloister, or tower.

They were extremely skillful in getting their supporting points ready for defense in a short length of time. By being extremely temperate and sparing with their scarce provisions, they often remained several days and nights in their stronghold and forced the Turks, on whom they inflicted many casualties by their fire to a careful encirclement and regular siege of their position. They often succeeded in escaping even then, in the

night. Most of the *Komitadschis* were accurate in the shooting on account of their modern weapons and training, but they were sparing with their fire, as they had to think of the great difficulties in the way of getting new ammunition.

A note made by Hubka concerning the complete lack of cavalry in these operations deserves mention. It deserves attention on account of the great expectations existing in Russia relative to the work of the Red cavalry whose main task it is to stir up the flames of guerrilla warfare and keep them burning in the territory of the imperialistic enemy. The use of cavalry formations was impossible from the very start with the conditions as they were. Single mounted men could be placed with the troops who were providing security, in case of need, but they made good targets for the enemy and were of no more value than foot soldiers. In some cases the absence of cavalry may be attributed to the nature of the terrain, which was very rugged and not favorable to cavalry. We recall that in earlier wars, also, cavalry was found to be very sensitive to ambuscades and surprise attacks. In the messenger service, however, mounted men rendered good service in the partisan operations. Artillery was not often used against partisans and, when it was used, in too unskilled a manner. But where it was judiciously employed, it gave excellent results, as may be imagined.

By the establishment of "cordons," rows of solid blockhouses along the frontiers of the empire, the Turks hoped to prevent the entrance of reinforcements, ammunition, supplies, and messengers for the bands of partisans fighting on Turkish soil, as much as possible. From accounts of battles in which these border patrols were involved, we must conclude, that this was not entirely successful. When several such strong points were attacked by partisan bands, or even harassed and held down by long-range gunfire or the use of explosives, single carriers of ammunition or even whole bands regularly were able to cross over the Turkish lines of defense. If there had been sufficient distribution in depth of the block-houses or sentry posts, the barricading qualities of the cordon would certainly have been increased. It would have been still better if patrol formations had been added, supplementing the purely defensive system represented by the block-houses and sentries.

But on Austrian soil, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, these partisan bands were very quickly done away with by the use of pursuit commandos, the so-called "*Strafunis*." These patrols operated as a sort of counter-partisan formation. They were made up of fighters particularly suited for the work and were fully up to the standards of the *Komitadschis* in the matter of endurance and skill in fighting. They show up suddenly and unexpectedly, first here, now there, and soon completely routed the partisan bands by their coups de main, ambuscades and surprise attacks. It is particularly important to note that through the adoption of harsh punitive measures, the desire was taken from the civil population to support and the shelter the *Komiten*.

The border chasseur companies which were instituted in the winter of 1908–1909, and which in 1915 were increased to battalions, were modeled after these old patrol formations and have proven their value. In 1914–1915, they handled the war with Montenegro almost by themselves.[73] The principle of a mobile, aggressive conduct of guerrilla warfare has shown itself as correct in this instance, also, and the experience of the Austrian in the operations of the *Komitadschis*, stood them in good stead in the World War, in the pacification of the occupied Serbian territory as we shall learn in the following section.

Bandit war in occupied Serbia, 1917

After the conquest of Serbia, the Austrian government was faced with the task of holding the people in subjection and maintaining order sufficiently well to permit the employment of all possible forces in the prosecution of the war with her allies. The occupational troops had to deal with a dangerous adversary, who was extremely clever in all matter pertaining to war. Well-versed in all forms of guerrilla warfare, filled with implacable, often cruel hostility toward the conquerors and supported by the love and admiration of the greater part of the population, the bands of Serbian partisans remained for a long time a source of continual uneasiness to the Austrian-Hungarian government. The tradition of her brave people, who honor "*Junak*," the guerrilla warrior, and the experiences of *Komiten* fighting, were as much to their advantage as all the advantages of their deeply-eroded, forested and familiar country.

After the conquest of Serbia, therefore, relatively strong forces were necessary to keep the country in subjection. Up to August, 1916, 35 battalions and one regiment of *Landsturm* troops, six companies of patrol troops, 12 units of railways guards, four and a half squadrons, five artillery batteries, and two improvised anti-aircraft batteries constituted the occupational forces. In addition, there were 5,000 gendarmes distributed over the 12 governmental districts. The figures were later reduced, but the organization was made correspondingly more severe.

From the very outset, as a result of the valuable experiences of the *Strafunis* in Bosnia, which we spoke of in the last section, the measures adopted were by no means confined to defense. It was planned to supplement the security provided by garrisons and sentries by active and mobile defense units. All men not capable of field service were destined for garrison service in the district cities and supporting points. Groups of gendarmes of from 20 to 30 men in strength, were stationed in the villages, as a sort of field outpost. For mobile and active defense, the district field gendarmerie sent out mobile patrols of from 12 to 15 men, in its area; furthermore, in each district there were patrol companies available which could serve as mobile combat reserves capable of greater striking power. General Kerchnawe had the mobile patrols organized



Figure 5: Right and wrong utilization of small cover for concealment. "The guerrilla sneaking up on enemy guards must make use of even the smallest depression, furrow, dirt- and rock-pile, mole mound and grass bundle for cover and concealment." (Jagdeinheiten)

in 1916, so he informed the author. He had had Albanian counter-partisan bands organized at a still earlier date.

When more serious fighting began, early in the Spring of 1917, and which we shall speak of later on, it became apparent that the patrol companies were not equal to their task. They were largely made up of men who were inexperienced in fighting; they were even composed of *Landsturm* troops who were not fully able to render service in the field and even their officers were not able, for the most part, to handle the especially difficult job represented by the mobile operations against the partisan bands. The decision was made, therefore, to combine the patrol companies, which up to that time had been working independently, into a regiment and to provide them with active officers and non-commissioned officers in order to give the organization a firmer character. In addition to this, the new formation received an excellent and energetic commander in the person of Colonel Klemm von Klemmringen. In this form, the formation, composed mostly of Hungarians and southern Slavs gave a good account of itself in the subsequent fighting. Further, a half-battalion was organized out of men belonging to the gendarmerie, for the particular use of the government. This was an elite organization, in every sense of the word, under the command of an experienced front-line officer and which was also frequently employed out of the country, in Macedonia and Montenegro.

To replace the patrol companies, which had become regular troops as a result of this arrangement, a district pursuit unit consisting of one officer and 40 men, similar to the Bosnian *Strafunis*, was formed in each of the districts, in the Spring of 1918. Only especially-capable men and officers were employed in these fighting units, operating as counter-partisan formations. Also, in time, success attended the efforts to turn the minorities who had been oppressed by the Serbians, especially the Mohammedans, against the

Serbian partisans. Turkish and Albanian counter-bands were formed who, dressed in the usual garb of the people, rendered patrol and combat service. According to the Austrian accounts they rendered very valuable service; also a home battalion, made up of Mohammedans under the command of former Turkish officers.

With respect to the missions assigned to the counter-bands and district pursuit units we gain an idea from an order which we shall reproduce in the text. It was issued by the Bulgarian general government, and is addressed to the counter-bands of the Bulgarian area. We may assume that the regulations and practices were quite similar in Austria. The clear, Bulgarian orders are of special significance because the chief of staff who signed them, Lieutenant Colonel Darwingow, had himself been commander of a band of partisans in Macedonia, and may therefore be regarded as an authority on guerrilla operations. The orders are as follows:

Instruction Number 4, concerning the
formation and tactics of counter-partisan bands

Nish, 16 July 1917

Paragraph 1. In exactly the same way that the police in uniform have to be supplemented by the secret police, the counter-partisan bands support the regular troops in the combat of partisan formations.

Paragraph 2. The main value of the counter-partisan bands is not their strength, but in the personality of their leader.

The strength of a counter-partisan band is set at between 15 and 20 men.

Equipment of the men constituting the counter-partisan bands: every man with a rifle, up to 100 cartridges, one hand grenade, a first-aid kit, a bread bag, an overcoat (the last two articles to be carried by pack animals as much as possible), but no pack. The pack animals may be used when desired to convert the foot unit to a mounted one.

Paragraph 3. Every counter-partisan band receives the assignment to follow a given partisan band for definite periods, such as a day, a week, or a month. This practice is a fundamental rule and must be observed as a law.

It is permissible for the units to organize their own message service. The tactics of the counter-partisan bands is the same as that of the regular partisan bands. The counter-partisan band moves, rests, protects itself and fights like a small independent formation. Their most powerful weapon is surprise and their

> greatest strength lies in initiative. It is very important that all movements which are planned be kept secret.
>
> Every two days the commander of the counter-partisan bands announces his whereabouts by messenger to his superior officer; all other reports are handed over to the closest troop formation. The units are to obtain their food either from the closest troop unit, or from the inhabitants of the community where they are located.

In addition to the tactical measures employed for obtaining protection against the partisan hands, the following administrative orders were issued: Every inhabitant must carry identification papers with his photograph. It was strictly forbidden to support the partisans in any manner. Rather, it was the duty of everyone to notify the nearest police picket when a band of them appeared. No one was permitted to leave his dwelling at night. As security against ambush and surprise attacks, the communities were ordered to cut away the trees and brush for a distance of 100 meters back from the highways. All those were measures that had proven their value during the trouble in zones of communication in the war of 1870–1871.

Concerning the encounters themselves, we have more details from General Kerchnawe who was conducting operations at that time as chief of general staff:[74] Kosta Bojnowic of the second levy occupied a prominent place as organizer and director of the partisan operations. He worked in the southern portion of the occupied region, around Mitrovica, where, as purchasing agent for the Austro-Hungarian intendance, he had gained a good acquaintance with all establishments of that region. Even by the end of 1916, his bands had carried out several successful surprise attacks. They had succeeded in enticing a whole patrol of the gendarmerie into an ambush, shooting them all down, 14 men in all.

After this there was a period of quiet on account of the intensification of counter-measures immediately following this disaster. At the beginning of the year 1917, the flames of partisan warfare were again fanned into life after the departure of the Serbian captain, Kosta Pecanac. This officer had been sent by plane by the high command in Salonika to behind the front of the Central Powers. He was supposed to stir up a general uprising there, in support of the planned New Year's offensive of the Entente. Concerning the manner in which this uprising was to be brought about, we gain an idea from an order to partisan leaders who were working the Bulgarian area:

> The commandant of the Komiten of the Jablonika formation issues the following order to the various districts: An uprising has been announced for 11 March (according to the old calendar) in all the provinces of the kingdom of Serbia. Every fighter must be in readiness. They are to gather in detachments on

> highways, attack hostile soldiers in towns and villages, destroy telephone and telegraph lines and railway tracks, and stop all soldiers who are transporting mail or who have horses in their possession. The enemy is to be hindered in his concentration of troops. Notice will be given of any further orders.
>
> Signed: Captain First Class Nisch W Blachowitsch Woitwode Dimitriwitsch
>
> This order is to be reported to the nearest commune of the Bladicin-han district is to be passed from there from commune to commune and is then to go to the Vrange district.

If the uprising had been carried out as planned, and if it had occurred simultaneously with the opening of the Entente Offensive, it would certainly have created an extremely serious situation. Fortunately, however, the leaders were led to a premature execution of the orders on account of conscriptions which the Bulgarians unexpectedly started to levy about the middle of February in the territory occupied by them. The men who were liable for military service failed to report for duty and fled in crowds to the mountains where they permitted themselves to be enlisted in the partisan bands. Captain Pecanac was now faced by the sudden and difficult task of organizing and arming these men who had rebelled prematurely. He was aware that he could certainly count on the Entente's employment of the severest of measures in the suppression of this revolt. He was therefore forced to assume the difficult task of carrying out his organizational work and of fighting at the same time. The volunteers who were pouring in were organized into groups of 10 men under a noncommissioned officer, and for every 50 men, an officer was placed. Every 150 men formed a company. They were not adequately armed. Only about a half of the fighters received rifles with from 80–100 cartridges a piece. Most of the men had hand grenades, however. It is not clear why the high command in Salonika failed to send good rifles and sufficient ammunition by plane. Perhaps it is only on account of the prematureness of it all; perhaps they were denied effective support for the reason that the high command underrated the importance of the matter.

Right at the outset of operations, the insurrectionists succeeded in attacking a company of Bulgarian soldiers by surprise in Kursumlje and in gaining the decision after a stubborn fight. The captured weapons, 150 rifles and two machine guns, were highly welcome. This engagement was followed by a few more successes. Finally, the men under Captain Pecanac succeeded in driving a whole battalion out of the territory of the insurrectionists and back to Nisch. At the beginning of March, 1917, the government itself and the

German inspectors of the zones of communication were threatened by them in Nisch. An extensive region was in rebellion.

The local attempts at defense were not very successful, at first. The commander of the first combat group, thrown together hurriedly from four patrol companies, a half squadron of cavalry and one battery of artillery, an elderly police major who was absolutely inexperienced in war, confined himself to defense instead of attempting to break up the still loosely-joined bands, as the government had ordered, by a vigorous attack. A cavalry patrol of 15 men which had been sent to the rear to maintain contact was wiped out. He finally withdrew completely from the narrow region where the revolt had occurred and relinquished the city of Blacé, which he had been using as a base for his operations, to the insurrectionists. A second combat group, likewise made up of patrol detachments, also got into a serious situation. Then, the defense system which had been instituted and worked out by the government and energetically put into operation by Lieutenant Colonel Jármi, began to bear fruit. The Austro-Hungarian forces, reinforced by troop formations from the Isonzo Front, succeeded in mopping up the revolting area in a period of six days, by an encircling movement. During the operations, their casualties were altogether more than 180 men, 140 of these being killed. The uprising which had begun so successfully for the Serbians, ended therefore, in total failure. This shows once again, that in guerrilla operations, it is dangerous to assemble large bodies of men and risk open battle, which makes demands which cannot be met by untrained troops such as these.

It is to be assumed, that with a discreet limitation of activities to those methods of procedure more adapted to guerrilla warfare, much more permanency would have been achieved in the venture. Captain Vojvonic, in 1917, succeeded in operating in Austro-Hungarian territory through the entire year, with a few small bands. Most of the time, he operated offensively. As a result of his daring, he was always able to fight his way through, even when the newly-organized patrol regiment under Colonel Klemm thoroughly combed the revolting region in July 1917 in a sort of drive, surrounding and annihilating the bands under Captain Pecanac. The brave leader was not brought down by the enemy till December 1917 and with his death the partisan operations came almost to a standstill. Even when the activities of the *Komitadschis* started again in 1918, they were not able to equal their earlier intensity. Captain Maulik who was engaged in defensive operations against the partisans in the very center of the revolting region, characterizes as tactical lesson the observation that: a blockade by cordons or encirclements or even a combination of the two procedures with the employment of "out-passes" have not fully proven their worth. On the contrary, however, the operations of the counter partisan bands and district pursuit units were highly effective, employing as they did, all the tricks of guerrilla warfare and beating the guerrilla fighter with his own weapons.[75] This description is to be regarded as

corroboration of previous findings. Fully as important also is the confirmation of the fact that unpopular uprisings are generally put down without much trouble when they attempt to copy the methods of combat of regular troops.

In conclusion, we wish to call attention to the importance of the personality of the leader, a factor of more importance in guerrilla operations than in any other kind of warfare. The partisan war in Serbia was wholly governed by a few brave and extremely resolute leaders. And the defense against these partisan operations was unqualifiedly successful only in those sectors where it was carried out by bold and energetic officers.

The Belgian Burgerwacht, 1914

The expression: "Peaceful deportment is the first duty of the citizen," certainly does not seem appropriate when the people and nation are threatened. But it is more sensible and respectable than the "noisy excitement of anxiety," the destructive stupidity which, during the first weeks of the World War, took possession of great numbers of the Walloon [French-speaking] population and, unfortunately, even of the Flemish [Dutch-speaking] population of Belgium like a sort of intoxication and which, far from being suppressed by the authorities, was even intensified by plan less orders and counter-orders. In the limited scope of this work we will not be able to touch on the legal phases of the matter or on the human side of the Belgian tragedy. It is, besides, superfluous, for all that could be done on the part of Germany, in the way of explanation of the events that occurred, has long since been taken care of in a dependable and professional manner.[76] We can also include in the limits of our examination, the lessons along the line of organization and tactics which stand out with considerable prominence from the Belgian revolt, that unsuccessful attempt at insurrection with inadequate means. The disaster which the obstinate attitude of the Belgian authorities brought upon both people and nation, should serve as a warning for all times. It showed how dangerous it is to play with the idea that a popular revolt in the form of a guerrilla war can always be counted on in case of necessity.

Such a popular uprising in the case of war constituted an essential part of the Belgian defense plans in the pre-war era. The "*Garde Civique*," which had existed since 1830 and which had been newly established on 9 September, 1897, was, apparently, a matter of assault troops plus the revolting populace. It is worth our while to examine a few features of this remarkable system. They will explain its complete failure and fateful consequences. Besides its police duties, the citizens' watch or citizens' guard had the task of keeping watch over the maintenance of national independence and the integrity of the nation. Strangely enough, it was not under the control of the minister of war, but rather the minister of the interior. According to the constitution,



Figure 6: Right and wrong way of minimizing the target. (Jagdeinheiten)

mobilization could occur only by special legislative act. The arrangement was further complicated by the distinction of "active" citizens' guard in cities of over 10,000 inhabitants and "non-active" in smaller communities. To make matters still worse, this distinction was further broken down so that in some 20 of the largest cities, the guard was also termed non-active. Only the active members of the citizens' guard wore uniforms, altogether some 46,000 men. They themselves had to pay for their uniforms. The government took care of their arms and other equipment. The special corps of the active citizens' guard, the artillery troops, the chasseurs, both foot and mounted and the firemen, altogether some 7,000 men, constituted a sort of elite body of troops with tough training. The members of the special corps were obliged to remain under arms throughout the entire duration of the war, when it occurred. If required by necessity, they could also be employed outside their home area and from the date of mobilization were not only under the orders of the minister of the interior, but also under those of the minister of war. What sort of mobilization was meant, whether the general mobilization of the army or, the special mobilization of the *Garde Civique,* in accordance with the law of 1897, is an open question.

The duties of the non-active members of the citizens' guard without uniforms were entirely indefinite, though their duties according to law were also supposed to be "the preservation of the integrity of the nation." Evidently, also, the men liable for service were ignorant of the sort of activities expected of men belonging to the active guard but who were too poor to pay for uniforms. Also, it is significant of the whole system that laborers were neither permitted to belong to the active or non-active citizen guard units.

The regulations concerning the employment of the *Garde Civique* were fully as confused as its organization. After repeated requests by the minister of war, on 18 January, 1906, the minister of the interior explained in a long

memorandum that he could not agree to an incorporation of the citizens' guard into the army. We perceive in another memorandum, a circular letter to the high commanders of the *Garde Civique* on 2 August 1909, what its tasks were to be: "After mobilization has been completed, the defense measures to be undertaken by the *Garde Civique* will be the widespread establishment of strong points in those areas where it has been called out capable of resisting the bold and overwhelming charge of a cavalry unit breaking through the rear guards of a field army.

"The resistance which the people oppose to the taking of our cities and the occupation of our provinces, will have the best effects of all on the morale of the nation. It will win the active support of the timorous."[77]

As an additional field of duty the *Garde Civique* was to be entrusted with the security of the various establishments in the zone of communications, with the protection of the capital city and the various garrisons. It was not desired that the citizens' guard should take part in open battles. It was to confine its operations exclusively to those proper to guerrilla warfare. The defense of towns and villages, house and barricade fighting occupied a central place in its instructions and activities. The whole organization and planned methods of action would have been in agreement with the provisions of the Hague Convention if the easily recognizable insignia prescribed in case of mobilization had been prepared and if, above all, the men had been adequately instructed in the laws and practices of war. But this was not done, and the events of the first weeks of the war are to be explained on the grounds of this criminal negligence and this unconscionable fanning of the flames of popular hatred.[78]

Even the mobilization of the *Garde Civique*, prescribed by constitution and by virtue of which it became a part of the army, according to the laws of war, was not carried out in the proper form and the civil population was not instructed with regard to the laws of war even at the last moment. As a result of this, the highly dramatic call to arms, accompanied in most places by the ringing of bells and the running of the populace, destroyed all traces of common sense and judgment, not only with the members of *Garde Civique*, but also with the rest of the population as well. But in any event, the *Garde Civique* discharged its duties very faithfully in the matter of "arousing the hesitant ones"! Shrieking women demand arms, boy scouts begin looking for spies and mishandled peaceful German citizens. In many places the mob committed acts of abusive violence against the person and possessions of unarmed German inhabitants. As far as any correct armament of the *Garde Civique* was concerned, just as little provision had been made as for any of the other necessities of systematic warfare. "What were they to do?" – The answer was simple when left to the people themselves. Any weapon was good: hunting rifles or guns, revolvers, daggers, scythes! A heroic strain, which reminds one of the ancient

Eburones runs through the commanders call to arms, reports *Le Soir*, 5 August 1914, Edition B, regarding the call to arms of the citizens guard in Tongern, and we have innumerable other reports from other localities of similar call in these places.

The main excitement was still further increased when, soon after the entrance of the German troops, a veritable flood of lies spread over the country and a report that the invaders were ridiculously lacking in valor passed from village to village. The people were told that the Germans were entirely lacking in fighting ability and could be rendered harmless with little trouble and would be cleared out, therefore, by the French in a matter of a few hours or days. Lies regarding alleged acts of terrible cruelty on the part of the German also aroused men and women to such a state of rage and excitement that they saw no other course open to them than war with whatever weapons were at hand.

It was, therefore, unavoidable, in spite of the peaceful and blameless conduct of the invading troops that wild clashes and treacherous attempts against the lives of the German soldiers soon occurred. These things were followed naturally by sterner defense measures on the part of the troops, and the latter became more distrustful and less gentle with the hostile inhabitants. The fights which sprang up in many localities and in which by no means, citizens' guard members had a part, cannot be regarded as guerrilla operations. They can hardly be compared with the attacks of the *Francstireurs* of 1870–1871 which at least betrayed some plan nor with the determined, skillful and indisputably brave military operations of the Serbian bands. Judging from their characteristics as a whole they were not determined by any tactical objectives but were the senseless expression of a passionate and confused state of mind. But there was no unified command, nor plans nor definite objectives, and for a time the effects on the German troops were negligible except for the fact that the clashes offered the enemy propagandists material for their unbounded exaggerations and lies.

Reconnaissance, particularly, was rendered very difficult by the treacherous activities of the aroused populace. In many areas, it was almost impossible to send detached messengers to the rear from the areas occupied by the advanced reconnaissance detachments, for everywhere, peaceful farmers and burgers were transformed to murderous beasts the moment they were able to make use of a gun or rifle without danger to themselves. Even in battles with regular Belgian troops, the German soldiers were oppressed by the constant thought that they might be fired on from the rear by civilians, who even brutally killed the wounded as they lay helpless. It is hard to estimate to what extent these popular uprisings, assassinations and armed clashes slowed down the German march. If they failed to obtain a decisive victory, it is above all because the cowardly disturbances were brought to an end before they became a real danger. The close proximity in which the people lived to one another, the close-woven network

of highways but above all, the mental characteristics of the people, were not favorable for the development of a determined and persistent guerrilla war. Thus, the plans regarding the employment of the citizens' guard got no farther than paper; the armed mobs broke away more and more from all control and the results of the popular uprising were far from gratifying. But for the individual fighters themselves, the results were frightful, for those who were not to blame in themselves, who had been merely swept off their feet, who had to pay according to the rules of war, with their blood, for the senseless clashes. The memory of those murderous attacks by the Belgians and the stern punitive measures which the German troops were forced to adopt, is a dark page in the history of the World War. We were obliged to open to it, however, for the unsuccessful attempt to defend the country by a universal uprising of the people which was not sufficiently prepared for and poorly carried out, should be a lesson for all time.

Briefly, the following facts are clearly evident: In a thickly-settled and open country with a high degree of culture and a well-developed network of highways, it is impossible to precipitate a popular uprising and get it into form and working condition fast enough when the enemy drives ahead with great speed and determination. The combat methods of guerrilla warfare are impractical in the strong point of operations. Guerrilla warfare requires just as much as any other form, indeed more so even, definite objectives. Lack of determination, contradictory orders on the part of the command, wild and impractical orders occasion useless sacrifice and lead with certainty to the collapse of the fighting spirit of the men.

Lastly, we see that there is serious danger when a situation arises calling for calm and determined fulfillment of duty, in arousing the passions of the people by lies, misrepresentation of the enemy and unrestrained egging of the people on. A nation which is too easily stirred up by its imagination and wild talk is, in its excitement, incapable of that cool-headed determination and tenacious persistency required by guerrilla warfare. Truth in the matter of reports from the bottom up and from the top down, is still more necessary in guerrilla warfare than in less difficult situations for the creation of confidence, without which the fighting spirit is quickly broken when faced by a resolute adversary. Not the mad dervishes of *Mahdi*,[79] but the well-prepared and trained marksmen of the Tyrol's, the bold chasseurs under Colomb, the dogged Serbian fighters of the Serbian insurrection, can serve as examples of guerrilla fighters. Fighting spirit aroused by the unclean methods of lies and misrepresentation disappears like foam in guerrilla warfare, this hardest of tests of the individual fighter and warlike ability of the race.

Russian Jagdkommandos

Scattered settlement of the land and broad, trackless and uninterrupted areas in which travel is difficult offer an excellent field for guerrilla

operations. On this account, it is not to be wondered at that this phase of warfare is given special attention in Russia. Even in the armies of the Czar, the possibilities of guerrilla warfare had been recognized, and the effort had been made to take advantage of them. In the regular army, missions of this kind were assigned to so-called "*Jagdkommandos*". These are to understood as independent formation of assault troops with a strength of from 10 to 200 men, with independent combat missions, sent out to attack the enemy in the flanks or the rear. As much as possible they were to be led by persons familiar with the region or rely on the help of the population. Their manner of fighting corresponded to that of assault troops in the war of position. It differed however in that they were not dispatched against local objectives, but were sent into the remote parts of the enemy's rear positions. The operations were planned in accordance with the results of careful reconnaissance, and depended furthermore on lightning-like surprise attacks of the enemy carried out, as much as possible under cover of darkness.

The following account of an operation of this type, the surprise attack executed at night on the village of Kuchozka Wolja (Styr), October 1915, behind the German front, is taken from Russian accounts.[80] In the village which was located in a large clear area of forest, were lodged the staff of the 9th Cavalry Brigade, the 8th Regiment of dragoons, parts of a cuirassier regiment and the 4th Company of the 22d Regiment of reserve chasseurs. The Russians were well informed of the situation as a result of the activities of their scouts. Besides, they had learned that a short distance to the northwest of Kuchozka Wolja an artillery battery position was being prepared and that it was soon expected to be occupied. The situation was favorable for a surprise attack. Kuchozka Wolja was situated about four kilometers back of the German outpost lines which provided for the Vislucha sector. The Russian outposts were located from one and a half to two kilometers east of the Vislucha river. Work was still in progress along the main German line of defense. It ran along close to the east edge of the village, then turned and ran on to the west through the village so that the houses in the southernmost part of the town were outside the barbed wire entanglements. In these unprotected houses, a totally unarmed labor company was lodged and which the Russian report of the battle called a company of chasseurs in order to make the success of the operation even more brilliant.

There was a great deal of brush in the area of the village, as well as trees and marshy spots. The three assault units of the Russian *Jagdkommando* which had been given the assignment had a combined strength of 214 men. Under the guidance of scouts who were familiar with the region, the *Jagdkommando* passed through the line of German sentries on the Vislucha unnoticed and approached the village from the south. When close to their objective, the columns divided. Assault group number one had the task of



Figure 7: Wire cable blockade as a quick and effective method of disrupting enemy road traffic. (Jagdeinheiten)

attacking the unprotected houses on the south edge of the village for the purpose of alarming the soldiers in the place and drawing them outside in an effort to occupy the position being attacked. Assault group number two was then to push its way into the village from the west and, above all, to capture the staff of the brigade. Assault group number three had the assignment of going further to the west, and attacking the battery. The Russian account reports that the skillfully planned *coups de main* was a complete success. In the undefended southern part of the town 67 "chasseurs and artillerymen," that is the above mentioned labor troops, were taken prisoner and the houses burned.

Assault group number two penetrated into the village as had been planned and is reported to have captured the staff of the brigade. But one of the Germans who engaged in this fight, Captain Balck, at that time commanding officer of the 4th Company of reserve chasseurs of the 22d Regiment, has doubts that this attack was entirely successful as regarding the capture of the brigade staff.[81] General Kerchnawe however, informed the author that a bulletin on the Eastern Front which was intended as a warning, reported the capture of a brigade commander and his staff! He also reports that this assault group moved into the village and, led by persons familiar with the place, went to the various officer quarters to take them prisoner. According to the Russian report, all papers, orders, journals and maps in the staff's quarters fell into the hands of the *Jagdkommando*. The only reason why the assault group sent against the battery was not successful was because the battery position which was correctly reported was, all right, as yet, minus its cannon.

As soon as powerful and systematic German defense operations were begun, the assault groups retreated as ordered. Their casualties were relatively small: three dead, and 17 wounded and all the latter with the exception of two were carried back by the Russians. The German casualties, on the contrary, were very heavy: 53 dead, 60 wounded and 70 prisoners and in addition, 76 horses were burned. A general feeling of uneasiness in the sector was a result of the successful *coups de main*. It was necessary to increase the strength of the guards; the men were already heavily taxed, were still further burdened. In judging the success of the operation, this factor should not be left out.

It will be noticed that the plan of the operations, was unusually clever and at the same time simple. In the planning of such operations based on the cooperation of separated groups of assault troops, there is one sure test which the commanding officer must never forget. All he has to do is to stop and consider how things will turn out if some unexpected occurrence interferes with one or even two of the groups which will prevent their support of the others. The plan of the Russian operation against Kuchozka Wolja, stands this test perfectly. If the group sent against the unprotected southern part of the town met with such strong resistance that it had to retreat without having accomplished its purpose, its plan to entice the soldiers out of the village would have been successful in spite of this. It was also very well advised to limit the objective in such a manner that clashes with assault group number two would hardly be possible. According to the Russian account, assault group number one did not penetrate to the interior of the village. When assault group number two penetrated into the city, assault group number one was already engaged in taking its prisoners to the rear. It is well when the possibility of clashes between one's own troops is precluded by such clear planning of the operations. If the planning is not careful, a very bad situation can develop, especially at night. If we consider, also, what the effects would have been if the attack of assault group number two had been repulsed, we see that its failure would not have affected the safety of the two other groups. In this case the operation would have ended with the fine victory of assault group number one. Group number three, whose assignment was quite independent would hardly have been affected by failure on the part of one or two, for the soldiers in the town were occupied to so large an extent by these two groups, in any case, that they had free rein with the batteries. It was also quite correct to keep the three assault groups in one column as long as possible. The famous principle: "march separately; strike together!" is entirely incorrect in such operations. Rather, after night, the commanding officer must keep all his men under his control as long as possible, and permit them to separate just before striking.

The second part of the operations, the retreat, which is often the most difficult part of the operation back of the enemy's lines, was also successfully

carried out by the Russians. It would be also interesting to know if and how they again succeeded in getting through the line of German outposts on their return trip, without being molested. It would have been a master piece of guerrilla warfare operations if they did this without alarming the outposts. But it seems possible that the shooting in Kuchozka Wolja and in the woods on the Vislucha would not have been heard. But perhaps on some signal, the glow of the fire, for instance, the Russian outposts drew the attention of the German outposts by lively gunfire on their own part. The noise of the fighting from the surprise attacks may have been drowned out, by the noise of the local firing. Perhaps the German sentries in the woods were not able to see the light of the fire and, obviously, in any case, the alarm was delayed. This surprise operation serves again as proof of the fact that in guerrilla warfare, when the defensive measures are limited to the establishment of a cordon about a position, an aggressive adversary will still be able to attack.

Red partisans

"In the coming war, which will inevitably develop into a civil war with the international proletariat, yes, into guerrilla warfare, the well equipped Red cavalry will emerge victorious!"[82] In this statement by the cavalry inspector of the Red Army, Budjonny, are summed up the many lessons learned during the years of the civil war. As a matter of fact, the stubborn partisan fighting engaged in by Budjonny himself, Blucher, and numerous other Red leaders against adversaries who in a material way were vastly superior to them, constituted the important preliminary engagements and finally gained victory. Those events may be regarded as a play of fearful portent. The methods of fighting proven in a hundred battles in the World War, the crushing weight of all the armament, the steel barriers of broad fronts, the ingenious structure of staffs and zones of communication crumbled, melted, before the hot breath of revolution. Tried generals and wise front line officers were helpless when confronted by the methods of fighting of guerrilla warfare which a year before, hardly one in a hundred professionally trained persons would have believed of any value whatever.

It is true that the peculiar nature of the vast spaces favored the guerrilla operations of the partisans; it is true that their task was lightened by the fact that the White troops were forced to fight against their will, weary of war and with no enthusing and compelling objective to gain. But this does not diminish the value of the new and successful methods of war, ambuscades, raids and surprise attacks. Those partisan battles which appear to us a return to the period of the Thirty Years War, show us clearly that apparently antiquated methods of fighting may be revived with all their original vigor, as soon as the time is again ripe for it. Perhaps the successful surprise attack, raids and propaganda battles of the Russian civil war are only a sign of what the future

has in store for us. Perhaps, looking backward in years to come, it will be recognized that they were the forerunners of equally significant future events as the battles in Manchuria in 1904–1905 when it was apparent for the first time to a thoughtful person, that from then on and for a long time, machine guns and barbed wire would occupy and important place in operations. They also perhaps, announce the dawn of a new era of guerrilla warfare and showed, as the tank battles of the summer of 1918, that movement might again be a decisive factor in the conduct of operations.

It is regrettable, therefore, that we have but few accounts in western Europe, relatively speaking, relating to the tactics of guerrilla operations and the lessons learned from them. In conformity with their usual practice, the accounts of the generals of the White Guard dwell at too great a length on strategic questions, operations, battles, changes in the position of the front. The reader sometimes distrusts their memories of certain events; whether they themselves went through the experiences and took part in them were really aware, subsequently, of the fact that their antiquated science had really succumbed under the blows – or rather daggers and arrows of the new method of fighting.

Even in the case of the great powers, surprisingly little consideration is given to those events which as a matter of fact, determined the fate of a gigantic nation. The more welcome, therefore, is a helpful sketch relative to partisan organizations



Figure 8: Single tree roadblock used as an obstacle to delay or divert enemy road traffic. (Jagdeinheiten)

for which we are indebted to Captain Wagner.[83] According to his account, the partisan troops were very like the *Jagdkommandos* which had already been known in the army of the Czar. Only they were far more mobile and aimed at deeper positions in the flank and rear of the adversary. The strengths of the formations differed greatly, but it was evident that smaller units of from 100 to 200 men, were the most effective as it was difficult to capture them. In thick wooded regions, marshy areas and in mountains, the partisans fought on foot; in open terrain, always mounted.

They were often given the assignment of holding broad secondary fronts with the methods of guerrilla warfare. But more frequently they were employed in raids a 100 or more kilometers in the rear of the enemy. Wherever there were any gaps in the enemy's front, the partisans seeped through into the rear of the areas. Surprise attacks on communications routes, bridges, supply depots and important military establishments were their objective. Their systematic propagandist activities did immeasurable damage with the peasants who were embittered on account of requisitions made on them by the White soldiers and misconduct on the part of the latter. Wherever the partisans got into a region, there was soon no dependable distinction that could be drawn between the peasants and partisans. The Red flood also rose angrily in the rear of the White armies, till the overstrained restraining levees broke.

Only in rare cases, were the leaders of these bands former officers. As a rule, a handful of daring adherents gathered around an old communist or revolutionist and bands formed in this way carried on war on their own account and resources. Many of the best known of the Red leaders began their military career as partisan leaders. Fanatical fighting spirit, devil-may-care boldness, an alert mind and tactical resourcefulness coupled with stubborn tenacity of purpose made extremely dangerous adversaries of the partisans for the White divisions. And in treating of them we should by no means ascribe all their successes to the fact that the Czar's forces were weakened, decadent and disintegrating. Even the able bodied, vigorous troops sent against them finally by the Entente, when the effort was made to intervene, were not able to hold their own against the Red storm.

With surprising clearness, Edwin Dwinger[84] describes the battles, colored by diabolical acts of cruelty on the part of both adversaries. His accounts give a clear picture of the method of fighting of the partisans and of their irresistible power. The traditions of the years of the civil war are carefully guarded by the Red Army and youth groups. Many troop units trace their traditions back to partisan formations. The claim is often repeated, that these traditions are of value to the troops not alone because of moral effects, but also because of the tactical and strategic lessons to be learned in them as well as clear and definite plans for the conduct of future wars.

As a bit of proof of the role that will be played in future developments in the right sort of terrain, by Red partisan fighters, we may call attention to the "bandit wars" in Manchuria in 1933–1934 which kept the Japanese so busy. In actions between the main lines with the engagement of very slight forces, they won very considerable success. Strong forces of Japanese troops were tied down. But in spite of this, great losses in both men and materials could not be prevented. Especially impressive was the manner in which the negotiations for the sale of the East China Railroad were accompanied and influenced in a manner favorable for the Russians by attacks by "bandits" in the late summer and fall of 1934. The punctuality was also impressive with which these attacks came to an end, as soon as the negotiations were terminated. Guerrilla warfare is in the limelight in this situation as an impelling factor in governmental decisions, regardless of how skillfully the ties were concealed which bound its operations with the Amur and Argun rivers.

From that day in which we see the Soviet Union involved in a war, we will see the operations of guerrilla warfare placed on an equal footing with regular operations of war.[85] Whether or not the Soviet Union would be able to develop partisan warfare in the territory of the enemy, may truly be questioned. But there is absolutely no doubt that in case of any invasion of the giant nation, the invader will run onto the stubborn resistance of countless partisan bands whose activities are dwarfed by the operations of the Red Army itself, but which, on the other hand will cripple the invader, the further he advances into the limitless area.

Old experiences and new combat equipment

Our glance through the history of guerrilla warfare in the 19th and 20th century gives us as the result of our labors, a few principles whose correctness is proven not only by successful operations but by unsuccessful ones which are none the less instructive. They sound simple, almost insipid, like commonplace statements. Nevertheless there is adequate reason for stating them with all clearness. Only too frequently – indeed it is almost the rule – that in time of peace the simplest truths that war has taught us are forgotten, and have to be dearly acquired again. And it would also cost us heavily in the future if we were to fail to remember in guerrilla warfare, of necessity, a few fundamental combat principles hold in attack as well as in defense.

1. In guerrilla warfare, attack has always shown itself to be the stronger form of combat action.
2. From this statement which appears to contradict the tactical experiences of the defense battles of the World War, arises the demand that security and defense missions also can be solved only by mobile methods of combat tending in the direction of attack.

3. In attack missions in guerrilla warfare numbers and armament are far less decisive than the inner value of the fighters, their slyness and their extraordinary developed skill in using means at their disposal and in taking all advantage of the nature of the terrain. In most instances, their mission also requires unavoidable numerical limitations of the combat forces engaged.
4. The chances of success in guerrilla warfare are limited by the need of a dependable support for the engaged forces and pursuit detachments whether by secret support on the part of the population of the region of operations or by the possibility, in the case of superior and dangerous counter operations on the part of the enemy, of obtaining quick support of one's own formations. Partisans also require dependable support with respect to the matters of supplies of ammunition and food, periods of rest, the care of wounded, communications and the receiving of orders.



Figure 9: Notching tree for direction of fall to create an obstacle (a). Multitree blockade providing creator depth to a roadblock (b). (Jagdeinheiten)

The principles that we have given have always shown themselves as correct in the past.

Will they always prove to be correct in the future? What influence on guerrilla warfare in the future will the great number of combat means now offered by science have, especially automatic weapons, motorization, toxic chemicals, and also modern propaganda? It is plainly obvious, that at least, they will alter the outward form of guerrilla warfare. Whether or not they are capable of changing its nature in any material way or to limit or expand the range of its effects, we should give attention to. For without vital relationships with the present and future, the lessons of the past would be of little value.

Let us start with the most important questions: Will attack also in the future remain the stronger form of operations in guerrilla warfare? Will automatic weapons which strengthen defense on the field of battle to an unsuspected extent, also cast their paralyzing influence into this auxiliary field of military operations? It is obvious that equipment with automatic weapons in guerrilla warfare also, is first, and above all, an advantage for the defender, that is, the forces who are assigned the mission of providing security. Much more extensive sectors of terrain than in former times can be barricaded by means of the concentrated fire of fewer automatic weapons as long as ammunition in adequate quantities is available. But the repelling, blocking effects of the automatic weapons cannot make themselves felt in guerrilla warfare in quite so overwhelming and paralyzing a manner as in battle – at least when the attacker selects the correct method of combat. Darkness and fog and difficult terrain, as is well known, detract greatly from fire effect. And, it is just this taking advantage of darkness, of fogs and of close terrains that is the main, essential feature of the successful surprise attack. The more copiously a formation is equipped with automatic weapons and the more, as a result, it is broken up into special groups, the harder will it be for it to assert itself in the more primitive and original combat conditions such as occur with poor visibility in the case of surprise attacks. The fire power they possess as the result of intensive specialization, in not much use when field of fire and visibility are both wanting. It must not be forgotten, that in darkness and thick fog, dagger and trench spade have occasionally been more valuable and dependable weapons than the machine gun.

In battle, to be sure, the opportunities which night offers to a bold fighter can be taken advantage of but to a very limited extent; for poor visibility which interferes with the action of the weapons of the defender, renders also any orderly massed employment impossible in the case of the attacker, and interferes with any systematic, tactical estimate of any partial successes attained. This defect is, however, in guerrilla operations, felt to a far lessor extent. The number of attackers may be small only, for it is only when those methods employed by assault detachments are employed, that success is to be

had. The attack objective is also, usually, relatively limited so that by dint of skillful work, in spite of lack of visibility, coherence and single command may be assured with some degree of certainty. One may, therefore, without further considerations, assume that even a formation with modern equipment and copiously supplied with automatic weapons will by no means be secure in the rear and on its flanks against bold attacks by skillful, bellicose partisans.

But, equipment with the proper automatic weapons, also opens possibilities to partisan bands and pursuit detachments, new and unsuspected capabilities, for it permits a small number of combatants at the decisive moment, to unleash a devastating fire on a worth-while target at close range. Only in rare instances will it be possible to supply heavy machine guns for use in operations in the rear of the enemy front, of course; even light machine guns are still to unhandy and, above all else, the machine gun ammunition represents too heavy a burden. And only in rare cases could full advantage be taken of the range. But the machine pistol [submachine gun or assault rifle] is very well suited for this purpose and this, on account of its handiness, on account of the light weight of its ammunition and its fire effects which, at short ranges, are entirely satisfactory can be rightly called the most effective and dangerous firearm of guerrilla warfare.

Hence, in spite of the development of automatic weapons, offensive operations remains the superior method of combat in guerrilla warfare. Also the second important factor, increasing motorization and mechanization will not alter this fact in the least. The very employment of motorized formations, of armored motorized weapons, and of air combat forces, spreads combat operations over wide areas in which, automatically, guerrilla fighting can and will take place. Surprise attacks on the vulnerable supply lines of the enemy, this Achilles' heel of the armored formations, operations against the enemy's flanks and even in his home areas are much easier to carry out today than during the last war. The transportation of troops and weapons by plane is no longer a dream of the future but an object of extensive experimentation in the United States and Russia. It has even undergone its baptism of fire in English colonial warfare. Armored formations and mechanized units are even able to lend powerful support in attack operations of guerrilla warfare. Thrusts against the flanks and rear of the enemy in accordance with the nature of the new, mobile formations, need by no means aim only at the tactical successes of the moment. When mechanized units set down guerrilla fighters in the vicinity of points in the rear areas of the enemy that are of strategic importance and topographically suitably chosen, they are not only able to produce open wounds in the body of the enemy by means of their tactical blows, but they insert, to a certain extent, foreign bodies in the sensitive network of arteries of his supply organization which can become troublesome, yes, dangerous in strained situations, when the effects are long continued. Motorization on the ground and in the air, prevents fixation of the fronts. By means of them, the field of activity which

applies to guerrilla warfare, is greatly extended. If in the last war we were accustomed to combat operations in the depths of the field of battle and of seeing all continuous lines disappear, it is more probable now that the coming war will break the front lines up completely in combat areas of great depth, that the battle fields will at least reach as far as the operating radius of motor vehicles – perhaps as far as the effects of the propaganda sent out by the great broadcasting stations and spread by pecuniary means. This broadening of the field of action actually invites to guerrilla operations. We thus approach again, situations which existed in former campaigns and which we would never have thought of in the World War, at least on the Western Front, even in a dream.

In the broadening of the combat area by motorization and mechanization and by means of aviation appears in the case of guerrilla warfare, preponderatingly to have benefitted the attacker, even so we must not forget to what great advantage the motor can be used in defense, also, in guerrilla warfare – of course, however, only when the defense is carried out properly, that is, when it is mobile and unceasingly aggressive. When a unit which has been assigned the task of providing security in a communications zone or for a sector of the frontier understands how to combine the mobility provided by the motor with the great fire power of automatic weapons, it is able to suppress guerrilla operations over a broad area or at least limit greatly chances for success.

Aviation is especially important in defense against guerrilla warfare. Air units in the years following the war, repeatedly showed themselves to be effective weapons in the hands of troops with modern equipment, against partisan and guerrilla bands. It is certain, that its employment limited greatly the chances of success in guerrilla operations. There are, of course, still considerable difficulties in the employment of modern combat and bomber formations against partisan forces. The great flying speed makes it impossible, for example, for the observer to recognize small enemy bands who quickly take cover. Also it is difficult for him to distinguish between them and his own free-lance forces. In the low flying which is unavoidable in guerrilla warfare, the difficulties of target designation is increased. This difficulty is avoided when special machines, namely autogyros [helicopters] are assigned permanently to the securing forces. They are superior in every respect to the other types for the special missions of guerrilla warfare. They are able to fly as slowly and close to the ground as is necessary for the purposes of thorough exploration and guarding of the area. They are able to land without difficulty even in rough terrain in order to set down police detachments or arms. Equipment with a searchlight or effective flares would also make night operations possible for them. Light armor could protect them from the fire effects which usually are not very considerable, of partisan bands. Even though a chance hit were to put either pilot or engine out of action, an autogyro is still able to land

without crashing where other machines would simply be destroyed. Their sole weakness, at the present time, as yet unavoidable inferiority alongside enemy pursuit aviation scarcely needs to be considered in one's own rear area.

Permanent assignment of these special machines for police work to the securing forces or the frontier and communications zone areas, will free large forces of infantry and armor for more important purposes and release them from a very thankless task. From the great significance attaching to armored vehicle and airplane in mobile, tactical defense against guerrilla bands, we perceive, besides this, that even older models of tanks and planes are by no means lacking in importance in an army. They may be employed to great advantage in mobile security of the rear areas, transportation routes, strongpoints, camps and airfields and when thus employed, free more valuable formations for operational purposes.

The reinforcement of their combat strength by means of motor vehicles and tanks, will be very welcome to the forces entrusted with mission of providing security in the rear communication areas; for as already mentioned, the situation obtaining in the case of the supply lines of a highly motorized army, actually invites surprise attacks. A constant stream of fuel must flow without cease along the supply lines in order to maintain the mobility and combat power of armor, motorized units and air formations. If partisan warfare breaks out along this inflammable stream or even only in the vicinity of important assembly points, this is a grave threat to the decisive weapon of the enemy. The security of the enormous supplies of fuel will be the more difficult the deeper the steel points of the armored formations and motorized assault forces have eaten into the enemy's area, the longer the supply lines have to be stretched out, therefore. The fact is also important, in this connection, that the high quality of the special arms, inclusive of the *Jager* companies which are up to the Liddell Hart[86] standard and of the "ordinary" infantry, which will also certainly be indispensable for missions of direct security in the future, requires more and more forces and, at that, the most valuable and capable of them.[87] At the time they broke into the Ruhr, the French are reported to have had difficulties in many places in posting the necessary security although the highways were overflowing with highly valuable armored formations. The difficulties encountered by the supply organization of a motorized army therefore, invite guerrilla operations and create certain possibilities, even for an inferior assailant, of dealing the armored enemy, serious blows. Hence, the motor is by no means able to render guerrilla operations quite impossible, but, in a certain sense, it even increases them considerably. Our statement concerning the superiority of attack is, thereby, again corroborated.

The question is less satisfactorily answered whether the employment of chemical weapons would be more beneficial to the attacking bands or the defense. It is also of less significance. It may be assumed that neither in attack

operations nor in security missions in connection with guerrilla warfare, will was chemical weapons play any important role. In defense, use can be made of gasses or, by far preferably, of infecting media, only in the protection of frontiers. In this special instance, of course, chemical weapons, if employed with thoroughness and on a large enough scale, could be of the highest effectiveness, which for a time at least would lighten considerably the task of frontier guard forces weak both from the standpoint of numbers and arms. In one's own rear areas, on the other hand, securing forces could make use of gas on a large scale against partisan groups only in the rarest of cases. But even the latter, on account of transportation difficulties, will have to refrain from the employment of means – which in themselves are very effectual – for the secret infection of camps, shelters and roads in the enemy's rear areas. It goes without saying that in the case of a breakthrough by armored units the strewing of infections are possible behind the enemy's lines, but, in a narrower sense, pertains as little to guerrilla operations as the scattering of infection by means of planes. Therefore, except in the protection of frontiers and in the case of withdrawals, the employment of chemical weapons will neither interfere with or be of assistance to guerrilla warfare conducted in an aggressive manner, to any considerable extent.

It is, therefore, to be noted that even in the future, there will be no change in the most important principle of guerrilla warfare: In partisan operations, bold attack will remain the stronger method of combat in the future, also. From this we deduce, that defense against guerrilla operations must also be mobile. It must seek out attack and must keep striking even at the risk, occasionally, of its blows landing on empty air. A formation attempting to fulfil a security mission in guerrilla warfare, making use of purely defensive methods, would have to put up with one blow after the other, like a boxer fighting in the dark with his guard only. This is true in the defense of frontiers, also. In such operations, as history has shown us, more importance attaches to lighting-like surprise of the enemy, than to weight of armament. He who in guerrilla warfare limits himself to pure defense, loses! No improvements in armament technique case any change in this fact.

We further noted that it is almost never proper to employ large detachments of forces for surprise attacks. The more thoroughly an operation has been planned and prepared for, the fewer men that are needed for its execution. The smaller the assault force is which carries out a well-planned, well-prepared surprise attack, the fewer the possibilities of friction are and the greater the probability of smoothness of operation. Operations which require the employment of a large band of combatants are doomed to failure from the very beginning in guerrilla warfare and frequently end in the total annihilation of the attackers. Only very seldom does the gain that can be attained bear an endurable relation to the cost.

The effects of modern combat means does not neutralize this rule, but rather makes it even more intense. The favorite aim of automatic weapons is

massed employment and this is true in guerrilla warfare, as well as in operations on the field of battle. A small assault detachment will, naturally, move with the greatest caution in the enemy's rear areas and will make use of the utmost slyness as it attempts to fulfill its mission. After the *coups de main* has been completed, it will be much easier for a small detachment than for a great mass of men, first of all, to conceal itself in the landscape and then again, with some luck, to reach its own lines. In the case of a large number of persons, the combatant feels himself less-forced to maintain all his senses at as great a tension as possible, and to make use of the utmost skill and cunning of which he is capable. In a psychological sense, leaning on numbers engenders the erroneous feeling of a certain amount of security which, when confronted with machine guns, may easily lead to destruction. In addition to this, herd instinct leaves the mind more open to any panic that may break out and in guerrilla warfare in most cases, panic means pitiless annihilation. Lastly, it is also almost impossible to conceal a large number of fighters in the enemy's rear area after the fulfillment of the mission. The larger the partisan band is, the higher will be the price in blood that it must pay to the enemy's machine guns. It is the duty of the command to ask nothing that is not possible. Operations which require a large number of men have been wrongly planned, and that is true of the guerrilla warfare of tomorrow more than ever before. Recollection of the enemy's automatic weapons will not permit of the formulation of such erroneous plans. The enemy's armor and aviation also render hazardous the employment of large masses of men behind the enemy's front. A small group of combatants is able to take such skillful advantage of the terrain that they cannot be discovered and taken under fire either by tanks or patrol planes. The larger a partisan formation is, the easier it is for these fast weapons to find them and deal them a mortal blow. The technical possibility of transporting even powerful formations back to the front by means of planes or motor vehicles protected by tanks and set them down there to carry out operations should not, therefore, lead to incorrect practices. A few combatants, who are of high quality and possess the best of equipment, accomplish in the rear of the enemy far more than a powerful formation which would be quite helpless there, and which the enemy easily surrounds and destroys with his fire.

And now, for the last principle – a principle which, as history has shown, is not of secondary importance. Without the support of armed forces or the population of the country, there is no hope for lasting guerrilla warfare. This rule also, as we can see, will retain its validity. It is, however, to be taken into consideration that the motor has considerably increased the opportunities of support for the partisan formations. First of all, it appears highly probable that in many cases they will be able to carry out their operations from the motor vehicles themselves. Especially in the case of a suddenly-started war, before the most necessary defense measures can be taken, poorly-defended frontiers are open to such far-ranging invasion parties. Later on in the course of the combat

operations, improvised motorized formations will have few prospects of success in the hostility-disposed rear areas of the enemy, however. In a country, however, where tolerance and support by the mass of the population can be counted on, the employment of motor vehicles assures the partisans of incalculable advantages also even in the further course of the operations. Through the help of improvised motorization, their normal mode of combat, namely, sudden appearance, lightning-like action and rapid disappearance, is greatly lightened. It goes, therefore, without saying, that partisan forces should everywhere in their own countries and, as long as possible, make use of confiscated motor vehicles – at least when there is sufficient fuel to be had for their purposes.

In the case of operations in enemy territory, however, assault detachment in guerrilla warfare, as soon as serious counteraction has started, are obliged to do without the advantages of the unarmored motor vehicle. They may be carried by planes making use of the parachute, by means of helicopters and be set down in the vicinity of their attack objective, or under favorable circumstances, they may travel with the protection of tanks which have broken through the enemy's front. They may travel thus to points far in the rear of the enemy's lines. The protracted and dangerous journey to the assigned area is thus avoided and the radius of the guerrilla operations, even in the enemy's territory, is very greatly extended. This is especially true in the case of sparsely-populated regions with adequate possibilities of cover. The return to their own lines can, however only in rare and very favorable situations, be facilitated by a second drive of armored units or by means aviation. After the successful completion of the operation, the combatants will rather, just as formerly, have to try to reach their own lines without the help of their comrades. They must be aware of the fact that they will be successful in the return journey only by use of all the caution, cunning, and endurance they are capable of. There will always be combatants in whom even this danger fails to instill fear. But the command must be fully aware, beforehand, that an operation carried out in the depths of the enemy's territory, even when successful, very often ends with the annihilation of the assault detachment. Figuratively speaking, the command fires the highly-valuable projectile (represented by the assault detachment) at the target that is to be hit in the rear areas of the enemy, and only in rare and lucky instances, will it return, like a boomerang, to the hand of the thrower. The "firing" of such a "commando" is, therefore, justifiable only when great effects justify the almost unavoidable sacrifice of capable combatants. In this sense, the use of commandos is to be compared with that of torpedo boats.

Far ranging thrusts by weak detachments of partisans, end sooner or later in their annihilation, especially in that case where they lead them into areas that are inhabited by a preponderance of hostile inhabitants or a population that is merely unsympathetic to them. They may, on the other hand, be carried out with success if the partisans have support on the part of the population. Hence, it must be a task of the propagandistic program to maintain in their own country

an attitude that is favorable to their own partisan operations, one that will bear with it and aid it, and, on the other hand, to incite the population to resist enemy partisan operations. In addition, it will endeavor to crush the combat spirit of the populace in the enemy's rear areas. Future wars will open political possibilities which are as yet very foreign to our European modes of thinking, but which must not on any account be overlooked. Deep, precipitous contradistinctions of race and class, scarcely concealed in time of peace, weaken the structure of the nation in the post-war period. Often the spark of a bold operation in the enemy's territory suffices to kindle the long-smoldering flame of rebellion tying up considerable forces, endangering the supply lines of the army and this, in tense situations, may have quite unpredictable strategic results. Therefore, it must be taken into account that partisan warfare and propaganda in regions of unstable opinions work hand-in-hand. In many cases, skillful propaganda will be successful in creating centers of unrest in the midst of the home and supply areas, where a sentiment favorable to one's own guerrilla forces will be predominant. How valuable, yes, how indispensable, even, is such support by the population or, at least by certain groups of the population of the combat area, to partisan forces, we repeatedly note in a review of historical cases. In the future, also, guerrilla operations will have to be supported and fed by the populace. This requirement is just as clear, as is the fact of the superiority of attack in guerrilla warfare; is just as clear as the requirement which follows from it: always to seek attack even in missions of security; and just as clear as the fact that, to a large extent, guerrilla warfare liberates one from the weights of numbers and material. Neither do the modern combat means annul these old lessons taught by experience.

Still another fact, one which Rudolf Bartsch[88] called attention to even before the war, is important in this connection – guerrilla warfare promises success only when the numerical inferiority of the partisans is at least partially compensated for by the complete mastery of suitable weapons. Only bellicose nations are capable of long, drawn-out guerrilla warfare. These indispensable prerequisites – love of battle and skill in the use of weapons – are often badly lacking in the case of nations of high cultural attainments. There is, for them, only one way to make up for this defect: service in a national army. Without thorough military training of its young manhood, guerrilla warfare is just as lacking in prospects of success as any other kind of land defense operations.

Ehrhardt's conclusion

"The old queen of the military art, surprise, who was only dispossessed of her crown while speed was unable to maintain the pace set by firepower, again seizes her scepter and mounts on the throne."[89] As her most faithful paladin, as bearer of her flashing sword, the *Schnelle Verband* (fast or mechanized forces) stands at her side. But broad areas of her domain will probably have to be left by her to guerrilla forces. The more concentrated the assembled weight of the assault power is gathered together on

the sword point of the decision, the more natural it is that extensive areas must be turned over to guerrilla warfare—that mode of combat with the most-sparing employment of men and material.

Partisan warfare will, presumably, continue to be an inseparable companion of that warfare which has again acquired mobility through the instrumentality of plane, tank, and motor. This likelihood is, it is true, accorded little attention, at the present time, since the matters of motorization, mechanization, and air warfare themselves are still matters of controversy, yes, since in many places, the new combat technique takes root with difficulty in the face of intellectual inertia and obstinacy. But it is quite a noteworthy fact, that in the Red Army, which according to Captain Liddell Hart, is the best-equipped army from the point-of-view of progress and technique, partisan operations have for long time been regarded as supplementary to the combat of the assault formations.

The reasons are entirely obvious. As likely as it is that massed armies of the old type will go to pieces under the blows of modern assault forces, just so certainly must we assume that even in the case of industrial nations, raw materials and factory capacities are not sufficient for supplying the totality of the men who are fit for bearing arms, with adequate modern equipment. The idea occurs quite naturally of employing 1) those persons who are not used in a special capacity and 2) those combatants who are not armored in places where they can hold their own without modern, heavy, costly equipment namely on secondary fronts. It is equally natural to suppose that skillful command strives to aid the queen of the art of war, surprise, to gain victories even on these secondary fronts. But there is no method of combat that is more suitable udner the conditions found there, than guerrilla warfare. Therefore, nothing is more probable than that it will be employed, for the main obstacle in partisan warfare – the continuous fronts of positional warfare supported on both sides – will scarcely exist any longer in wars of the future. With the destructive power at the disposal of armored formations and aviation, there is no longer any object in the construction of continuous positions. They most likely will be obsolete in coming generations.

Fantastic ideas regarding the wars of the future are certainly useless and ridiculous. When, however, the indications of probable developments are so obvious, as is the case with guerrilla warfare – when one of the most powerful military powers quite frankly claims guerrilla methods as its own mode of warfare – then the time seems entirely ripe for reflection concerning the matter. It is, therefore, astonishing that professional literature occupies itself so little with this subject. The easily-comprehended lack of sympathy of the professional soldier for this somewhat ill-famed field of activity, which he heretofore has contemptuously left for those outside of military circles, should not stand in the way of the accordance of serious attention to the dangers nor the advantageous opportunities represented by it.

(a)



(b)



Figure 10: Destroying a road by creating a ditch or crator were road traffic cannot create a by-pass (a, b). (Jagdeinheiten)

Partisan forces need not, like undisciplined herds, interfere with one's own military operations, as has actually been true in the case of various such groups of evil memory. Neither should one look upon all their leaders as dumbbells, nor as fantastic braggarts covered with tassels, bobs, and braid. The partisans of the war of tomorrow will be of another stamp. Only vigorous, cool-headed, resolute men will be able to achieve success in this auxiliary field of military operations, which is far from lacking in importance.

The difficulties involved in guerrilla warfare are considerable. Insufficient preparation, incorrect procedure, and half-hearted measures lead to the heaviest, wholly-unnecessary losses of both blood and national goods. In no other field is this stern fact truer: "What is not done with a clear understanding of the situation, wholeheartedly and with firm will, is destined to failure."[90] It is impossible for a nation to wait till the time of extreme emergency and then attempt to avail itself of this dangerous weapon which, unskillfully handled, turns against the one employing it: himself. It would be equally ill-advised to wait for the solution of the problems of defense until the flames of war have already been kindled.

Outsiders who understand our nature and our methods of conducting military operations assert that, granting that we are wholly capable in the matter of organization, lack the ability to face suddenly-arising danger, a new combat means, an unanticipated combat method. That is certainly an incorrect analysis. However, in spite of this, we should give timely attention to the possible dangers existing in a mode of combat which might be dangerous for the very reason that it is quite foreign to us.

Photograph reproduced courtesy of the US Army (317957)

CHAPTER 3

KLEINKRIEG TO *BANDENBEKAEMPFUNG*

These were counterinsurgency considerations the Germans began World War II (1939–1945) with. As Germany invaded and occupied territory from 1939, the Armed Forces, SS and Police all provided instructions to deal with resistance and rebellion. These early wartime efforts began with a mix of directives and units. Efforts intensified with the invasion of the Balkans and the Soviet Union.[91] Initial Jewish "final solution" efforts were often labeled anti-partisan actions or "head hunts." In July 1941, with the Soviet declaration of partisan war German leader Adolf Hitler responded that this "gives us the opportunity to exterminate anyone who is hostile to us."[92] In time, these various prescriptions were incorporated into what would be recognized as doctrine to organize, equip, and train forces. On 25 October 1941, the Army High Command issued Directives for Combating Partisans. According to Blood, by August 1942 with Directive 46, Hitler intended that "combating banditry"[93] (*Bandenbekaempfung*) would be the third element of German security policy along with genocide (*Endloesung der Judenfrage*), and forced labor (*Erfassung*). This involved active participation of military and police forces.[94] With this as an overview, the actual German response to resistance varied with time and place ranging from local collaboration to genocide. The most extreme conditions were in Poland, the Balkans, and the Soviet Union (Shepherd's "Wild East").

In fact, there was opposition to any overly systematic approach from the highest level. In late 1942, Hitler noted, "The essential thing about anti-guerrilla warfare – one must hammer this home to everybody – is that whatever succeeds is right. Here's the most important point: if someone does something which is not according to instructions but which leads to success or if he is faced with an emergency with which he can only deal by using brutal methods, then any method is right which leads to success. The object must be to exterminate the guerrillas and re-establish order …

the annihilation of the guerrillas is an overriding duty. Therefore anything which assists in the annihilation of the guerrillas will be considered right and conversely anything which does not contribute to the annihilation of the guerrillas will be considered wrong." To which Armed Forces High Command General Alfred Jodl[95] added, "In battle they can do what they like."[96]

The way ahead was debated for some time and Hitler was not satisfied with the doctrine written as: "by issuing regulations, the troops would be limited in their ruthless fighting against gangs." Jodl responded that "what people do while fighting is not written down in these regulations … But these regulations deal with retaliation after the fighting, and that has to be forbidden."[97] The Armed Forces High Command issued "Battle Instructions for the Fight against Bands in the East" in November 1942 which evolved into "Fighting the Guerrilla Bands" by May 1944.[98] In broad terms, the threat from partisans or guerrillas was defined using the terms "bands" and "bandits." Command and control, unit organization, and reconnaissance for both offense and defense were described in detail. Support from the air, by communications, and with motorized forces was also addressed.

A brief look of German security structure is required before going further. While Germany proper was organized at the regional level (*Wehrkreise* or *Oberabschnitt*), invaded areas used different control measures. In occupied territories there was an agreed upon split between the "front" and "rear" which saw the Armed Forces (*Wehrmacht*) being responsible for pacification at the front with the SS and Police carrying out similar tasks in the rear.[99] The Army High Command (OKH) maintained security of rear areas based upon whether it was occupied territory, a zone of military administration, or within a theater of operations (zones of communication and combat). This was carried out with security divisions, regiments, and battalions under the control of area (OFK – *Oberfeldkommananturen*) or sub-area (FK – *Feldkommandanturen*) provost commanders and town commanders (OK – *Orskommandanturen*) and used Army tactical forces as needed from supply and replacement units. While cooperating or competing with the Armed Forces High Command (OKW), the Reich Leader of the SS and German Police (RFSS) Heinrich Himmler used several levels of control to conduct these same duties. At first, this was through various regional Higher SS and Police Leaders (HSSPF, SSPF) who conducted security and anti-partisan efforts. These transformed from the earliest SS-Main Office of Reich Security (RSHA-Bds) and Order Police (Orpo-BdO) task forces in occupied territory to joint military operations. Armed (*Waffen)*-SS units, normally under the tactical control of the Army, were also used for security operations.[100] Eventually this was carried out with the RFSS Headquarters Staff (KSRFSS) which retained units directly under its control for employment on "special" tasks.[101]

Doctrinal solutions

Any analysis of German methods needs to include the body of doctrinal material available rather than in isolation from other tactics, techniques, and procedures. Doctrine for anti-guerrilla operations was based solidly upon previous field service regulations and experience rather than being a departure from them, though it was still viewed as combat under "special conditions."[102] The strength of the German approach was characterized by van Creveld as fighting power based upon troops who obeyed orders.[103] Von Thun took exception, and felt it was more a result of a superior system that placed emphasis on "mission-type orders" as found in Condell and Zabecki.[104] Reality was a more complex mixture of educated and trained leaders, drilled and motivated troops, established doctrine and procedures that emphasized maneuver and initiative, and ample weapons and equipment. All of these were employed in combinations German opponents could not match, at least locally. Whatever failings at the highest level, the battlefield approach (the German art or way of war), was combined with a military culture of "absolute destruction."[105] A more detailed consideration of this evolving doctrine provided needed insights into the mechanics of the effort (the exercise in reverse engineering). I offer that this revised perspective is more accurate than previous accounts. Apparent from the German method was that in the rear areas, minimum troops were to be used for security with a district focus using headquarters and provost units.[106] Standing security forces came from army regional headquarters, provost, field police, or SS and police units, while tactical forces provided commands, units, detachments, and patrols as needed. The German methods showed an institutionalized view as put forward in this account. This was based on the whole of German experience and not just a departure or ad hoc approach when it came to security and pacification actions (hostage taking and reprisals). This will be considered more closely in the following sections.

Command and control measures

The Germans knew command, control, communications, and information were the basis for either passive or active military actions to kill, capture, or convert resisters. Information, surprise, mobility, and firepower were essential. Initiative had to be maintained, even if limited forces were at hand. Resolute resourcefulness was demanded in order to keep the bands from establishing themselves and gaining strength ("If possible, each action by the bands has to be followed by counter action … Newly appearing bands have to be fought at once.").[107] It was acknowledged that no one battle tactic would master the band menace. The enemy would

take advantage of any stereotyped response ("In the battle technique as well, adherence to a rigid principle has to be avoided, since the bands quickly react and take the necessary countermeasures").[108] The means chosen depended upon the strength of available German forces, the enemy situation, and the general course of the campaign – a commander used the method that caused the greatest damage. Control by sector with close objectives allowed independence within a framework of set tasks. Needed to exercise command was reliable telephone networks that were backed up by radio. Personal mobility with light aircraft or helicopters allowed commanders to intervene at decisive locations.[109] Commanders were admonished to always have a distinctive center of gravity (*Schwerpunkt*), but retain enough mobile reserve forces to change it "in a flash" when faced with a new situation.

Recognized was that "success depends upon superior leadership," seen by unity of command in any specific operation. One army, police, or SS leader would be in charge of all other services. Related to this was the need for close cooperation between military and civilian authorities.[110] Dixon and Heilbrunn observed a number of guerrilla leaders achieved almost legendary fame, but "not a single anti-partisan fighter, ancient or modern, has made a reputation for himself or is known to anybody but the initiated." These anti-guerrilla leaders were made rather than born: "his job is a highly technical one; he must combine the qualifications of a military officer and police officer, and he must be trained for his job. But no country in the world has ever trained anti-partisan fighters; they all had to learn the hard way." By the time needed experience and knowledge was gained by counter-guerrillas, according to Dixon and Heilbrunn, it was often too late for them to use it. This seemed to be the case for the Germans, who did not always assign their best leaders to these duties.[111]

German sources of expertise included Army-Generals Kurt Zeitzler, Erich v. Manstein, Hasso v. Manteuffel, and Reinhard Gehlen.[112] There were at least two Army schools (I and II) dealing with this type of combat, teaching courses in close combat, patrolling, anti-guerrilla, and partisan tactics.[113] Armed-SS contributors to doctrine noted by Prinz Eugen Division commander SS-General Otto Kumm[114] were staff officers Karl Wolff, Fritz Arlt, and field commanders Hermann Fegelein, Fritz Klingenberg, Walter Schimana, and Gustav Lombard. He added, "Schimana and Klingenberg also taught the course on anti-partisan warfare at Bad Tolz, and we all attended at one time. This was the first attempt to make this type of warfare a legitimate course of instruction, and it was needed badly."[115] In September 1942, Himmler named a deputy for anti-bandit warfare (*Bevollmaechtigter fur die Bandenkaempfung im Osten*), SS-General Erich v. dem Bach-Zelewski,[116] whose responsibilities expanded in June 1943 to head all SS and Police anti-bandit units and operations (*Chef*

der Bandenkampfverbande).[117] SS and Police-General Wolff remembered him as being controversial, one of the architects of the police special task force (*Einsatzguppen*) "concept of anti-partisan warfare," who removed troops from peaceful areas regardless of suspicious activities, but was also ruthless and efficient.[118] Hitler felt that v. dem Bach was "a clever chap." Added Armed Forces chief Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, success occurred when, "In those anti-guerrilla actions laid on by Bach-Zelewski he was in sole command both of the police and of the troops from the divisions in the area."[119] In another case, Himmler told senior commander SS-General Arthur Phleps[120] in Yugoslavia that the aim was clear: "The creation of two territorial corps, one in Bosnia, the other in Albania. These two corps with the division 'Prinz Eugen,' as an army of five SS mountain divisions are the goal for 1944." To this end, the V and IX SS-Mountain Corps were formed in the Southeast to command the Prinz Eugen, Handschar, Skanderbeg, and Kama Divisions in suppressing rebellion in Croatia, Bosnia, and Albania.[121]

Two kinds of intelligence about the enemy were needed by these commanders: that gathered before operations and that needed as operations were undertaken. This was collected by ground, air, and signals observation and reconnaissance submitted to a centralized center in order to conduct pattern analysis that formed the basis of situation reports and graphics.[122] Intelligence from guerrilla deserters was considered unreliable but the interrogation of prisoners was one of the best sources of information and "It is therefore wrong to shoot captured bandits at once."[123] In addition: "The use of informants and provocateurs ["V-men" or *Vertrauensmann*] forces the guerrilla unit to reinforce their observation teams and use special precautions when contacting civilians. Men of confidence and sympathizers must be ordered to observe the enemy agency [Security Service or SD] that recruits and employs the informants against guerrilla units. Informants that have been uncovered must be destroyed."[124]

Enemy resistance groups were considered different from "what is otherwise usual at the front. His cunning, viciousness, and cruelty have to be met with special attention, resoluteness, and harshness." Thoughtlessness and inattention caused most Germans not to recognize this threat. Because they faced fewer and more lightly armed forces they underestimated the impact of bandit actions.[125] One commander recalled, "unlike the … military, the partisans adhered to no set doctrine, used no set order of battle you could study, and basically struck when most opportune."[126] Local populations were recognized as necessary to provide a support network and terrain strongly influenced the possibility and means available to a band. Developed, open, and urban terrain presented greater problems for resistance (mainly because they could be countered with

normal police measures) than wooded, undulating, poorly passable terrain, with weak infrastructure.

The use of local auxiliaries was critical but they were not to be trusted: "A very great danger is that the bands will learn too early about the planned undertaking. Therefore all preparations have to be made within the smallest circle of the command staff."[127] Heaton showed how this included not just German nationals, but overseas Germans, and foreign auxiliaries (between two and four million non-Germans) in a war of brutal ethnic extermination.[128] The efforts to win the local populations were opposed from the highest level and German forces participated in fights "conducted with extreme cruelty on both sides." Keitel felt that "members of the Wehrmacht who were involved in the guerrilla fighting were afterward called to account for their behavior." To which Hitler responded: "The enemy is using fanatical, communist-trained fighters who don't hesitate to commit any act of violence. More than ever this is a question of survival. This fight has nothing to do with military chivalry or with the agreements of the Geneva Conventions. If we don't engage in this fight against the bands with the most brutal means possible – in the East as well as in the Balkans – the available forces will soon be unable to control this plague. Therefore, the troops are authorized and required to use all means possible in this fight without any restrictions – including against women and children – as long as it leads to success."[129] A German commander in the Southeast concluded: "All is right that leads to success. After three full years of war in the Balkans each commander knows what is best."[130]

Passive measures

Defensive efforts, or police measures, were oriented on "lines of communications:" railways and rail traffic, roadways and road traffic, waterways and water traffic; administrative and communications facilities; and agriculture or natural resources. In this, all "troops must be able to conduct actions against bands, even supply units, technical units, and security units."[131] A proviso from field service regulations qualified that "no more manpower than is absolutely necessary" was committed to the rear areas. Protection against bands: "All troops, troop billets, traffic and economic installations as well as war important plants have to protect themselves and to be protected against attacks by bands through security measures."[132] A note of caution was added: "The securing and guarding of the land and of all important installations … makes careful reconnaissance and planning for all guerrilla actions, but does not make the actions impossible. There is no countermeasure … that cannot be rendered useless through skillful adaption to it."[133] In fact, a majority of the defensive effort was involved with rear area security.[134]

The attitude of the population and the amount of assistance it was willing to give to guerrilla units was of great concern to the Germans.[135]

Different treatment was recognized for affected populations, band supporters, and bandits, so-called population and resource control measures for each were noted (but were in practice, treated apparently as one and the same). "Action against enemy agitation" was the psychological or information operations of the N-S period. It was believed: "Because of the close relationship of guerrilla warfare and politics, actions against enemy agitation are a task that is just as important as interdiction and combat actions. All means must be used to ward off enemy influence and waken and maintain a clear political will. Tactical activities must always take consideration of this necessity. It is essential … to have constant news of the general situation."[136] The priority of focus was on the German forces, the local populations, and guerrilla bands: "The leader in charge of political questions has the important duty of establishing and maintaining contact with the population. This must be done under consideration of all precautions. He must find out their sufferings, worries and opinions, … Every possibility must be used to unmask enemy agitation and lies, to supply the population with true news, reminding them of the eternal values of nationhood, and root out cowardly servility."[137] With public affairs units down to the division level, all reliable means to spread information were used. "Often the most simple are the most effective (mouth-to-mouth, chain and ring letters, inscriptions with chalk, paint, and stamps on walls, enemy billboards and proclamations, pamphlets from hand to hand). It may become necessary for larger units to acquire a duplicating machine, or a printing press, and also material to make simple stamps."[138]

Active measures

Were offensive efforts, or military operations, that needed the aggressive deployment of "hunter" units, surprise attacks or pursuit, and encirclements by major commands:[139]

1) Reconnaissance-strike operations were the most common action engaged in by units and commands. Deployment of patrols against guerrillas: "Small, but especially effective units, composed and armed as *Jagdkommandos* (rifle or combat patrols, so-called rifle commandos), are especially suitable to impede the formation of bands and to disrupt band communications."[140] Hunter patrols were formed with local assets from the army rear area, security, and other divisions endangered by guerrillas. These were platoon to company size. Internal structure called for four squads each with an officer in charge, one local scout in civilian clothes, armed liberally with light machine gun, semi-automatic and automatic rifles, sniper rifles, and grenades. Mobility was by foot, draft animals, skis, and sledges. Provided with radios, hunter units were supposed to operate for up to two weeks without re-supply.[141] It was a kind of warfare that could not be rushed and required time to

develop opportunities to defeat the guerrilla. A post-war German special forces officer described hunter units as consisting of "men who knew every possible ruse and tactic of guerrilla warfare. They had gone through the hell of combat against the crafty partisans in the endless swamps and forests of Russia."[142]

The leading idea behind the battle procedure was: "By imitating the fighting technique of the bands and assimilating themselves to local conditions, to get unobtrusively as near to the band as possible, and then annihilate them by surprise action." The best terrain to operate in was the areas through which the guerrillas move, obtained their food, and through which they had to pass to carry out attacks and sabotage. Of note was that fortified guerrilla base camps were not suitable targets for the hunter patrols.[143] Doctrine went on to explain: "The employment of special hunter forces … is a considerable problem for guerrilla fighters. It is the mission of these hunter forces to detect, pursue and fight the guerrilla units with the same means and methods – cunning, camouflage, surprise – that the guerrillas use. Because of this, the … hunter forces, which consist of specially picked men, are particularly dangerous. Only untiring watchfulness and never lessening caution can protect against surprise attack from … hunter forces. It may be necessary to concentrate the complete guerrilla war effort in an operational area on destroying an especially dangerous … hunter force."[144]

Friedrich Umbrich with the 2d Regiment of the Prinz Eugen Division, left an account of hunter actions in practice from the fall of 1943: "To call our assignment in the mountains in the area of Sinj a 'patrol,' then, is a misnomer: it involved more than patrolling the countryside. Rather, we were spaehtruppen – lookout troops – sent to rocky, densely forested mountains in a desperate attempt to prevent partisans from gathering and mobilizing. At the same time, operating in small groups, we were exposing ourselves to ambush. We could trust no one, for snipers could be lurking behind every bush and every outcrop …

"Most of the time, we were to be invisible. Moving quietly, spread out in fan formation which isolated each man from his group, we covered huge distances on foot and spent hours lurking at lookout points in the area we were assigned to patrol, the group leader scanning the surrounding terrain through field glasses. If we observed nothing, we then fanned out cautiously to a new position. … Our main job was to make sure the partisans didn't gather and become stronger. We had to keep them split, to prevent them from joining into units large enough to attack and overrun us."[145]

2) Attack-pursuit operations were used as opportunity offered. Destruction through surprise attack and hunt: "If forces or time are not sufficient for encirclement or difficult ground makes it impossible, the bands, even without previous encirclement, have to be attacked, defeated and hunted until they

are completely destroyed."[146] Two approaches were used, one where reconnaissance was possible beforehand allowing the placement of blocking forces and the other where a frontal attack had to be launched because of a lack of time or restricted terrain.[147] The goal was to surprise the guerrillas while on the march or before constructing base camps. A quick attack would cause them to fight or flee and then to be hunted down and destroyed as a split up group ("One has to put up with the escape of individual isolated groups"). The hunt was a more elaborate version of the attack-pursuit; with the goal of overtaking the guerrillas carried out by fast moving forces. The primary target was guerrilla leadership.[148]

Prinz Eugen commander SS-General Kumm recalled that by 1943, "we decided on a tactic of probing forward with a squad, followed by a platoon, which would be flanked by a platoon on either side. Once the partisans fired, the center squad would give chase, dropping to fire as the following center platoon rushed through the covering fire. The two flanking platoons were in radio contact with the rest, so depending upon which way the partisans ran, the facing platoon would stand fast while the entire formation would pivot around the enemy, chasing them into the line of fire of the stationary unit.

"This plan worked very well, and once the enemy were engaged the platoons would call artillery fire behind the partisans preventing their escape, forcing them to stand and fight. This was when heavy weapons would take over and artillery would be walked back into the partisan unit … The circle would grow smaller, constricting the ring until the surviving partisans broke for cover, and we allowed an avenue of escape that was fire free … The few who attempted to leave got burned, while the rest would group together to find moral support or security in their closeness. This we exploited by bombing, artillery or machine gun fire, but it was always a costly tactic … [but still] the best method of containment and liquidation that we ever used."[149] Of course these remarks addressed battalion and company-size engagements rather than the larger scale regimental and division operations such as Knight's Move (May 1944) or Open Season (June-July 1944).

3) Encirclement-annihilation operations were preferred but the most demanding in terms of material and personnel. Encirclement of the guerrillas and cleaning out of the encircled area is described as such: "This is the main battle technique and at the same time the most efficient means for eliminating the band menace. It requires larger forces, but leads most decisively to success."[150] The Germans believed that this maneuver was the most comprehensive and should be attempted in all cases, even against small guerrilla groups: "The basic maxim of this technique is: To cut off every escape route and to annihilate all parts of the band."[151] According to Lieb, this tactic needed first rate units such as the 7th SS or 1st Mountain Divisions to carry out in broken terrain.[152]

To accomplish this, a number of variations were analyzed to insure success. Preparations and preliminary movements were needed to bring forces in place. All of these forces had to move from assembly areas at different rates to arrive at the encirclement line at the same time. Ground had to be occupied and positions prepared without giving away the intent of the maneuver to the guerrillas. Thin lines were not sufficient, conventional defense arrangements were needed to include advance outposts, main lines of resistance, adequate artillery, and mobile reserves. Air support was of more limited value because of the fleeting nature of the target or the possibility of compromising surprise.[153]

When the encirclement was complete (the so-called "spider's web" from the control measures portrayed on German maps), the annihilation effort began. The resulting "cauldron" was cleaned up by tightening the encircling line with "battue" shooting or a "pocket drive." A "partridge drive" occurred when one side of the cauldron held fast and allowed the rest of the encircling lines to move towards it (best used when a geographic feature such as a mountain or river served as an obstacle against the guerrillas). Another method was to send in strong company or battalion columns to break the cauldron into sub-cauldrons which in turn were reduced. If a permanent base camp was encountered, a designated shock unit from the reserve force would be used to attack it because of the guerrilla's tendency to fight rather than flee.[154]

Encirclement and search of the operational area required large numbers of troops: "If … forced to employ such measures that tie down a large number of his forces, this is already a success [for the guerrilla]. Such large-scale operations must be feared less than the employment of hunter forces because there always are sure possibilities to evade" through moving when the intention to encircle is detected, going through enemy lines before it becomes fixed, staying behind in a hidden area, or breaking out through a weak point in the line.[155] A classic example of this method was found with Operation White.[156]

With the major defeats in Africa and Russia, the Axis needed to secure its threatened southeastern flank in December 1942. At play was continued rivalry between the Germans and Croats on one hand and the Italians and Serbs on the other that would prevent real cooperation in the course of events.[157] German Armed Forces Southeast and Twelfth Army underwent a continued number of shifts in organizational structure for Croatia, Serbia, and Greece at this same time. Conduct of operations fell under the leadership of Army-General Rudolf Lueters, Commanding General, German Forces Croatia as part of Army Group E of Air Force-General Alexander Loehr. The Italians were led by General Mario Roatta (later General Mario Robotti) and the Second Army. The stated mission was to defend coastal regions and lines of communication from Allied attacks. Vital to this was the elimination of the

internal threat posed by the growing insurgent movements in the region. Joint planning took place in Germany and Rome with final orders being approved in January 1943.

Operation White (known as the fourth offensive to the communists), was the most infamous encirclement in the Southeast Theater, taking place between January through March 1943. Against an estimated 43,500 of Tito's followers centered on Bihac the Axis mustered 90,000 men with a further 60,000 in support. This included the German 7th SS-Mountain Division; the 369th, 714th, 717th Infantry Divisions;[158] and supporting Croat forces. The Italians provided the *Lombardia*, *Re*, and *Sassari* Divisions with supporting Serb chetniks. The 718th Infantry and *Murge* Divisions joined in the action later. German, Croat, and Italian aircraft added combat power throughout the fighting.[159]

Fought primarily in Italian areas of responsibility, Operation White consisted of three sequential major engagements. In the first, the partisans were encircled in Bosnia by strong motorized columns concentrating on Bihac between 20 January and 17 February (Operation White I). The partisans with seven "brigades" or "divisions" had been taking steps to move from Bosnia into Montenegro and eventually Serbia. The Axis attack seemed to have been anticipated and the partisans were on the move before the cauldron was completed.

The second phase was between 25 February and 17 March (Operation White II), when the object was to catch escaping partisans in Herzegovina and Dalmatia with a series of running engagements through Drvar, Livno, and Jajce. Mixed weather conditions limited air support to days of good flying, while the Axis units kept to the roads, and held up operations at night letting the partisans continue southward despite efforts to stop them (conventional German tactical doctrine called for controlling mountains heights from the valleys and existing road network). During the course of this the Germans were unable to intercept the partisans and the Italian and chetniks did not hold their defenses along the Neretva river allowing Tito to cross over into Montenegro. The third and final phase, Operation White III or Mostar, was to eliminate those partisans who escaped the encirclement. Tied to this was the disarming of the chetniks demanded by the Germans of Italy. This final phase was left mainly to the Italians and failed, so the Germans followed with Operation Black (the fifth offensive) within months.[160]

SS-General Phleps led the 7th SS-Mountain Division during this operation and the Prinz Eugen Division justified its role as a regional reaction force, first on the eastern and then western flanks of the operation. The division divided into three battle groups, Boser in the east, Hedrich center, and Schmidhuber west. First was the attack on Bihac and then the pursuit of the partisan breakout from the encirclement to the southeast to Bosnaski Petrovac,

Drvar, Livno, and Jajce. All of this was carried out in an effort to get in front of Tito's columns using artillery or air to pin the partisans down and high speed road mobility to get in front of their columns. A learning curve was at play with this type of operation, as Phleps continued to force the enemy to fight though by-passing them with individual battalions, "However, the enemy was more mobile in the mountains and always avoided our encirclements."[161] Also found was the need to attack over high ground and not from the valley or plain, "We learned a bitter lesson: we could only advance over the hills and mountains, before we entered a village in the valley."[162] Some 101 engagements of company-size or higher took place during the first two phases of Operation White.[163] The Germans claimed 3,603 enemy killed both by count and estimate, another 2,378 wounded, with a large amount of "booty" captured.

Himmler wrote that Phleps "proved his worth through his far-sighted, energetic and flexible troop leadership ... This was accomplished in spite of snow more than one meter deep in the mountainous area that they had to cross and the countless tree and road bocks." He added, "The physical and fighting performance of the SS-Volunteer Division 'Prinz Eugen' in the wild, rough and remote mountainous area, in the middle of snow storm, rain and fog, must be considered excellent."[164] But according to Kumm, "Phleps did not trust his heterogeneous officer corps enough to issue brief orders. In spite of all the previous training, he still did not feel secure. Phleps' work was not finished even after he issued the order. From early morning until late at night he was with the battle groups, orienting them on the spot and issuing subsequent orders."[165] To his credit, this was an area Phleps had served in before and during World War I. On 4 March 1943, at Hitler's military conference, it was briefed that "The Balkan operations are characterized by particular success by the *Chetniks*. The SS division is continuing to advance."[166] Later another conference revealed political and military conflicts within the Southeast that were unresolved at the highest level, as "one can't understand the mentality of those tricksters if one doesn't know them." In this, it was commented that "Phleps knows the situation down there quite well. He was also quite successful with his units."[167]

At Hitler's request, Himmler passed orders from the SS-Main Command Office (*SS-Fuhrungshauptamt*) that contested areas were to be turned into "a desert and not to spare anyone, women or children" - in effect the whole region was declared enemy territory. Phleps directed that: "the entire population of this area must be considered rebel sympathizers."[168] In April 1943, the Prinz Eugen Division commander ordered that children and women were to be shot in "action" or "judicially." At the time, the Croatian Minister of War complained to the German Foreign Ministry that 22 locations and some 1,000 inhabitants had been crushed. The German Plenipotentiary in Croatia



Map 2: Operation White (Unternehmen Weiss), January to March 1943. Gray: Partisans forces, Black: Axis forces, MVAC: Milizia volontari anticommunist *(chetniks).* (WS Hill)

Army-General Edmond von Glaise-Horstenau recorded, "The SS acted as if they were in enemy territory, led by the bad example of their commanders. Robbing and looting were wide-spread. No action was taken against any offenders … The example of the SS and Cossacks also had its influence on the regular *Wehrmacht* troops, who wondered why they could not have the same privileges."[169]

Fought in the winter with great brutality, large numbers of civilians were detained or displaced, livestock and stores seized, and villages razed in the partisan areas. The partisans lost some 12,531 killed or executed and another 2,506 captured and deported. The Germans lost 672 killed or missing and some 258 wounded (other Axis losses were less). In addition, some 4,626 civilians were killed or died of exposure and another 1,229 arrested and deported. If order was restored for a

time in Bosnia, Dalmatia, and Herzegovina it was at the expense of the rural population. Bauxite and mining areas were put back in to production. It was the largest anti-bandit operation in terms of numbers and territory covered. It was also too big, too slow, fought with mixed forces and goals. Despite the effort, some 20,000 partisans, including 4,000 wounded, escaped the cauldron to fight another day. Some 12,000 chetniks were pursued by both the Germans and partisans and lost their Italian and Allied support. In the end, German military and political leadership in Croatia questioned the approach that offered no hope and only desperate resistance.

Kill them all, God knows his own

Allied, particularly Soviet, attacks in 1944–1945 forced Axis withdrawals, including from the Southeast Theater which stretched from the border of Austria, through Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece. This made the Yugoslav partisan efforts in line with the definition of supporting conventional military campaigns rather than being independent rebellions or social revolutions (which took place in Yugoslavia during the war and in the post-war period). In the aftermath of military actions, extreme efforts ensured that resources were no longer available to support resistance. This was because the best safeguards remained without permanent effect, "if the formations do not succeed, by way of attack, in creating a sufficiently extended area which is free of bands."[170] The population was sent off as labor, those remaining were turned into refugees or killed, stores and useable material were removed, and any remaining infrastructure destroyed. By this means, a return to the medieval *chevauchee* or the more modern *rastrellamenti*, resistance was prevented from taking root. The current concept of winning over the population through long term social and economic programs (i.e.: hearts and minds) was recognized but kept in check by short sighted wartime necessity. Of course this ignored the power of desperation for prompting both resistance and collaboration.

Where does this leave us at this point? It would be useful to recall the words of Weigley, when he wrote: "Irregular war is not only utterly unglamorous in reality but extremely hard to win. In addition, because it puts a premium upon breaking rules and doing anything to win (while conventional war does at least adhere to certain rules and customs), because almost the essence of irregular war is that anything goes, irregular war can well plant an infection of lawlessness and brutalization in any society that becomes involved in it."[171] Put more succinctly, if the German strategic goal in the Southeast was to maintain order to secure resources, workers, and soldiers; then, according to one Prinz Eugen Division veteran, "their tactical treatment of the population was in total contradiction to that particular goal.[172] Experience like this is what produced the official doctrine reproduced in Part Four.

CHAPTER 4

FIGHTING THE GUERRILLA BANDS

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht Nr. 03268/44,
Merkblatt 69/2, "Bandenbekampfung," 6.5.1944

Translated from the German by the US Army Communications School for the General Staff

Intelligence Division (Registry Number F–1598)[173]

OKW's preface

The pamphlet "Fighting the Guerrilla Bands" is intended to give to units of the Army and their leaders who have been charged with fighting the guerrilla bands generally applicable proven principles, experiences, and suggestions. It is for use by all parts of the Army as well as by others (Labor Service, Todt Organization, etc.)[174] committed in occupied territories.

The menace of the bands[175]

1. In the course of time guerrilla warfare has grown and gained considerably in importance. Through guerrilla warfare the enemy endeavors to prevent strong parts of our forces from being committed at the front.

2. Commitment of the bands takes place as part of the over-all operation. In the case of the Bolsheviks the bands currently receive their military missions and their political instruction from centralized band command. Moreover, some bands, especially those in regions near the front, are in direct contact with secondary commands posts such as are found at the military command centers. Furthermore, close contact is maintained between the illegitimate political organizations and the bands. These close relations between the band organization and the illegitimate political organizations are underscored in every questioning of prisoners.

3. The combat objective of the bands is to inflict damage upon us in our rearward areas. Specifically, the bands employ the following means:

a) Raids on points of support, billets, transport trains, troops on the march, supply columns, and individual vehicles.
b) Blowing up roads, bridges, tracks, and other railroad installations, especially on lines which are important for the movement of supplies to the front and, when possible, at the time of decisive combat activities.
c) Destruction of communication installation and connections, especially cable and wire lines leading to important sectors of the front.
d) Destruction of all installations affecting the national economy and destruction of crops.
e) Terrorizing the populace with the objective of withdrawing it from the influence of our own administration and at the same time to safeguard for the [Red or Soviet] Army that part of the male population which is capable of bearing arms. The fact has been established by numerous reports that the bands seize the men who are capable of bearing arms, training them militarily to some extent and transferring them to the [Soviet] Army as the front moves up.
f) Disintegration of our own units in the territory.

4. The bands are composed of:

a) Small nests of enemy troops as they may have remained undestroyed behind our front as the territory was conquered.
b) Stragglers of enemy forces.
c) Enemy forces infiltrating through the front either singly or in smallest units;
d) Airborne enemy forces.
e) Escaped prisoners of war.
f) Deserters who are willing to help.
g) Inhabitants of the countryside who join the band voluntarily.
h) Inhabitants of the countryside who have been terrorized into joining the bands.

The bands are currently maintained as the required strength. New recruits are strictly screened in order to render it more difficult for *V*-men to gain admittance. As a rule, recruits go through a test period. They are trained, it is true, but for a preliminary period they are not given arms. Women are frequently found in the ranks of the bands as armed fighters, as helpers in matters of supply, for giving medical aid, and as communications personnel.

5. The leaders of the Bolshevist bands are taken from the ranks of officers and commissars as they may have been left behind by the retreating enemy forces or brought in by air; moreover, the enemy command has employed as band leaders other men who appeared suitable, preferably officials and political functionaries. In other regions and in deference to the characteristics of those regions the bands are under the leadership of their own chieftains.

6. The organization of the bands is military. These are closed units the size of which varies greatly. The terms however used by the bands to designate their units do not correspond to those in use by us, although they may sound the same. The most frequent designation "brigade" is often employed to describe a band of only a few hundred men. Normally, the bands appear in about that size. Sometimes large-size bands are formed comprising several thousand men which are in parts organized along military lines.

The endeavor on the part of band leadership is everywhere apparent to develop the bands into units of considerable striking force, to enlarge them, and to contain them in strict discipline. Discipline generally is maintained with rigid measures. In addition to band units which are strictly organized along military lines, there are units which are in the state of being developed and which for that reason have looser organizations. Larger units often comprise smaller units of various kinds and of varying striking power. For the service of blowing up roads, etc., and for the building of bridges the bands have special units. Frequently, mounted units are formed as parts of the bands, but artillery and anti-tank units are less common.

By means of special signals units the bands develop an efficient and closely knitted communications net. By radio they are in contact with their superior posts and neighboring units. They have at their disposal and efficient and carefully operated code system.

7. The combat methods of the bands are characterized by the following: Their combat missions are principally directed at destruction and raids. The execution of such missions will in the majority of cases call for open battle to be avoided. The sabotage units or units charged with blowing up installations, which are never any stronger than their immediate mission, requires them to avoid all open battle. In operations against our troops the bands usually employ:

a) The surprise attack. It is directed against troops in either bivouac or in billets which are inadequately or poorly secured. After thorough reconnaissance the bands put in their surprise appearance, attacking the most sensitive spots (command post, weapon depot, etc.) and thereafter disappearing again just as quickly.
b) The ambush. Its objectives are the destruction of railroad transports, units on the march, columns, and accompanying trains. By the use

of mines the bands first cause a delay and then open fire in complete surprise, suddenly, against troops in the open.

Whenever the bands are forced to give battle their reactions are different, depending on their size. Usually, the larger bands readily give battle, conducting their combat according to military principles. Bands which realize their insecurity almost always engage in evasive tactics, especially when they are threatened to be encircled or surrounded. If the encirclement has been successful and there is no other way of escape, the bands will attack smartly for the purpose of breaking through. Sometimes, however, they prefer to infiltrate through the encircling ring either singly or in smallest numbers or to hide, for which purpose they will frequently disguise themselves as harmless inhabitants of the countryside. Frequently, they will try to distract the attention of the encircling troops through simulated attacks. For the defensive the bands will establish excellently camouflaged field positions and underground bunkers from which they will fight doggedly and obstinately. They permit the enemy to approach up to a very small distance and will then open fire, ambush fashion. Similar tactics are employed against advancing reconnaissance forces.

The bands treat their victims with unsurpassed cruelty. Whoever falls into their hands must expect a terrible death. Mutilation of the dead and wounded is the rule. These are facts which every soldier, fighting the bands, must know; be just as hard.

8. The bands frequently change positions. This change takes place either in the execution of a mission with which they have been charged or for the purpose of safeguarding their own supplies, or lastly as evasive tactics to avoid being seized by our forces. On the march the bands carefully secure themselves to all sides, maintaining strictest march discipline. Night marches are the rule. The bandits almost always move on side roads which are known only to those familiar with the countryside and they use fords which to not serve ordinary traffic. Some roads are used especially so often that they might well be called band-roads. Even in flight, the bands seem to prefer such roads. As means of transport the bands employ the customary small wagons or sleds, depending on the seasons of the year. Their horses are strong. They replenish their horse supply by requisitioning the necessary replacement animals. On the march they will exchange their tired beasts for fresh animals from the villages. They know how to adapt their transports to changes in terrain and road conditions. The bands are capable of daily marches of from 60 to 70 kilometers.

9. For shelter the bands use inaccessible terrain, for instance, woods which would appear as impenetrable to anyone not familiar with the region, impassable swamps, swamp islands, mountainous forests which are difficult to reach, hidden caverns, etc. They will always establish secure camps in the shelter areas which are supplied with defense installations such as field

(a)



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

Figure 11: The example of a road ambush by a guerrilla platoon (a). The example of a railroad ambush by a guerrilla platoon (b), both used to interdict enemy surface lines of communication. (Jagdeinheiten)

positions, high lookout posts, and underground bunkers which are protected by minefields. Frequently, several camps are established close to one another on a relatively small area. In addition to the main camp, two or three alternate camps are prepared. The supply depots and ammunition depots are always found at some distance from the main camp. The bands surround the main camp or areas for several separate camps with guards which are supplied either by the band proper, after the fashion of field posts, or by the helpers of the bands from nearby villages. Frequently, two security lines are formed.

In the camps supply installations are established such as butcher shops, bakeries, hospitals, and weapons repair shops. When it becomes necessary to leave the camp suddenly the supplies are hidden in caches, usually by burying

them in the ground. Another practice is for the retreating bands to leave the supplies which are not needed on the march with the populace against receipts for the purpose of getting them back later. Whenever the bands succeed in remaining for a longer period of time in one and the same area they establish their own administration, they conscript recruits, establish new units, and engage in military training. In this manner the so-called "band republics" come into being.

10. The bands employ many war stratagems. Their most important ruse is to pretend to be stronger than they are. To the inhabitants of the countryside and to everybody else they grossly exaggerate their strength, maintaining they possess weapons which are in fact not at their disposal. They use every occasion to disseminate such false information for the purpose of misleading us and to deter us from attack.

Disguise is another one of their ruses. Frequently, the band members who are employed for reconnaissance or for requisitioning will wear the uniforms of the German Police, the Army, or the SS. And quite frequently individual bandits will be found disguised as women. In the field of camouflage the bandits show highest efficiency, especially when it is a matter of hiding. Thus, bandits were found standing in water up to their mouths, their heads hidden by pieces of sod; others were found almost completely buried in the ground.

11. The bands have an exemplary intelligence service.[176] Frequently, their agents will be found without being recognized as workers and interpreters in German service posts. Almost every village will have at least one man who is helping the bands; he will be acting as messenger for the band's intelligence service. Scouts endeavor to spy on commitment measures and the operational methods of the German service posts. Messengers disguised as harmless inhabitants of the countryside carry intelligence. Especially clever are the bands in the matter of wiretapping. The personnel for intelligence service include many women and minors. The fact that the German language is widely used in the occupied territory makes it easy for the bands to maintain excellent intelligence services. This service enables them to quickly recognize and to protect themselves against commitments on our part, unless absolute secrecy is maintained by us. The intelligence service of the bands simultaneously works for the enemy's Army command.

12. As a rule, the bands will be armed only with light and heavy infantry weapons. Weapons and ammunition are obtained from supplies left behind by retreating enemy forces; the supply is currently replenished by air. Moreover, they employ weapons and ammunition obtained through raids.

13. The bands secure the necessary foodstuffs by requisitioning them from the countryside. There demands are as a rule reasonable so as not to antagonize the populace.



Figure 12: Earth bunker cutaway and layout used as a guerrilla hideaway (a, b). Foxhole for the hiding of wounded who cannot be moved (c). (Jagdeinheiten)

14. The bands are not uniformly dressed. In addition to civilian clothes they wear every imaginable uniform from friend and foe alike. Through raids they replenish their clothing supply.

15. The bands have established their own ground organization for the air forces which supply them; this ground organization includes radio direction finder, light signal posts, and emergency beacon light installations. In their shelter areas they have landing fields.

16. The bands, in order to maintain themselves in any given area, require either absolute control of their shelter area or support by the populace. Toleration is the mildest form of support. Very frequently however, the cooperation between the populace and bands will go much further. Parts of the populace will without abandoning their calling of farmer or artisan participate occasionally or at times in the fights of the bands, or will render assistance to the bands, for instance as scouts, messengers, or agents. Occasionally, the bandits will be given leave from the bands for the purpose of enabling them to work at their calling. In case of necessity they will later be called back to service in the bands.

Fighting the bands

A. Leadership

17. Fighting the bands is a matter of leadership. This fight is to be executed and evaluated in accordance with established tactical principles, with due regards for all special aspects which are treated thoroughly in this pamphlet. Success too, will depend upon superior leadership.

18. In broad outlines command authority and responsibility is determined by the Army High Command and the Reich Leader of the SS and German Police [*Reichsfuehrer SS*].

19. A leader is to be appointed for every large scale operation against bands. It is necessary to determine beforehand his command authority over the Army forces and the forces of the Reich Leader SS which participate in the operation, as well as over civilian service post whenever necessary; this determination to be effected in closest cooperation with the command centers involved.

20. Fighting the bands requires closest cooperation between the military service posts and those of the Reich Leader SS and the civilian service posts. This cooperation must be effected from the very moment preliminary plans are made. For all measures to be taken by civilian administration such as agricultural work, road building, bridge building, forestry, evacuation of the populace from any given are, etc., the situation with respect to the bands must be duly considered. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the civilian administration must be given careful consideration in the fight against the bands.

21. No territorial boundary must be allowed to represent an obstacle in the fight against the bands. Should an operation in the course of combat activities be carried into a neighboring region, it is nevertheless to be continued without delay. Early participation of neighboring units in the preparation of large scale operations guarantees the timely and effective commitment of the former.

22. In fighting the bands the following methods have until now been employed successfully.

a) Encircling the bands and cleaning out the pocket. This is the principal combat method and represents, at the present time, the most efficient means for eradicating the evil of the bands. It requires superior forces, but it is most likely to lead to success.
b) Destruction through surprise attack and chase. Whenever, because of inadequate forces or lack of time, encirclement is impossible, or such encirclement is made impossible through difficulties of the terrain the bands must nevertheless be attacked without earlier encirclement; the must be defeated and chased until complete destruction has been accomplished.
c) Commitment of rifle commandos [*Jagdkommando* or hunter patrols] against bands. Small units which nevertheless must possess great striking power and are organized and equipped as rifle commandos are especially suited for impeding the formation of bands and for disrupting the relations between them.
d) Safety against bands, see sections 94–128. All troops, troop billets, traffic installations, and installations affecting the national economy, as well as war important values, must protect themselves or be protected from band raids by the necessary measures for safety.

23. In the fight against the bands we must always have the initiative. Even where a leader has but a small force at his command he should not allow himself to be led into indecision. Every operation against bands should, whenever possible, be followed by a counter measure.

Which method of combat is to be employed in the individual case will depend on the strength of the forces available, on the band situation, and on the over-all situation. Courage, aggressiveness, and versatility in leadership, as well as experience in fighting the bands must result in the employment of that method, which under given circumstances tend to inflict the greatest possible damage on the bands. Delay and inertness give the bands time to establish their positions and to reinforce themselves. Newly appearing bands must be fought without delay.

It is not possible to stem the evil wrought by the bands by the use of just one combat method. The best led and most successful operation in fighting the bands will be denied the ultimate success unless the region which has been cleared of the bands is kept free from them. Likewise, any security, no matter

how well developed, will in the long run remain ineffective, unless it is possible by advance and attack to create a sufficiently large forward area altogether free of any bands. In the technique of combat, too, every pattern must be avoided, because the bands quickly adapt themselves to such pattern and take the required counter measures; this is particularly true because they receive current instructions to that effect from the band command.

24. The effective operations against bands require a clear-cut formation of a point of main effort both with respect to the operation proper and to its security. In the course of the operation against a band the picture will frequently change with lighting speed, confronting leadership with unforeseeable situations. For this reason it is necessary that every leader have at all times adequate forces at his disposal, thus enabling him to shift the point of main effort at any time. Small and readily mobile units are most effective in serving as reserves and supplementary forces.

25. The large area of operation which characterizes the fight against bands makes it difficult for leaders to currently control the combat activities of subordinated units. The following three auxiliary measures have been found effective:

a) An efficient communication net prepared early, that is to say a well-developed wire net make for rapid message communication, especially over long distances.
b) Great mobility for the leader by means of small aircraft [Fieseler-156 *Storch* or Stork] which enables him to be at decisive points.
c) By virtue of sector wise advances with designation of targets only which are near at hand the leader will keep his troops in hand, especially when the communication system is poor and the operational area large. Loss of time must be contended with. Informing the troops about the over-all plan for the operation guarantees the necessary independence of action within the scope of the measures ordered.

26. In the fight against bands surprise is an especially important factor for leadership. As a matter of experience the bands anticipate that only rarely will they be attacked when the weather is bad or the terrain difficult to negotiate. Furthermore, they believe that our troops will enter swamp and virgin forest only reluctantly. Whoever executes an operation against bands, weather and terrain difficulties notwithstanding, can almost always be assured of completely surprising the band.

There is great danger that the bands will learn in advance of any planned operation against them. For this reason all preparations must be made within the narrowest circle of the responsible leader's staff. Telephone calls are to be avoided. Designation of camouflage facilitates secrecy. In as much as the bands stress the very surveillance of message communication and electronic

communication installations for the purpose of informing themselves of operations in the offing, it is important that the communications service be adequately camouflaged and that the communications themselves be encrypted; these safety measures are to be executed with utmost care from the very beginning and should be subjected to continuous checking in order that any slack in matters of secrecy which we have learned to expect may be prevented. It is best to instruct the troops only immediately prior to their commitment. For reasons of security it is suggested to alert the troops for movement into position preparatory for the operations proper. Civilian administrative centers are informed only when the operation is about to begin; only the Reich's Commissioners and the General Commissioners are personally informed in advance of pending important operations. Even in the course of preliminary commitment the troops should be on guard against surprise attacks by the bands. Assembly points and positions of readiness should be reached only in the evening or at night. Action stations are not to be occupied until the troops have arrived. The troops should leave the positions of readiness at the earliest break of dawn.

27. Seasons of the year play an important part in the fight against bands. During spring and fall the advance through swamp and virgin forest is especially difficult. During the summer it is easier for the troops to fight in swamps and to live in them. During the winter alone is it possible to walk on the swamp cover in most swamp areas. For this reason the winter is especially suited for large scale operations, especially for large scale encirclements. Fresh snow will facilitate the finding of tracks. Moreover, in winter the bands are impeded in their movements because they remain closer to their camps and their supply depots; for this reason the chance is better of forcing them to give battle. Whenever the over-all situation and the band situation itself require the bands must be attacked even in bad weather.

B. The troops

28. All German troops, including supply troops, technical troops, raid units, must be capable of waging war against the bands. The civilian administrative centers which are employed in the regions endangered by the bands must be informed of the basic combat principles so that they may, if necessary, participate in the operations. It is indispensable that the individual soldier, as well as the units, be thoroughly instructed in the special aspects of operations against bands.

29. The fight against bands is fighting under special conditions and these are the special aspects; in their fight against bands the troops are confronted by an enemy whose combat habits and conduct will in many respects deviate from what is normally customary at the front. His cunning, his treachery, and his cruelty must be off-set by alertness, determination, and sternness.

That is more important in the fight against the bands than any other factors. Usually, the troops will fail to recognize just that. They are inclined to make light of the operations against bands. Confronted at times by inferior forces and lessor weapons they are likely to act imprudently, thereby endangering themselves and other units. This in the course of time has caused unnecessary losses. Only constant alertness will safeguard the troops against these avoidable losses. It is the duty of every leader to insist upon a combat-like attitude of the troops at all times. We must not confuse a carefree attitude with bravery.

30. The troops must be expected to achieve extraordinary efficiency in reconnaissance, scouting, and observation, and beyond that in locating and ferreting out of hiding places. The well camouflaged and hidden bandits, their alternative shelters, as well as their supply and ammunition depots, must be found. For this purpose it is recommended that bloodhounds be used. The mines which usually have been cleverly placed must be found early. For mine detection engineers are to be detached to scout units, to the heads of columns on the march, and to spearheads (see section 39). In unfamiliar territory it is permissible to employ as guides deserters, prisoners, or other suitable natives, provided the necessary security measures are taken (for example, the native foresters who are familiar with the roads).

31. The fight against the bands requires careful security since the enemy must be expected to strike from any direction. Every march must be secured on all sides. The security distances are to be kept small. Heavy weapons [machine guns, mortars, infantry guns] are to be distributed over the entire length of the marching column. Whenever it becomes necessary to use roads which were not previously reconnoitered the following measures to protect against mines may be taken:

a) Rollers made from tree trunks and drags may be drawn before the troops;
b) Cattle may be driven in from of the troops.

Troops at rest must take thorough security measures. The best means of protection is offered by the "hedgehog" [*Ingel*] arrangement. Even in villages the troops must secure themselves on all sides. Splitting units for the purposes of billeting must be avoided.

32. Methods of advance through forests. The troops must be capable of following the bands into virgin forest or swamps and defeating them there. In advancing into a forest, in which considerable band strength must be expected, the troops must safeguard themselves by: increased reconnaissance, superior fire readiness, and method of advance. In these instances the company is generally the smallest unit to advance independently.

As a rule, the troops will advance on a broad front (for example, company with two platoons within the frontline) so that the bands may be forced to give

battle and the greatest possible number of men and weapons may be quickly employed in the ensuing firing action and pursuit. Moreover, this method of advance offers the best protection against ambush [*Bandenglocken*] which is frequently employed by the bands. An additional method of grouping for the purposes of advance is offered by the narrow and deep formation. It affords, especially when the band situation has not been reconnoitered, freedom of action to the leader and facilitates the advance. Its disadvantage, aside from vulnerability of the flanks and danger from ambush, lies in the fact that for its employment the troops will normally keep to roads and well passable regions, a fact which makes it more difficult to force the bands into battle or in the alternative, makes it easier for the bands to break out. For this reason troops which are experienced in advancing through woods will prefer to advance in the broad form. Whenever it is only a matter of combing the forest for hidden single bandits cordons of riflemen will be formed in which it will be practical to have two men advancing together.

In all manners of advance the matter of maintaining direction and contact is of special importance (direction group). Connection is to be maintained to both sides, contact only to the right. Reserves of up to one-third of the unit protect against surprises. Generally the leader will have them, as well as part of the heavy weapons, follow immediately behind him. Whenever parts of the unit encounter terrain that can be passed with difficulty only the general speed of the advance is to be adjusted to these parts. Should gaps occur within the company or battalion they should be filled at the earliest possible opportunity by stops at appropriate places (forest paths, ditches).

Swamps which are altogether impassable do not exist for the bands and consequently they cannot exist for our own troops either. Out troops must be thoroughly familiar with the use of the improvised means for fighting in swampy terrain (see section 42, et seq.) and if necessary, they must, the same as the bandits, be capable of fighting without them. The troops must be trained with the view of giving them the necessary toughness.

33. The troops must be superior in the fire fight. The well camouflaged bandits offer but small targets which moreover would frequently be visible for only short intervals. This requires accurate and quick firing. Firing discipline must be strict in order that the troops may keep fire superiority under combat circumstances which are frequently subject to sudden changes. In fighting the bands all unnecessary shooting is to be strictly forbidden. Avoiding premature firing is absolutely indispensable. The movement of spearheads must be guarded by heavy weapons so that firing ambushes by the bandits may be stopped at the earliest possible moment. Spearheads must carry along with them heavy weapons, especially weapons which offer quick readiness for fire so that in case of suddenly encountering the enemy they may rapidly gain fire superiority.



Figure 13: Searching a forested area for guerrillas (a, b). Deployment for assault and defense in ravines and broken ground (c, d). Deployment for crossing water obstacles (e). (Polizei)

34. For effectively fighting the bands the troops must be accustomed to night fighting. On one hand the troops must be capable of providing strict observation and security at night for the purpose of executing, on the other hand, scouting and shock troop operations at night. In the course of combat even when the weather is bad or the conditions of the terrain difficult the troops should spend the night wherever the combat mission may require them to do so. The indolent practice which can be so frequently observed, of putting up for the night in villages, is to be forbidden under all circumstances because this practice will unnecessarily free areas for the activities of the bands. The troops must be trained to live in the open.

35. Likewise, the troops must be capable of fighting the bands even though they may be entrenched in field positions. In such cases it is principally a matter of quickly penetrating of positions by sudden action of shock troops, even if heavy weapons should not be available.

36. The troops must be well experienced in noiseless advances and camouflage, if they are to succeed to take the bands by surprise. Every uncamouflaged movement, every lying about without camouflage, make for an easier task for the band observation. Camouflage suits and snow smocks especially are indispensable in the fight against bands. The troops must not be careless, must not give themselves away, as for example, by lighting open fires within proximity of the enemy.

37. The armament of the band fighting units must be adapted to the requirements for band fighting. Even in difficult terrain the troops must carry with them their weapons by their own power. Especially advantageous in fighting the bands are weapons which make for rapid fire readiness. Hand firearms and submachine guns, automatic rifles, rifles equipped with telescopic sights, light and heavy machineguns, light and medium antitank guns, light infantry guns, light antiaircraft guns, light flame throwers, these are the weapons which have proven their value for fighting the bands in swamp and virgin forest. These weapons however, represent an essential support of those forces which are employed for example for the purposes of sealing off a pocket, for interception, or reserves (see diagrams).

38. Armored scout cars and tanks, even the older models, are important for the fight against bands because, aside from their weapons effect, they have great moral effect on the bands. It should be noted however that the use of these vehicles in swamp and forest, as well as in mountainous terrain, is frequently difficult, if not altogether impossible.

39. Engineers are indispensable for repairing roads and bridges which in the majority of cases will have been blown up, for establishing passage in swampy terrain and in forests, for removal of mines and for blowing up of band fortifications and shelters. For the rapid crossing of streams and rivers the engineers should have available pneumatic floats and prefabricated bridge parts for the building of emergency bridges. Native forces should be commandeered to expedite the work of the engineers.



Figure 14: Branch hut and roof a and round branch hut for use as improvised shelters for troops during counter-guerrilla operations (a, b): 1) Lashing, 2) Flue, 3) Branches, 4) Fireplace, 5) Air inlet, and 6) Sleeping place. Star-shaped fire pit, pit fire, shavings, log fire, and invisible fire to heat these shelters overnight patrol bases (c, d, e, f, g). (Jagdeinheiten)

Figure 15: Noiseless walking on soft ground, on hard ground, and on grass (from left to right). (Jagdeinheiten)

40. Mounted units have been found to be especially helpful in the fight against bands for the purposes of combat reconnaissance, especially in terrain that is hard to negotiate. Likewise, motorized units may be successfully employed whenever road conditions generally are favorable.

41. From the beginning mounted forces must be subordinated to the units charged with independent combat missions, likewise special weapons, so that these units in their mixed nature may be capable of conducting the combat in all its phases independently, without having to wait at the decisive moment for the arrival of supporting weapons. Furthermore, units charged with independent activities should be provided with at least one interpreter per battalion, and if possible, with Security Service or Secret Field Police [SS *Sicherheitsdienst* or OKW *Geheime Feldpolizei*] personnel to allow the rapid questioning of prisoners.

42. The troops must be readily mobile. Motorized units are capable of following the frequently very rapid movement of the bands and to get ahead of them, if that should be necessary. In addition to these, forest, swamp, mountainous regions, and operations in winter generally call for the customary little wagons, pack animals, and sleds. Equipping motorized units with these means of transportation is a matter which must be taken care of beforehand. Every effort must be made to render the troops fully mobile for operations in winter (skis, sleds, etc.) In order to rapidly move his troops which do not have necessary means of transportation of their own for decisive actions the officer responsible for fighting the bands must make preparations for the immediate availability of motor vehicles belonging to the civilian administration centers within his area.

43. For movement in swampy terrain some of the troops will require swamp gear. This equipment includes primarily slats to be attached to the feet or feet-plates woven from twigs which allow the troops to walk on swampy surfaces; furthermore, boat-type runners similar to the *Akjas* [sleds] must be provided which serve to carry the heavy weapons and ammunition. In summer months mosquito



Figure 16: Improvised sledge for transport of supplies, ammunition, and personnel for counterguerrilla operations. (Jagdeinheiten)

netting will be required. For fighting bands in mountainous regions mountain gear is indispensable. For spending the night in the open the troops must be equipped completely with tents; in the alternative they must be trained to get along without them. For the winter adequate protective garments are required.

44. In case of emergency the troops must know how to provide these auxiliary means themselves; the troops must be capable of improvisation. After all care has been given regarding combat equipment for the troops it is still a matter of seeing that it is not too heavy. Many an operation has failed merely because the troops were weighted down by too much equipment.

45. For fighting the bands the troops require strong signal units for communication purposes; these elements must be readily committable and must possess the degree of mobility which conditions within the individual territory may require. Mounted messengers and, when road conditions permit, motorcycle riders represent an indispensable supplement to the electronic means of communication.

46. As a rule, it will be very difficult to bring up supplies through regions which are infested by bands. Supply columns and moving the wounded must have the protection of accompanying forces. It is to be expected that the roads over which supplies are to be brought will be mined. From the start the troops must be given plentiful supplies of ammunition and explosives. Food must be requisitioned from the countryside whenever necessary. The small independent combat units and the rifle commandos are to be provided with plenty of supplies and means of transportation in order to enable them to wage independent combat over a period of several days.

47. For the purposes of moving the wounded and the sick within the area of the band fighting ambulances must be provided from the very inception of the operations for regiments, battalions, or combat groups because of the fact that the area of operations are as a rule quite large. The employment of medical aircraft [*Sanitats-Stoerchen*] at medical aid centers was shown to be very helpful.

48. Native troops are most efficient in the fighting against bands if they are committed together with our own troops or in close connection with them. It is principally a matter of taking care that they are not exposed to the enemy's propaganda. This is accomplished by adequately informing them on our part and by charging them without letup with ever new combat missions; in this manner they will have no time to establish unnecessarily close relations with the populace which must be presumed to be under the influence of the enemy's propaganda.

C. Reconnaissance against bands

49. In the matter of band reconnaissance we must differentiate between:

a) Gathering information regarding the bands' activity,
b) Reconnaissance before an operation,
c) Combat reconnaissance in the course of an operation.

Gathering information

50. The purpose of gathering information is to obtain through many details a picture of the overall band situation. Responsibility has been determined according to section 19.

51. Gathering information embraces:

a) Forwarding all observations regarding band activity. This work is engaged in by the troops of all parts of the Army, by the troops subordinated to the Reich Leader SS, and command posts, as well as by all civilian administrative centers which lie in band-infested or band-suspected areas.
b) Methodical observation of the bands. This is primarily a function of the units established for this purpose: the Security Service, Secret Field Police, and Military Security.

52. Message centers are established for all band reports at the posts of those locally responsible for fighting the bands and if necessary at the posts subordinated to them. The message center must be connected with a good communication net. If the lines are frequently disturbed by the bands, supplementary communications is provided by radio.

53. The band reports must go directly to the message centers. For details regarding the formulation of reports see sections 64–68. Whenever a person making a report is not subordinate to the person receiving it he must simultaneously make his report to his superior officer without allowing any delay in the communication proper of the band report.

54. Important band reports are treated preferentially. Those requiring urgent commitment measures are to be given priority over the electronic means of communications, and more specifically: over the telephone as emergency calls; over the teletype as urgent (*KR*) message; over the radio as urgent (*KR*) message.

55. Band reports are interpreted by those locally responsible for fighting the bands. This interpretation of the band reports requires experience and familiarity with conditions in the particular locality. Valuable information may be gathered from the supply activities of the bands. The quantities of foodstuffs requisitioned and the numerical strength of the requisitioning commandos permit conclusions regarding the strength and camp location of the bands. The same is true for supply aircraft, their numbers and their landing fields. Statements by natives from the surrounding countryside are to be evaluated with caution. Information from these people regarding the strength of the enemy or his losses are usually greatly exaggerated, and information on matters of time is usually wrong. Frequently the statements will have been influenced by the bands, for the purpose of giving our measures a certain direction. The proper conclusion regarding future plans of the bands are frequently very difficult to make. The person making the interpretation of the information must guard himself against far-reaching surmises, frequently he will have to be satisfied with a reasonably accurate clarification of the band situation at the time. Most important is it to accurately forward what has actually been observed. Mere surmises must be clearly identified as such.

56. The result of the interpretation must bring about immediate decisions. Whenever the interpretation shows that an immediate commitment is necessary and possible, such commitment must be ordered and thereafter the band report (see section 53) must be forwarded together with indications as to what has been decided to the next superior officer responsible for fighting the bands. Whenever the interpretation shows that a commitment is required, while the necessary forces therefor are lacking, the band report is to be forwarded to the next superior officer charged with fighting the bands, together with a notification that a commitment is considered necessary but that the party reporting does not have the necessary forces.

57. All band reports are to be incorporated in the daily report which is to be made for every 24 hour period, including those which by reason of their importance may have been previously forwarded. This daily report must contain in condensed form a summary of the band activities within the area under control of the person making the report, as well as information regarding his own position, the measures he had taken, and the objectives to be attained thereby.

58. Neighboring command posts must mutually exchange their reports. It is essential that all bands reports be brought to the attention of the Security Service and Secret Field Police posts which are responsible for the particular area.

59. The officers charged with fighting the bands must maintain situation maps for their own area as well as for the neighboring ones (see appendix).

Reconnaissance before an operation

60. Before band-fighting operations the officer-in-charge must procure in due time the necessary information about the enemy for the purpose of facilitating the commitment of the forces. Responsibility rests with the leader who ordered the operation. As a supplement to the interpretation of currently gathered information reconnaissance must supply certainty regarding the shelters of the bands and the road conditions leading to them, as well as useable information relative to the strength and armament of the bands. There are three methods for accomplishing these reconnaissance missions:

a) Employment of *V*-men: This method comes into play in all instances, and is the only method when it is a matter of conducting the reconnaissance unobtrusively.
b) Commitment of rifle commandos with reconnaissance missions: This method is employed when it is a matter of conduction reconnaissance for an area which is thickly occupied by bands, or in operations against large-size bands which it may not be assumed that they will surrender their area without fight.
c) Commitment of slow-flying aircraft, primarily Fiesler-*Storch* (Fi 156): This method is only employed when the band area is flown over frequently anyway, so that the bands will not draw conclusions from the appearance of the aircraft regarding the plans for a given operation. In the case of large-size bands of which it must be assumed that they will give battle, there is less danger in this than would be the case where we are dealing with small bands which will presumably avoid battle. Against bands in flight air reconnaissance is to be used without hesitation.

61. The employment of *V*-men in band reconnaissance is especially important. Working with *V*-men is a prerogative of those service centers which are especially familiar with this sort of activity, more specifically: Security Service, Secret Field Police, and Military Security. Selecting the V-men requires vast experience.

62. The observation of the population too may furnish valuable directives for band reconnaissance. The observation of the population is participated in not only by the command posts immediately concerned with fighting the bands but also by the civilian administration centers which have dealings

with the populace, specifically the agricultural administrators and the forestry administration centers. In this category also belongs the surveillance of native auxillary forces. Any special observation and suspicious findings must be quickly forwarded to the message centers.

63. Observation of the movement of band support aircraft yields valuable information regarding the location of the band shelters and the strength of the bands.

64. Band reports must be unequivocal and the persons making them must refrain from all exaggeration. A person making a request for assistance who exaggerates the impending danger may cause useless commitment measures to be taken causing thereby a waste of forces which could conceivably be employed elsewhere with far greater success. Any exaggeration in a report on the results of an operation will cause the strength of the bands being considered as eliminated, while in reality the band in question continues to exist, this practice then endangers the over-all success. Reports on the success of a given operation should refer to only those things as "captured" material which have actually taken and secured. Whatever has been destroyed on the spot should be reported as "destroyed."

65. Band reports should be short and precise. Long-winded, exhaustive reports are of no value. In the first report relative to the bands the answers to the following questions are especially important:

a) When was the band observed?
b) Where did the band appear?
c) How strong was the band?
d) What was the band doing?
e) How is the band composed?

For the purpose of preparing the propaganda and also for the purpose of determining the fighting forces of the band it is necessary to early determine the composition of the band with regard to its nationality (Latvian, Estonian, Lithuanian, Polish, etc.). All other information, which, while of great importance for band reconnaissance, would, for the purposes of summarization and forwarding, delay the commitment, is to be forwarded later as supplement. Such information includes:

a) The names of the band's leader and commissar.
b) Designation of the band.
c) Positions of reserve and alternate camp.
d) Where the band came from.
e) Where the band was going.
f) How the band was armed.
g) The vehicles of the band.
h) The damage inflicted by the band.
i) Other special points that may have been noted.

66. Band reports will employ the following terminology.

a) Personnel:
Bandit; a permanent member of a band.
Band helper; one who only fights with the band at times or assists it in other ways.
Band suspect; one who is suspected of helping the bands.

b) Matters of locality:
Band area; this is the area where are located camps of the bands, here they have exclusive control.
Band infested territory; territory in which the bands will occasionally requisition or through which they will occasionally pass.
Territory free of bands; here there are no bands.

67. Names of villages, etc. must be given in the band reports according to 1:300,000 map with aircraft report grid. If this map is not available a supplementary designation must be employed for smaller places and for names which occur frequently, this is to be done either according to the coordinate map grid or by reference to other places which are easily identified.

68. In the band reports the bands must not be described by terms which for us would be misleading and which are used only by the bands. Any report, for instance, should not be made to read "Band Brigade XYZ" instead it should be made to read correctly "A band of 350 men, the so-called Band Brigade XYZ."

Combat reconnaissance in the course of an operation

69. In the course of an operation against bands efficient reconnaissance is essential for all phases of combat and for all units of the troops, including those committed rearward and on the flanks. Responsibility rests with the leader of the operation and with the leaders under him. The objectives of reconnaissance are:

a) To find all hidden enemy forces.
b) To early recognize all attempts at flight for breakthrough.
c) To anticipate and prevent raids and ambush.
d) To reconnoiter enemy positions and the best ways to approach them.

Combat reconnaissance is conducted according to methods normally employed. Scout detachments against bands must be strong. Trained rifle commandos are best suited for this purpose.

70. Statement by prisoners represent one of the best sources of information. For this reason it is wrong to shoot captured bandits on the spot. During operations the prisoners must be questioned singly and as quickly as possible. The immediate and principle objective of questioning the prisoners is to get the

important facts relative to the conduct of operations at the moment. Results which are important for the leader are to be reported to the leader without delay. Other findings may be reported later. The questioning is to be done by the Security Service or Secret Field Police attached to the unit with the assistance of experienced interpreters, and not by inexperienced men. After questioning in this preliminary manner the prisoners are to be transferred to the proper Security Service or Secret Field Police posts with the exception of prisoners which, because of their familiarity with the roads, are to be retained as guides.

71. Further, questioning of suitable prisoners will usually furnish the information relative to the connection between and the composition of the bands. This difficult work of questioning requires especially experienced experts. Security Service and Secret Field Police posts forward important prisoners to their superior centers. The posts of the Army and Reich Leader SS are instructed to exchange valuable results of the questioning of prisoners.

D. Methods of combat

Encirclement and destruction

72. Destruction through encirclement is to be the objective in all cases even when only small bands are involved. This objective can always be obtained if the forces necessary for encirclement are available.

73. The basic principle for this combat method is: To cut off the bands from all avenues of escape and thereafter to methodically destroy every part of the bands.

74. In determining the forces required for the encirclement the following points are essential.

a) For the purposes of encirclement thin cordons of riflemen are never adequate, instead what is required are lines capable of repelling the enemy (security first, then the bulk of the forces with heavy weapons, and behind them mobile reserves).
b) The area to be encircled should include only the band area proper. Band infected and band suspected areas nearby are of no importance. If the forces available are insufficient for encirclement of the entire band area the conduct of combat is to be confined to the encirclement of only part of the area and more specifically of that part which at the given time is the most important.

75. In preparation and execution of the operation it is important that the encirclement be effected suddenly. For this purpose the encirclement forces are assembled far from the band nucleus. It is not always proper to arrange the assembly areas in a circle around the band area. For the purposes



Figure 17: The Encirclement, the approach march and details of the completion of a pocket or "Cauldron." (OKW, WS Hill)

of misleading the band it is suggested that the forces be brought up so as to prevent any conclusion relative to the planned operation, and so that, instead, entirely different plans will be surmised. The deception will be the more successful the greater the mobility of the troops effecting the encirclement. From the assembly areas the forces will begin the operation in such a manner that they will reach the line of encirclement simultaneously. Important is the reconnaissance beforehand of the approaches. Band securities and relatively weak secondary bands are sidestepped, any resistance encountered in the course of the advance is quickly broken. The objective is to rapidly and securely encircle the main band. The lines of encirclement are to be arranged

with due regard for the conditions of terrain. Any terrain is favorable which lends itself to easy defense. In the forests swaths and paths cut through them and running across the general direction of advance are favorable. In mountainous terrain the lines of encirclement should be placed on elevated positions (see figure 17).

76. The interval between moving up to the line of encirclement and the establishment of readiness for repelling enemy attacks is the critical period at the inception of any operation. Combat experienced bands will feel out the line as it is being formed and will attempt to break through a weak spot. For this reason it is important that even during the time of moving into line heavy weapons be available at the front.

77. After reaching the line of encirclement the encircling force will immediately get ready to repel any effort by the bands to break through. Boundary lines between units, paths, ravines, swamps, and water courses are especially endangered and are to be secured accordingly. In terrain which offers good visibility it is sufficient to establish support points. The points however must be so close to one another that they can render mutual support through fire. The support points are to be established in such a manner that all-around defense is possible. Connection between support points is maintained by guards and scouting forces. These forces have the additional function of preventing individual bandits from filtrating through.

Repulsion of the enemy is primarily dependent upon the firing power of heavy machine guns; mortars and light infantry guns cover the areas which are not open to observation; antitank guns cover roads and paths leading toward the line of encirclement. The plans of fire are to be made beforehand. Combat posts are to be sent out. Combat reconnaissance must extend beyond the combat posts and into the area in the rear of the line of encirclement. The forces stationed in the rear of our own position, they are mobile forces, form the backbone of the encirclement. All encirclement forces must have close contact with one another and must be constantly on the alert.

All attempts by the enemy to break through must be defeated by concentrated repelling fire. If parts of the bands nevertheless succeed in breaking through the encircling forces must continue to hold their respective positions and must close any eventual gaps. Pursuing the enemy forces which succeeded in breaking through is a function of the reserves. Mounted and motorized forces, as well as tanks, will be committed during the encirclement in sectors lying near roads, or will be used as reserves.

78. Destruction of encircled bands can be accomplished in various ways:

a) Pocket drive [*Kesseltreiben*]: The pocket is narrowed by all forces of the encirclement starting simultaneously and moving toward the center. This method which appears as the simplest is however

CLEARING OUT THE POCKET BY SHORTENING THE LINE OF ENCIRCLEMENT



Figure 18: Cleaning out a pocket by shortening the line of encirclement. (OKW, WS Hill)

indicated when the numbers of the enemy are relatively small. Over wide areas it is difficult to employ because in the case of a longer line of encirclement it is hardly likely that all encirclement forces will be able to advance with equal speed. This tends to disrupt the immediate contact, causing gaps through which the enemy may easily escape (see figure 18).

b) Partridge drive [*Vorstehtreiben*]: The forces of one sector of the line of encirclement begin the attack while the forces opposite of them remain in their respective positions. The attacking forces press the bands in the fashion of herding wild animals toward the forces remaining in their positions. In the course of this operation it must be expected that the bands will attempt to break through the ranks of the attacking forces. For this reason it is necessary to employ reserves in back of the attacking forces. This method is indicated whenever it has become known what direction the flight of the bandits will take or over which roads they will retreat and is still further indicated whenever some part of the encircling forces are positioned in an area which lends itself to easy defense (water course, ridge, edge of forest). In these instances any attempts at breaking through are hopeless and driving the bands towards forces positioned in such favorable areas should lead to their quick destruction (see figure 19).

c) Moving strong assault forces forward: Immediately after the encircling forces have reached their positions strong assault

CLEARING OUT A POCKET IN THE FASHION OF "VORSTEHTREIBEN"



Figure 19: Cleaning out a pocket in the fashion of a "Partridge" Drive. (OKW, WS Hill)

forces are sent forward of the line of encirclement toward the center of the pocket or in the direction of known band camps; the forces advancing employ combined armament; the balance of the encircling forces remain in their positions. This method tends to deprive the bands of freedom of action. They cannot even find the opportunity of ascertaining, through their own scouting forces, the weakest spots in the line of encirclement for the purposes of effecting a break through. The bands determinedly attacked in their main camp, are forced to split up into individual groups. After a successful splitting up operation, the forces in the individual sectors of the encirclement advance, simultaneously pushing strong wings out and forward; they establish contact with the assault forces and divide the pocket into individual parts which parts are then are to be cleaned up without undue haste. Cleaning up large pockets will frequently call for engagements which may last for several days. In these instances the troops are to be assigned their objectives from day to day. What has been said about the formation of the encircling line is equally applicable for the selection and manning of intermediate lines. The troops should reach these intermediate lines well before darkness and should then establish themselves there for the night. Assault forces which have advanced over a considerable distance



Figure 20: Cleaning out a pocket by splitting it up into smaller pockets. (OKW, WS Hill).

should secure themselves on all sides in order to prevent raids by the bandits. Strong assault forces will take up "hedgehog" positions before darkness, while lesser assault forces will return to the main force for the night (see figure 20).

d) Forming an assault detachment: Wherever a band has established a strong camp and reconnaissance indicates that it intends to defend the camp, a strong assault force is formed, once the encirclement has been completed from the troops constituting the reserves up to that point. It begins its mission at the line of encirclement, attacks the camp and destroys the band. In the course of this engagement the encircling forces have the function of intercepting escaped bandits and thereafter searching the pockets for hidden bandits (see figure 21).

79. Once the bands have been "brought to bay" in a pocket, they will usually try to mislead the leader of our operations by false information. Deserters will state, for instance, that the bulk of the bands has escaped or infiltrated through. Their purpose is to achieve thereby the discontinuance of searching operations within the pocket or of the encirclement. No matter how credible such information may sound, the leader of the operation must not allow himself to be induced to abandon the search for bandits. Even the most hardened bandits cannot remain hidden in the swamp water for more

CLEARING OUT THE POCKET BY AN ASSAULT FORCE



Figure 21: Cleaning out the pocket by an assault force. (OKW, WS Hill).

than a few days. To catch them then is a function of those encircling forces which have remained in their positions to the last. Frequently, repetition of the search will be indicated, in which case it should be continued if possible from a different direction.

Destruction through surprise attack and chase

80. If either the forces or the time available are inadequate for encirclement of the bands, it is advantageous to force the bands into battle by surprise, to destroy them by quick attack and to chase the small groups into which they may have split and to destroy these individually. An escape by routed individual groups must be contended with. This method of combat is especially successful when employed against bands which have as yet not reached definite positions or which are on the march. Aggressive troops under stern and capable leadership may achieve good results even when confronted with numerically superior bands.

81. The basic principle of this combat method is: To quickly disperse at the decisive point the band forces by virtue of superiority at that point and then to chase them until their destruction has been accomplished.

82. Prior reconnaissance is indispensable, the speed of this particular method not withstanding. Position and strength of the band forces must be ascertained before the thrust is begun.

83. The attack against the band shall be a surprise blow. The troops assemble far from the combat area and advance over roads previously reconnoitered in an inconspicuous manner. Whenever it is to be anticipated that the band will endeavor to engage in evasive tactics, the attack must avoid this movement.

Only for bands which presumably will offer serious resistance, is attack from positions of readiness indicated.

84. The further course of combat will depend on the actions of the bands. If the band accepts the fight the attack is to be continued according to plan. Through concentration of fire and forces the band position is broken into, the position is rolled up and the defeated enemy is destroyed. Whenever the band evades battle the troops will follow the enemy frontally without haste for the purpose of effecting, by quickly advancing, using an encirclement of the band. If the band splits up, the troops will undertake the chase. Corresponding strong combat groups must be formed. They pursue the individual parts of the band untiringly and force them to give battle. If the band is dissolved the troops will stop for the purpose of conducting renewed reconnaissance. It is to be anticipated that the band command has instructed the individual members to reassemble later far from the area of combat. To find these assembly points quickly is a function of reconnaissance. After that a new plan of combat is to be developed.

85. Chase is an increased form of pursuit. The objective is to overtake the enemy, to force him into battle, and to destroy the bands. In these course of these operations the pursuing troops must safeguard themselves against being delayed by rear guards and against being turned into the wrong direction. Even the smallest enemy groups must be driven to such a point that the last man has either been destroyed in battle or has been taken prisoner. Prerequisite for the chase is great mobility for the troops. It is practical to increase the mobility of the troops for more rapid advance in swamp and forest by having ammunition and baggage brought up to them by other units, if necessary to have them moved by manpower. Primarily the chase is directed against the band leadership. Again and again we must endeavor to personally capture the band leader or to destroy him. Leadership data are particularly valuable for continued fighting of the bands and should be carefully secured. Rewards for capture of the band leader will give additional incentive to the men during the chase.

Commitment of rifle commandos against bands

86. The creation of rifle commandos [*Jagdkommandos* or hunter patrols] makes possible active fighting against the bands even with smallest forces. Moreover, the rifle commandos are especially suited for reconnaissance where the use of force may become necessary. Such commandos are to be made available to all troops engaged in the fighting of bands and to the service center in the form of reserve forces; they are to be employed at every opportunity. It will be practical to establish a rifle commando as a permanent organization and to continue its existence in that form. The rifle commandos are to see to it that the bands do not get any rest. They hamper the organization of the

bands and their supply. For their own forces which are engaged in matters of security or tied down through other missions they establish a forward area free from bands.

87. The basic principle of the method is: The imitation of the bands' method of combat and efficient adaptation to local conditions, to approach the bands unnoticed whenever possible and to strike them as a matter of complete surprise.

88. Favorable commitment areas for rifle commandos are areas: Through which the bands march, in which the requisition their foodstuffs, and through which the must pass preparatory to their raids and their acts of sabotage. Unfavorable for rifle commandos is terrain in which the bands have the support of fortified camps.

89. The strength of a rifle commando should not be less than one platoon nor more than one company. The rifle commando is especially equipped for its mission (camouflage clothes, winter clothes, the customary little wagons and sleds, pack animals, skis and boat-type runners, mess equipment, mine detection equipment, tools of all kinds); telephone equipment for connection with existing lines, for wire-tapping purposes, or for the communication of messages; radio equipment which must be efficient for both range and dependability, and good armament (many submachine guns, automatic rifles, light machine guns, light mortars, a large number of egg-shaped hand grenades). The rifle commando must be capable of fighting and living for a protracted period of time without receiving supplementary supplies.

90. Suitable as band fighters are soldiers who are fearless and well trained. Several engineers, mounted messengers, communication personnel, and interpreters are an integral part of a rifle commando. The employment of native forces in rifle commandos may may be practical, but only experienced and dependable men should be considered. Between engagements all band fighters are to be kept at a high state of efficiency by appropriate training.

91. The rifle commando must be led with considerable cunning. Thorough knowledge of the bands' method of combat and of local conditions are prerequisites, before battle ruses can be expected to be effective. For this reason the band fighters should, whenever possible, be employed within an area with which they are thoroughly familiar. For example, the following is important: Whenever a rifle commando is stationed for a longer period of time in a fixed position it must be assumed that the band intelligence service is holding all preparations and movements under surveillance down to the last detail. It is the very departure for an operation which must be secreted from the bands. At this early point the band intelligence service must be misled; this will be accomplished by having the commando move out in a direction opposite the area of commitment, thereafter they will reach that area on detours at the time when the fight against the bands is to begin. All marches and rests must be



Figure 22: A rifle commando cutting back before resting (a). Backtracking and jumping off the track (b). Road ambush by a rifle commando (c). (Jagdeinheiten)

skillfully camouflaged. Should the commando be recognized, it changes its position. Fine sagacity in all band fighters and especially in their leader is an essential prerequisite for a successful operation. The rifle commando must secure its own information relative to the activities of the bands, especially when it is engaged far from other units.

92. The rifle commando fights in the following manner: It will march at night, during the daytime is will be in a hidden camp. March and rest are to be camouflaged and secured. Upon reaching the area of commitment reconnaissance begins. The activities of the bandits are determined by the traces of the bands. No relationship must be established with the populace, this is necessary to prevent betrayal. For rifle commandos the employment of scouting troops in ambush has always proven valuable. From ambush these forces observe from a spot which is advantageous for fire attack the approaches and the paths over which the bands move. Good camouflage, close contact between the forces and above all, much patience are needed for success (see figure 23). After destruction of the enemy, papers and maps are to be secured, weapons and ammunition are to be rendered unserviceable. Taking loot must be done under cover fire. This is especially important because the evasive tactics of the bands will be confined to

DESTRUCTION OF A BAND ON THE MARCH BY A RIFLE COMMANDO



Figure 23: Details of the wrong and right way to destroy a band on the march by a rifle commando. (OKW, WS Hill)

a relatively small area, so that they may retaliate by a firing attack of their own. Rifle commandos will avoid battle with fire-superior bands.

93. As a matter of safeguard against surprise the rifle commandos will make no running reports. Reconnaissance findings which are especially important and which call for immediate commitment of stronger forces must however be communicated by radio or messenger or over the telephone in which case care should be exercised that the communications is carefully camouflaged; this is accomplished by connecting with existing telephone lines and, if necessary, by first disconnecting that part of the line which continues on into the band areas.

Security against the bands

A. General

94. Combat against bands which is exclusively conducted in the form of attack must be supplemented by methodical active security against bands. In addition to security for the troops themselves, it is a matter of securing:

a) The railroads and rail traffic.
b) Roads and waterways and the traffic moving on these.
c) The countryside.
d) Installations important for national economy, administration centers, and communication installations.
e) Agriculture and forestry.

95. The basic principle of security against bands is: Everything which is important for the conduct of the war must be secured against band activities. The immediate protection of installations and equipment alone is not enough. The security force must not stick to object to be secured. How far they may go away from their point of support would depend upon their strength at any given time, upon their armament, their determination, and the band situation generally. Only an attitude of activity and initiative makes for respect and thus leads to success.

96. Relative to individual security missions the list of those responsible for security is given below. Command authority in the various security areas and the basis for cooperation between the various forces engaged in matters of security are to be determined by the person responsible for fighting the bands in any given locality. Under no circumstances may security missions remain unexecuted because of any doubt in matters of authority.

97. Every leader who has been entrusted with a security area must employ, for purposes of security, only those forces which are necessary for the execution of the security mission. All other forces should be held in readiness for fighting the bands (rifle commandos).

98. All troops, not only those directly engage in fighting the bands and in matters of security, must take care of their own security everywhere in areas endangered by bands and at all times. The responsibility for the security of the troops always lies with their leader. The existence of special combat posts charged with fighting the bands does not relieve him of this responsibility of his. Normally, a company (squadron, battery) should be the smallest unit to be stationed by itself in a given place without supporting forces.

99. Before marches are made through band supported or infested regions the band situation maps and the road condition maps are consulted by those charged with the responsibility for fighting the bands. The march is to be secured, this includes more specifically:

a) Sending scouts ahead into the villages lying on the route of the march.
b) Sending mine detection detachments to the head of the column.
c) Automatic weapons ready to fire distributed over the length of the column.

100. Billets and bivouacs must always be established in such a matter as to allow all-around defense. The forces should be distributed so as to make it possible for the individual man in case of attack to reach his position over the shortest course. Protracted falling-in at alert points only offers the bands the opportunity to fire on the bulk of the troops. Quick readiness to repel any enemy attack is the prime consideration. Protection against fires should be established.

101. Every security and every security detail (see 120 et Seq.) in band-suspected and band-infested regions must be arranged in strong-points for defense. The following factors are important:

a) The strength of a guard shall never be less than one squad.
b) Armament for the guard include automatic weapons and flare-pistol. The ammunition supply must amount, if possible, to two field issues and should include a large number of hand grenades.
c) Every guard must be equipped for close-range fighting. In the case of stone houses, windows and other openings must be established as embrasures. Wooden houses are not suitable for defense positions. It is more practical to construct underground living shelters and to conduct the defense from a position which has been established around these. Provision must be made for the men to reach their combat positions from their shelters quickly and under cover. The position must not be extended too far; the guard personnel must be sufficient to take up the position without leaving any gaps. If in exceptional cases wooden houses must be used for shelter they



Figure 24: Checkpoints, guards or sentries, and patrols used for local security against bands (a, b, c, d). (Polizei)

are to be reinforced by walls of sandbags at least 1 meter thick and 2 meters high. Ammunition may be stored in ammunition bunkers only.

d) In front of the position barbed wire obstacles or obstacles made from limbs of trees are to be established; likewise, whenever necessary, mine fields and other mechanical means of defense. Provisions must be made for giving alarm from all approaches. The plans for the mine fields are to be made known to all other units of the neighborhood and to those who might be marching through the area and to administration centers; the mine fields must be marked.

e) The immediate surroundings of every guard position must be cleared of all matters offering the opportunity for hiding. In the woods clearings must be made of not less than 400 meters diameter.

f) Elevated guard posts and observation towers protected against enemy fire facilitate observation during daytime.

g) Connection between guard and nearest troops must be safeguarded. As a supplement to electronic means of communication emergency lights must be established. The guards maintain continuous contact with their neighbors through scouting forces which at the same time guard the terrain in between. Supplementary scouting forces, to be supplied whenever possible by other units, are valuable.

h) The populace are to be prohibited from entering the support points.

i) The guard personnel is to be kept well trained at all times for their functions. Alarm training should not be conducted pursuant to any established pattern. This form of training must confront the leader of the guards and the guard personnel with missions which correspond to the probable conditions of combat. The guard personnel must furthermore be trained for greatest possible alertness in the performance of its duties. Exercises at irregular intervals are required.

102. All troops stationed in band-infested regions and all administration centers must provide their own security. Every house which we occupy, every shop which we use, every camp which we may have established must be secured. The occupants are responsible. Whenever continuous guarding is not feasible mechanical security measures and alarms installations are to be provided. It must be made impossible for every stranger to enter without being noticed, particularly at night. All officers, men, employees are to be billeted together and whenever possible in close proximity to the place of their respective duties. Habitation on ground level must be protected against fire from the enemy. Protection against fires is to be provided for all billets. Every man must be armed at all times. Even at night in bed. In all shelters regardless of whether

occupied by troops or other forces, some of the occupants must sleep fully dressed and serve as alarm forces. When walking outside the shelter attention must be paid to security. Never move about alone. In motorized vehicles at least every other occupant must carry either rifle or submachine gun ready to fire.

The movement of natives in the offices must be kept under surveillance. The shelters, the shops, and the depots are to be repeatedly checked for the purpose of detecting any attempt at sabotage by the enemy. Native auxiliary forces must be kept under continuous surveillance. An attitude of trust may mean death. Commanding officers of villages, army patrols, police, and military policy are instructed to see it that these general security measures are observed.

103. Every precaution should be taken that the forces employed for purposes of security are in no wise dependent upon the populace. Otherwise, bandit reconnaissance will be greatly facilitated. For this reason security forces must never be required beyond their own needs.

B. Security for railway installations and rail traffic

104. The protection of railway installations and rail traffic has preference over all other security missions.

105. Responsibility for safeguarding railroads rest with specifically designated administrative centers and units of the Army. In regions having civilian administration and in cooperation with the administration center of the Reich Leader SS an adequate security strip must be established alongside the railroad installation as a fore field of the right-of-way.

All forces charged with securing the right-of-way in any given locality, including armored trains and other security vehicles, are placed under the command of the officer for that particular locality. Close contact is to be maintained with the administrative officers of the railroads and the transportation system.

106. The railroad security forces must not contend themselves with the direct protection of railroad installations (object protection and patrol service). The main thing is to control the forefield of the right-of-way. For fighting the bands attack considerable parts of the right-of-way security forces, at least 1/3 of them, are to be committed constantly. Railway stations, block stations, as well as important service installations (in order of importance: bridges, underpasses, water towers, pump stations, electronic appliances, and railway service stations) are to be afforded security in the form of support points, and in cases of long distances, the open right of way should receive intermediate support points. For the purpose of defending railway installations the railroad employees should be employed, together with the other forces, as far as employment is compatible with the maintenance of the railway service. Their employment is determined alone by the head of their respective administrative officer.

(a)



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

Figure 25: Securing fixed railway installations from band attack (a, b). (Polizei)

107. Security objectives are:

a) Sending out patrols for the purposes of establishing connections with neighboring patrols. These patrols move at some distance from the right-of-way proper for the purpose of ascertaining any ambush by the bandits and eliminating it.
b) Establishing scouting forces in ambush, the purpose being to catch sabotage forces of the bands.
c) Patrolling the right-of-way at irregular intervals and times for the purpose of detecting mines laid or other activities intended to disrupt the railroad service.
d) Securing the objects the protection of which is the basic purpose of the security measures.

The patrols direct their attention on suspicious traces at the right-of-way which would indicate that the right-of-way has been entered upon by persons not authorized or which would indicate that mines have been laid or that the tracks have been loosened. Reinforcing these patrols by tracking dogs

is practical. The security forces are to rapidly remove any mines detected. In patrolling the right-of-way that track should be used which carries trains coming in the opposite direction, but even when patrols observe this regulation they should be on guard against trains from either direction. Upon the approach of a train both tracks must be cleared. In the development of support points or in protecting bridges and underpasses with wire, clearances must be maintained. For detailed information the railroad administrative offices must be consulted.

108. In case of imminent danger or other suspicious occurrences all railroad traffic must be stopped immediately, this is accomplished: During the daytime by moving a red/white signal flag in circular fashion, if such flag is not available any other object will do, even the signaling person's arm; At night by circular movement of a lantern, if possible a rea one, or an emergency torch (to be fashioned, for instance, out of straw). If, in the event of an accident on one track, the other track has no clearance, the trains moving on the other track must be stopped first, thereafter the track on which the accident occurred is to be safeguarded backward. If there is any doubt relative to clearance, the other track must by all means be blocked. The signal to stop is to be given at a distance of a least 700 meters, and if possible, of 1000 meters from the scene of the accident. Any attack on the railroad must be brought to the attention of the nearest transportation or railway administration office immediately. Auxiliary trains of the German railroads should be given an accompanying commando of at least one squad. These accompanying commandos must be hold in readiness the railroad security forces wherever these auxiliary trains are located; every scene of an accident is to be protected against attacks by the bandits over an area of adequate circumference.

109. Outside of villages or towns on both sides of the right-of-way, a strip of "no man's land" must be established in a depth of 300 meters on either side. This no man's land is marked by warning signs in German as well as in the language of the country. All standing timber must be removed from these no man's land strips. Only a thin screen of trees is allowed to remain standing close to the right-of-way proper for the purposes of depriving the bandits of the opportunity of freely firing onto the right-of-way, those portions of the woods which may serve as protection against snow drifts are likewise left intact. Under no circumstances may snow hedges be chopped down, damaged, or thinned out. The railroad administrative centers determine what portions of the woods should remain standing as protection against snow drifts. In all other respects the removal of timber is under the control of the administration centers for forestry. Whenever possible felled timber is to be removed because felled timber which has been allowed to remain could under circumstances afford the bandits better cover and concealment than standing timber. The strips of no man's land may not be used for agricultural purposes. New growth must not be allowed to come up. Nobody

other than patrol personnel, railroad employees, and the forces working on communication installations may enter no man's land or right-of-way, specifically excluded are all natives and unauthorized members of the Armed Forces. The inhabitants of no man's land must be removed to other localities. In removing native railway helpers due regard must be given to the maintenance of efficient railway service.

All traffic across the right-of-way is to be confined to certain roads. In the selection of the location for these roads the railroad and transportation administrative officers should be consulted. All other crossings are to be blocked by adequate obstacles. Large railroad bridges may be entered upon by only those men who have worked on them. Passes for all men will be issued by the patrol units or the transportation offices in cooperation with the railroad administrative offices. Native railroad workers engage in work on the right-of-way are to be given identifying marks. They are permitted to enter upon the right-of-way only over certain roads and then only in a body. The same applies to these personnel leaving the right-of-way. Every communication troop working at the right-of-way carries a well visible yellow flag. Whenever it must be expected that the bandits will misuse the flag, the identifying signals should be changed from time to time. It will be practical to have the native track checkers accompanied by the railroad security patrols.

110. Every person using the railroad in band-endangered territory must anticipate a mine attack or a shooting attack at any moment. He must be at all times ready to defend himself. For every train passing through territory endangered by the bands the head of the last unendangered junction must provide readiness for defense. Regulations for the security of troop transports and men on leave are contained in pamphlet 18/2, "Preliminary Directives for Securing Troop Transports and Trains Carrying Men on Leave in Band Endangered Territories."

111. For use of the railroads the natives require the permission from the officer in command of their village or town and the permission of the commissar for the area. The requirements for obtaining these permissions should be rigid. All civilian personnel traveling on railroads are to be carefully checked by the authorized railway administration offices and the transportation offices as



Figure 26: Maintaining security against bands during movement by railway: 1) forward security team, 2) train guard, 3) strike team, and 4) rear security guard. (Polizei)

well as by the military police because the bands frequently have scouts and messengers using the trains.

C. Security for roads and waterways

112. Securing land and waterways is a function of those charged with fighting the bands in any given locality. Special officials are put in charge of especially important points.

113. The necessary forces are to be taken from the security troops. The employment of native forces in connection with our own troops may be considered.

114. The most endangered parts of roads and waterways are the man-made structures, especially bridges. These must be protected by means of strong adequate security measures. The installations requiring protection, at least their most vulnerable parts are to be incorporated in the support points and are to be protected by strong obstacles. In the case of bridges across rivers the danger of ice in the winter should be given due consideration.

115. The roads and waterways proper as well as the communication installations running parallel to them are to be guarded continuously by mobile forces. Specially suitable for this are: On the roads, patrols moving in small [*Kubelwagen*] vehicles (motorized military police and motorized rural police). On the waterways, patrols and motor boats (engineers and harbor police). It is the function of these patrols to ambush the bands likely to disrupt the traffic.

116. Along stretches of road which are especially open to danger protection by accompanying forces should be provided. The first principle must be: no pattern for security measures and no dispatching of accompanying trains by any schedule. The bands quickly recognize regularity and adjust the conduct of their activities accordingly. Endangered stretches are to be blocked. The block guard posts must at all times be manned. Accompaniment should be arranged pursuant to the following principles:

a) The accompaniment must possess adequate fighting power.
b) An energetic leader is to be appointed.
c) The vehicles move in a body, maintaining, however, safe distances, the heaviest vehicles goes first. No vehicle must be allowed to fall back or to be left alone because of trouble. Every vehicle is responsible for the one immediately following it. All men must hold their firearms in readiness.
d) If there is any suspicion of a trap by the bands the men leave the vehicles and proceed on foot under necessary march security.
e) Every driver must in view of the mine danger drive in the tracks of the vehicle in front of his own.

(a)



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

Figure 27: Deployment of advance guard for security against band attack on a convoy (a, b). (Polizei)

D. Security for the countryside

117. The countryside must be kept at peace. After destruction of bands the infiltration and the creation of new bands is to be prevented. Regions which are free from bands should whenever possible be protected against band areas.

118. Security for the countryside is a function of all troops stationed in rearward areas, including those troops which may have been assigned other missions (for instance, training forces and schools). Whenever troops are shifted from one position to another due consideration must be given to purely military aspects and to general security functions as well. The concentration of forces and administrative offices in cities and towns must be avoided. An extensive distribution of forces over the villages increases the security for flat lands.

119. All troops stationed for a protracted period of time at one and the same place are assigned an adequate area for billeting purposes, such an area is to be regarded as a security area. The troops are bound to keep this area free from bands without, however, neglecting their other missions.

120. If it is impossible to station a sufficient number of troops in any given locality, security details are established for individual villages, etc. In this connection valuable service can be obtained from native forces (military police and regular police). Effort should be made not to employ them unless controlled by our leaders or connected with our own units. A security detail should have the strength of at least one company. Each security detail must be required to have detailed information regarding the band situation in its area and must be engaged in incessant cooperation on all questions relative to band reconnaissance.

121. The security forces should frequently patrol their areas but at irregular intervals. Patrols should never be less than one platoon. They must be very mobile (motorized vehicles, farm wagons or sleds) and should be equipped at least with automatic weapons, if possible, with heavy weapons. Every effort should be made to equip them with armored vehicles. Even the oldest looted vehicles and emergency tanks of all kinds will serve the purpose.

122. Immediately after an operation against bands attention should be given to securing the area in question. Whenever possible parts of the band fighting forces remain for the time being in the combat areas. By means of ever repeated search and patrols they destroy the last vestiges of bands which may have escaped.

At the same time the security details establish themselves in an area which has been restored to peace. Only after they have been sheltered with adequate protection and are once more ready for commitment can the remaining parts of the band-fighting troops be permitted to leave. The security details continue the lively patrol service for the purpose of preventing bands from again appearing.

E. Security for matters affecting the national economy, administrative centers, and communication installations

123. Installations affecting the national economy which are important for the conduct of the war, and administrative centers, supply depots, as well as stationary communication installations, require adequate object protection. Security measures are to be taken for those works requiring protection. The most important parts of such works are to be developed into strong points with strong obstacle protection.

124. What installations are to be protected is determined by those locally responsible for fighting the bands. A gauge is presented by the importance of an installation for the conduct of the war and in matters of supply. The object protection is the more easily executed, the more efficiently the bands are fought in the surrounding countryside.

125. The necessary forces are to a considerable degree to be taken from the works themselves. It does not constitute an excess of additional duties if all employees of a plant are required to work after working hours for the security of their place of employment. Only when the personnel of a plant should be inadequate, security troops may be employed within the limits of availability, and under certain circumstances even other native forces may be employed.

F. Security for agriculture and forestry

126. The best way to protect agriculture is by stationing troops in the countryside and through patrols. The request by the agricultural administration are to be given all possible consideration in the commitment of patrol details.

127. Especially important is the protection of the crops. The yield from crops in band-endangered areas must be removed as quickly as possible from the danger of being seized by the bands. The mechanics are determined and controlled by the agricultural administration.

128. Work in the forests is to be adequately secured upon request by the forestry administration. On the other hand the forestry administration should be instructed to choose the location from which timber is to be taken not so much with regard to forestry considerations but rather in such a manner that these locations will require but little supplementary protection.

Special aspects

A. Commitment of the air force in operations against bands

129. Cooperation between ground forces and air units in operation against bands requires continuous close contact between the two as well as intimate knowledge of their respective commitment conditions and possibilities. This is all the more important whenever the cooperation

is joined by training or supplementary (*Ersatz*) units which either have little experience or have been recently organized. General directives for cooperation between ground forces and air units may be obtained for operations against bands, too, from the pamphlet 100/44, "Cooperation Air Force-Army in the Combat Area."

The successful commitment of air units presupposes a continuous detailed exchange of information relative to the developments in the band situation and during combat activities. In the case of operations against bands on a large scale quick successes for the Air Force can be expected only when their forces have been concentrated at the points of main efforts. The simultaneous support by the Air Force of other operations must in these case come to be of secondary importance.

130. In operations against the bands the Air Force will have specifically the following functions:

a) Cooperation in reconnaissance of band movements, strong points, camps, etc. by means of air reconnaissance and by supplying aerial photographs.
b) Destruction of the aircraft engaged in bringing supplies to the bands.
c) Operations against band strong points, band camps, etc. Support of ground forces in their commitment against bands by means of aircraft bombs and armament.
d) Supplying the troops whenever the movement of supplies to them in the normal way is difficult or impossible.
e) Dropping propaganda material.
f) Giving mobility to high ranking officers and messenger service.
g) In special cases commitment of parachute and airborne troops, as well as parachuting agents.

131. In main band areas the Air Force instructs special command centers in the conduct of the operations against the band from the air. These centers comprise the committed air units for fights against bands. In as much as ordinary reconnaissance and fighting forces will rarely be available for the purposes of operations against bands, simply because the Air Force units will be occupied with support of the Army at the front, the forces necessary for the former purposes will be taken from the schools, supplementary groups, night fighting squadrons, and liaison squadrons. These command centers, that is to say the parts of the Air Force committed directly for operations against bands are instructed to maintain close contact with those units of the ground forces which are engaged in fighting the bands. Whenever necessary, liaison officers between ground forces and air units will be provided for operations against bands.

132. In air reconnaissance against bands the following points are to be considered:

a) The bands will regard conspicuous operations of reconnaissance aircraft over their areas as the first signs of impending operations against them and will, after such reconnaissance flights, be inclined to change their positions. This factor must be given special consideration for areas over which aircraft will be operating but infrequently, for the purpose of not jeopardizing the element of surprise. In the case of large-size bands, of which it must be assumed that they will give battle, or in the search for dispersed band units no limitations of air activity are required.
b) Air reconnaissance against bands in forests is usually most difficult in summer, because of the care which the bands exercise and of their excellent camouflage; such reconnaissance is however easily executed in winter. Tracks made by wagon and sleds in normally uninhabited regions are generally sure signs for the presence of bands.
c) Aerial photographs are to be interpreted by Air Force personnel especially trained for the purpose. Supplied in due time and in adequate numbers, distributed down the the battalions, they frequently form an important basis on which terrain reconnaissance may be conducted.
d) Aircraft crews are to be instructed in the special identification marks of the bands and their installations, this instruction is to be conducted by means of aerial photographs. Efforts should be made to train the ground force leaders in the interpretation of aerial photographs.

133. Generally the bands will receive their supplies of manpower, weapons, equipment, explosives, ammunition, and medical equipment by air; these supplies are dropped by parachute or are brought in by plane whenever it is possible to land or by cargo gliders at night. Bringing in supplies in this manner is made possible through extensive ground and signal light organization on the part of the bands. Observation of supply flights and ground installations will usually yield important information relative to strong points, strength of bands, points of main effort, and band camps. Choking off air supply is effected by the Air Force in night fighting and operations against the landing fields. For these purpose all relevant results of observation should immediately be brought to the attention of the air units in question. We must utilize all means to mislead the band supply planes.

134. For the destruction of fortified strong points and fortified band camps, for operations against band assembly points, as well as for the formation of

points of main effort on the ground, bombs are especially suited. The dropping of bombs is effectively supplemented by aircraft armament at low altitudes for those personnel targets offering little return fire.

The leaders of air units must be clearly informed of the situation by means of precise map data and should be informed of the operational plan on the ground. For the purpose of providing continuous communication service in operations against bands radio connections shall be established whenever possible. Installations for that purpose are to be committed at the most forward parts of the ground forces. Poor visibility in the terrain, the differences of clothing and equipment for both our troops and bands, as well as the frequent absence of regulation signal means constitute a danger for the ground forces from our own forces in the air. To eliminate this danger clear-cut regulation of identification and communications services must be provided, as well as the necessary limitations upon the respective operations both in point of time and place.

In operations against band settlements attacks should be principally directed against the edges of the villages, etc., exits from villages and neighboring wooded areas because it is in these places that according to statements by captured bandits, the band shelters will usually be located. For this reason an attack upon the center of band villages will usually not inflict material losses upon the bands. The attacks are to be principally at the break of dawn; during the daytime the bandits will be scattered all over the area in performance of their duties. Whenever possible several band villages should be attacked simultaneously because of the fact that the band staffs will frequently change their position from one neighboring village to another.

135. Bringing supplies to the troops engaged in operations against bands is impassable terrain, in swamp and forest occasionally requires supplies to be brought in by air by means of dropping them or having supply aircraft land. In the latter case the plane should be simultaneously used for the purpose of carrying back the wounded.

136. Dropping propaganda material is usually the only way to influence the populace or the bands by means of propaganda. The propaganda material is to be provided by the command center of the ground forces charged with fighting the bands.

137. The leaders of troops committed against bands must be quickly mobile; this purpose is served by liaison planes, especially Fieseler-*Storch*; the leaders must be enabled to inform themselves from the air of the situation on the ground. Moreover the liaison plane will frequently offer the only means for the transmittal of orders and messenger service. Accordingly, landing fields are to be established in the proximity of combat posts.

138. In exceptional cases the commitment of parachutists or airborne units may be considered for the purpose of effecting a surprise encirclement or a sealing off of bands. In such cases precise planning, both with respect to time

and place, for the commitment, and the regulation beforehand of the method of combat after landing are necessary.[177]

139. The crew of any aircraft flying over band areas must possess hand firearms in addition to the ordinary aircraft armament; these hand arms are essential for self-protection in case of emergency landings. Furthermore, emergency equipment and emergency supplies are to be carried along which will permit the crews to live for a period of several days without receiving any help from the outside.

B. Armored trains[178]

140. Armored trains are especially suited for operations against bands. In the case of operations on a large scale they are to be employed:

a) For advances into enemy territory with their own combat missions.
b) For artillery support.
c) For participation in operations by means of their manpower and equipment which is capable of leaving the train (armored reconnaissance cars, tanks, infantry platoon, heavy mortars, engineer detachments).
d) For the purpose of preventing bands from escaping across a railroad right-of-way. In these instances the armored trains may under no circumstances be deprived of individual weapons or parts of their crew.
e) In special and exceptional cases, whenever the commitment of an armored train is out of the question, such trains may serve to provide command centers for the staff of the operation, including full utilization of the extensive radio equipment. For the execution of independent, small scale operations armored trains are especially suited in cooperation with their own armored reconnaissance cars and tanks, depending on the character of the terrain. Security trips, in view of the excellent intelligence service of the bands, hold the promise of success only if the best possible secrecy is maintained and if they are executed preferably at night, at irregular intervals, and if they are camouflaged to appear as ordinary runs. They are especially effective if the bands are kept in a state of unrest by scouting forces, patrols, and ambush scouts.

Their timely employment in case of attacks on transports and operations against the railroad line on open stretches requires:

a) Constant maximum readiness in case of alarm.
b) The quickest possible communication of reports and transmission of orders, if possible through radio.
c) Priority dispatch of the armored train as “urgent auxiliary train.”

141. Conceivable as special functions for an armored train are:

a) Escorting important transport trains, courier trains, and special trains for high ranking officers.
b) Supplying the personnel in combat at strong points along the right-of-way with weapons and ammunition and bringing back the wounded.
c) Aiding in case of accidents after operations by the bandits against trains, including track repair and medical aid.
d) Protecting railway stations in danger of the bands, man-made structures, and workers engaged on or along the right-of-way.
e) Transporting infantry units with armor protection for forces up to platoon strength, battalion strength without armor protection.
f) Disseminating propaganda material along the line.

The employment of armored trains for these purposes is to be limited to special, well justified, exceptional cases. In any event, the armored train must be given clear combat missions and the necessary other orders. Whenever it becomes necessary to issue two or more orders simultaneously, the sequence in which they are to be executed and their relative urgency is to be determined. Efforts should be made to hear the commanding officer of the train on what his train can and cannot do before orders are issued.

142. Special heavy and light armored trains: Differing from ordinary armored trains the heavy and light armored trains consist of 10–14 individual cars, each one of which is self-propelled. For this reason they are able to travel along the line at great distance from one another (with distances of 500 meters between individual cars they may extend over 5 to 6 kilometers) and upon receipt of radio orders can quickly assemble at danger points.

143. Right-of-way security trains are equipped with emergency armor and armament; their crews are made up from special details. In the composition of these trains the *G* (freight) and *R* (passenger) cars of the German railroads are employed, depending on their availability; these cars are secured by armor plate or concrete, they are connected by heavy planks or railroad ties, they are made bullet proof with fillings of sand or are otherwise armed by armored scout cars and tanks which do not run anymore and which are loaded upon them. Their floors, too, should as far as possible be secured by armor plate against mines. The cars should be so equipped that the personnel riding in them can use hand grenades from within and can leave the cars through the floors if that should become necessary; these factors are to be taken into consideration in the construction of the cars. Command centers which intend to build these right-of-way security cars may consult the commanding officer for armored trains at the office of the Chief of the General Staff relative to matters of construction, armament, organization tables, and

tables of basic allowances; several proven models are available for inspection. In committing right-of-way security trains in operations against bands it is practical, like for armored trains proper, to duly consider their far inferior combat power.

Armored self-propelled lorries and motor vehicles [*Schienengangig*] equipped for traveling on tracks are extensively employed for the protection of railroad lines. Railroad security cars are railroad cars produced by the German Railroad Administration which are equipped with auxiliary armor, they are held in readiness in small groups without crews at certain railroad stations within the band areas. Crews for these are provided in individual cases by the troops requiring them or, if these troops should be unable to provide the crews of the railroad police. These railroad security cars are made part of endangered trains for the purpose of protecting the latter. In this connection it should be noted that their concentration facilitates better utilization of their combat power, but that, other the other hand, the train to be protected would in its entire length be without protection except where the security cars are concentrated. Distributing the security cars over the length of the train would afford better protection for the train but would reduce the combat power of the cars.

C. Special aspects of communications in operations against bands

144. All electronic means of communications are important for the leads of operations against bands. No pattern exists for a system of communications. The signal units must be employed in the individual case in a manner corresponding to the combat mission. Due regard must be had for the special aspects in the use of communications installations in forest and swamp; this applies particularly to the increased danger of short circuit in telephone lines because of defective wire material. The peculiarities in the behavior of radio waves (influenced by terrain and distance) as well as the differences between available radio equipment are to be taken into consideration from the beginning.[179] For this reason the signal officer is to participate in a preparation for commitment.

145. The signal officer and the signal units of the Army and the Reich Leader SS must closely cooperate with one another (exchanging radio data, mutual use of fixed radio installations and stations, utilization of wire connections, etc.).

146. Contact should also be had with the offices of the German railroads relative to the use of the railroad communication net. Unauthorized connection with the railroad communication cables at the line of operation must be avoided in view of the possibility of jeopardizing efficient railroad service.

In case of large scale commitments it will be practical for the purposes of keeping them secret to impose radio silence and telephone restrictions upon

units at the front for the period of assembly and possible until the encirclement has been accomplished.

147. Radio communication with aircraft is to be safeguarded in complete understanding with the Air Force.

148. In forest and swamp the radio equipment must, if necessary, be taken out of the radio vehicle and loaded on horse-drawn wagons and sleds. All equipment, especially the storage batteries, is to be protected against moisture and frost. In difficult terrain the portable radio sections are to be reinforced by assigning to them additional carrying personnel.

149. For the purposes of interception of band radio service the captured radio equipment and spare radio parts, as well as all radio data (columns of figures, pages from notebooks, etc.), are to be sent immediately to the nearest signal officer. This officer is responsible for this material being forwarded at once to the next higher signals intelligence unit. Even that data which appear to be unimportant may be exceedingly valuable.

150. Protection of a telephone net, in operations against bands, too, is to be provided. In this connection, however, considerations should be given to the following points:

a) The bands will methodically disrupt or destroy telephone connections which are known to them; they do this by cutting or chopping or blasting the cables, by felling or blasting the mast, by establishing branch lines, and shooting the insulators to pieces. For this reason the telephone lines, as well as the construction details and trouble-shooter details must be given adequate protection.
b) We must at all times anticipate that the bandits will tap our telephone liens. Telephone and inverter equipment offer no adequate and dependable protection against wire tapping; and the bands may have at their disposal equipment which is suitable for listening in on these connections. For this reason telephone services, too, should employ code designations and other means of encryption.
c) In order to better safeguard and control the telephone net only those connections are to be established which are absolutely necessary for the conduct of operations.

151. The employment of field teletype equipment is especially effective for use by larger staffs. Practical are simple lines which will hardly lend themselves to transmittal of the spoken word. Generally speaking, the interception of messages transmitted by teletype will be difficult though not impossible for the bands to accomplish. The Bolsheviks have for a long time been acquainted with teletype equipment. If it becomes necessary to transmit secret teletype messages by wire they should be transmitted if possible in code.[180]

152. If adequate communication connections are to be maintained in band-infested and band-endangered areas, the communications installations

must be afforded efficient prevention protection. The communications lines running alongside of roads are to be protected by the road security details. Fixed installations come under object protection. Mechanical means (installing strong steel wires in poles, equipping the poles with contact mines, etc.) provide additional protection for the communication installations. The troops must handle their communication line carefully. They should not be damaged in the course of timber felling or blasting activities. Every damage to communication lines is to be immediately reported to the nearest telephone center.

D. Special aspects for employment of the motorized vehicles in operations against bands

153. In operations against bands the motorized vehicle is an important piece of equipment both for combat and transportation, even though the frequently very unfavorable conditions of terrain and road will not always permit its full utilization. We must not expect motorized vehicles in swamp and forest to do the impossible. For this reason it is important to consult the officer in charge of the motorized vehicles before their commitment.

154. Every operation in wooded or swamp areas must be preceded by thorough road and terrain reconnaissance. If this reconnaissance is not feasible, the motorized vehicles may not be driven beyond the point where for the largest of them there is still a chance to turn around, in order to avoid immobility, should unsurmountable obstacles be encountered. Road reconnaissance would then be conducted on the march, that is to say, from one turning around point to the other.

155. Stretches in the terrain which are difficult for the motorized vehicles to negotiate (such as sand, soft ground, and snow) can be made passable for these vehicles by means easily obtainable (heavy planks, boards, shrubbery, rocks or sand).

156. Whenever over especially endangered stretches the vehicles are required to proceed in the fashion of convoys the following points must be duly considered as a matter of motor mechanics: The first vehicle to go must be an armored vehicle or at least the heaviest truck. These are less likely to be damage by mines than lighter vehicles. Vehicles with stationary structures (buses, closed trucks) are not suited for the transportation of men because they impede the occupants from firing. For travel through band-endangerd regions the top of the vehicle must be open or removed under all circumstances.

E. Treatment of the populace, the band helpers, and the bandits

157. In operations against bands the attitude of the natives is of utmost importance. The bands will not be able to maintain themselves in the midst of a populace which is sympathetic to our forces. Besides other factors the amounts of goods delivered by the natives will allow valuable conclusions as to their

attitude. The regional administrators should be consulted. The administration must see to it that through just treatment, through methodical and efficient organization, as well as through thorough purposeful instruction, the populace assumes the right attitude toward our cause. These are the objectives: The farmers are supposed to defend their possessions themselves against the bandits. For which purpose they will be given weapons and other support by us once they have established themselves as trustworthy. The decisions relative to the creation of defense villages are made by the SS Reich Leaders and the commanding officers of police forces, in the theater of operations how by the Army High Command for the region in question.

158. Propaganda for the natives is very important. The enemy propaganda goes to great lengths for the purpose of influencing the populace. In addition to political orientation , counter-acting enemy propaganda is the primary objective. It is not so much a matter of disseminating theoretical principle, rather it is a matter of disproving and correcting the reports made by the enemy. It is effective to discuss the news and accomplishments of the day. Propaganda must be uniformly conducted. The emphasis is to be placed on the distribution of handbills and newspapers and on propaganda of the spoken word. Radio reports are effective only in localities where the natives have the opportunity to listen in. In this connection it should be noted that only such sets are to be permitted which work only for the wavelength on which the propaganda is broadcast, moreover, matters of radio sets are to be administered by a thoroughly dependable person. Propaganda over loudspeakers offers a reasonably good substitute. The participation of propaganda forces in operations against bands is indicated.

159. The relations between troops and natives must never grow beyond what is necessary for the good of the service. No matter how desirable it may be for the natives to have confidence in our troops, it is nevertheless important that respect be instilled above all else. Familiarity on the part of the natives is frequently nothing more than an attempt to gather news and to lull us into a state of complacency. Units which have come to establish too close relations with the natives thereby endangering the overall security, must be shifted to another locality.

160. The free movement of individual band helpers can be prevented by continuous surveillance of the populace. To achieve this forces should be primarily employed which are experienced in these matters such as police forces and the forces of the rural police. Suspicious characters, whether they are in civilian clothes or wearing German uniforms, should be arrested without further ado, no matter how many means of identification they may have; they are to be transferred to the command centers of the Security Service or Secret Field Police. We must take into consideration that the bands will endeavor to counterfeit all our identifications and that they frequently have shown themselves extremely efficient in this field. The security service maintains card index files for persons wanted, etc. Special attention is to be given to the

surveillance of railroad traffic on trains and the picking up of hitchhikers in motor vehicles.

161. "Combing" bandit-suspected villages requires experience. The security forces (Security Service and Secret Field Police) cooperate. The real band helpers must be identified and seized with all sternness. Overall reprisals against the populations of entire villages (this includes burning villages down) may be taken only in exceptional case and only upon orders from division commanders, higher SS leaders, and commanding officers of the police exclusively.

162. The evacuation of villages is indicated in instances when band helpers will again and again appear in the same village. In this connection it is important the necessary forces be available for methodically executing the evacuation and maintaining it. The decisions rest with the division commanders, the higher SS leaders, and the commanding officers of the police.

163. All bandits on principle who are taken prisoner in the uniform of the enemy or in civilian clothes during combat are to be considered prisoners of war, likewise, those who surrender in combat. The same applies to all persons who are encountered in the immediate zone of operations and who are considered as band helpers even though it may be impossible to prove that they participated in the fighting. Bandits in German uniform or in the uniform of any ally of the German Reich, whenever they have been taken prisoner during combat, are shot after careful questioning. Deserters, no matter how they may be dressed, are to be given good treatment. The bands are supposed to learn about this.

F. Seizure of natural products from the land

164. The seizure of natural products from the lands goes hand in hand with every operations against the bands. The responsibility rests with:

a) The leader of the operation for safeguarding what has been seized.
b) The regional administrator for the mechanics of the seizure.

165. Whenever a region is evacuated all agricultural supplies and equipment are to be seized. Everything that can be utilized for our own conduct of the war or later by the bands is to be moved away. Whenever a region is to be left in a state of peace the natives are to be left in possession of what they require for their own substance and for the continued work of the land. The quantity of the natural products to be seized in these instances is determined by the agricultural administration. In this connection it must be duly considered to what extent the populace has complied with the instructions relative to goods to be delivered to us.

166. Seizure must be safeguarded at all times. Protection must likewise be provided for the transportation of the goods seized and for the depots in which they are collected. The troops employed in any given operation, as well



Figure 28: Deployment for operations in small town or village and the collecting detainees (a, b, c). M.L.B.: main line of battle. (Polizei)

as those charged with the protection of goods seized, are to be thoroughly informed relative to the importance of the seizure. The troops must be made to realize that the goods seized can by no means be considered as their booty. The natural products seized belong to the people as a whole. The manner of their disposition will be determined by those in authority.

167. It will be practical to employ in matters of seizure experienced details. More specifically, should these details be represented by expertly trained forces

which must include the necessary number of interpreters. The seizure details are either kept in constant readiness for these particular missions or must be so organized that they are ready within the shortest period of time when needed.

168. The best assistance in seizure can be rendered by the administrators of cooperatives, bookkeepers, mayors, or village alderman. They are the first ones which we should endeavor to find.

169. As soon as the populace has been informed of the quantities of goods to be surrendered, provisions for meting out penalties for noncompliance may not be omitted. The severest penalty is the confiscation of livestock.

170. Spoiled produce have no value for delivery. This does not mean that the required quantities are to be reduced, rather substitutions is to be made in the form of other goods.

171. The cooperative and the farmers are to be given receipts for either a number of deliveries or individual deliveries, in order to facilitate payment later. Duplicates are furnished to the agricultural head of any given district.

172. Whenever the natives have flown or it is otherwise difficult to obtain the required quantities, the hiding places must be found, as for example under the hay, buried in the garden, under the floorboards in the houses, etc. Native forces are suited for making these searches or neighbors for whom incentives may be provided in the form of rewards for good results.

173. The regional administrator is responsible for reporting the results of the seizure to his superior administrative office and to the leader of the operation.

Photograph reproduced courtesy of the Imperial War Museum (NA15108)

Appendix

For pamphlet 69/2: Symbols for band situation maps. (*OKW*, WS Hill)

SYMBOLS FOR BAND SITUATION MAPS
Generally applicable symbols

Band detail

Band of 150 men

Band camp with 100 men

Fortified band camp with 200 men

Band of 150 men on the march

Engagement on 9. 10.

Destruction of band camps, villages, bunkers, etc.

Parachutists

Dropping supplies by parachute

Free balloons

Enemy aircraft (nose in direction of flight)

Band airfield

Band radio transmitter

Requisitioning of food and feed, horses, wagons, sleds, clothes, and other important items

Recruiting and persons being carried off

Raids on strongpoints, shelters, billets, troops on the march, supply columns, and individual vehicles

Blast operations on roads, bridges, tracks, and other railway installations

Destruction of lines of communication

Destruction of installations important for national security, destruction of crops

Terror against the populace

Disintegration of units willing to help our side

For use only in situation maps of higher staffs
(including indication of strength)

"Wswod"
(several details)

"Rota"
(several Wswod)

"Otrjad"
(several Rota, independent unit)

"Bataljon"

"Polk"
(several Otrjad or battalions, special unit)

For identification of scout and reconnaissance details the following symbols are suggested:

Higher scout staff

Scout detail or reconnaissance detail

"Brigada"
(several Otrjad or battalions)

Band command staff
(Divisional staff operational group)

Higher band command staff
(Corps, operation center, fairly large number of brigades or Polk under one command)

Band area

Presence of bands ascertained

CHAPTER 5

SMALL WAR LEGACIES

In January 1945, based upon some six years of experience with a variety of fronts and circumstances, the Germans concluded that "guerrilla war is conducted in the frontline, the flanks, and most of all in the rear of the enemy and his country, in enemy occupied area and in the countries that are allied with the enemy or are important to his war effort, economy and politics."[181] By then, the Higher SS and Police were writing the doctrine although the German Army still conducted the majority of counter-guerrilla actions. It was found by them that: "Guerrilla war that is conducted in a hard, determined fashion, and with clear political aims, is an effective means to assist one's own military and political struggle, and to harass and paralyze the enemy's war effort, economy and politics through military subsidiary actions."[182] The study of partisan warfare also formed the basis for N-S concepts of resistance as the occupation of German territory occurred.[183]

It was believed by the Allies during the war, that to understand German anti-partisan measures, "it is necessary to discuss briefly the characteristic of Allied partisan organizations and their fighting techniques." American intelligence reports as late as March 1945 perpetuated this theme, when summarizing German analysis of experience and doctrine.[184] As the war ended, the Allies continued to observe the German methods used for combating Russian, French, Polish, and Yugoslav guerrillas. Although this was mainly through studying the Axis response to resistance in occupied territory, it again looked at both sides of the coin for insurgency and its counter, as "The Nazis, who have considerable experience fighting guerrillas and who have time to make preparations in advance, can be expected to produce German guerrillas who will be more experienced than any band of guerrillas hitherto encountered either in this or in any other war."[185]

With the qualifications that "In every country which the Germans occupied, guerrilla warfare was prevalent in one or more of its aspects. The guerrilla activities were, however, not the same in every country. Therefore, in each occupied area the Germans developed particular

countermeasures to suppress the guerrilla in the particular area. … In any case, countermeasures are always susceptible of improvement, and an interchange of information on countermeasures between units fighting guerrillas will assist us."[186] It was concluded: "The principles involved may be accepted by the Germans and find their way into actual practice in the near future."[187] This saw a return to Clausewitz's views of more than a century earlier: "The guerrilla war is not a momentary substitute, but an essential part of modern warfare. In desperate situations it is the ultimate means to defend freedom and life of the nation to the utmost. Conducted in conjunction with general military operations, clear political objectives and qualified means, the guerrilla war can lead to success of decisive importance."[188] Success was based upon "the political, military and economic situation, the terrain, population's density, traffic infrastructure, national characteristics and religious habits, the attitude of the population and most of all, by the toughness and combat effectiveness of the employed guerrilla units."[189]

With the developments considered here, where it the present day German doctrine some 70 years after 1945? Have theory and practice kept pace or changed from the example of the preceding? One observation is that the terms *Kleinkrieg* and *Partisan* are applied for the use of irregular or guerrilla warfare, while *Bandenbekaempfung* is still used by the Germans for the enemy employment or response. A social concern is that: "The term 'counterinsurgency' (COIN) is an emotive subject in Germany."[190] And how does it square with the concepts of leadership development and civic education that underlies much of current German military thought?[191]

Some scholars claimed there was a direct relationship with wartime and post-war efforts, implying these were ill advised or unseemly.[192] This was with the adaption of the German special warfare experience and doctrine by the victorious Americans during the period of occupation and subsequent Cold War conflict in Western and Eastern Europe. The US Army Center for Military History found that of the 721 Foreign Military Studies conducted by German authors, some 21 dealt directly with partisan or anti-partisan warfare, while another 44 dealt with the topic indirectly. Historian Birtle concluded that the US Army Field Manual 31–20 published in 1951 was an adaptation of the German Fighting the Guerrilla Bands presented here.[193] Additional formal studies refined this effort as worthy of more detailed considerations in a search for lessons learned from the German experience that would apply to a potential conflict between the West and the Communist Bloc (similar to the Soviet effort to apply the example of the Great Patriotic War to another European conflict).[194]

Other commentators asserted there was not direct connection to the past, as the doctrine examined seemed to be more in tune with the conventional

realities of the Cold War that did not require considering "security" warfare by Democratic societies. What anti-terrorism needs existed where dealt with by the German law enforcement and security services.[195] A longer view would consider a more complex evolution.[196] This was with the acknowledgement that the German methods used could be counterproductive. A former Yugoslav guerrilla wrote in 1947, that the Germans "reckoned with the fact that such anti-guerrilla warfare executed under the respect of purely military methods and international law, would demand a prolonged time. But as it is understood, they were in a great hurry owing to the fact that the grave situation at different Allied fronts [required the] urgent transfer of forces engaged in the anti-guerrilla action. All these considerations prompt[ed] the Germans, the Italians, and the *Ustashi* to resort to methods contrary to the fundamental principles of military science, humanity, and elementary decency."[197] Which in turn provoked further resistance as the US Army concluded, for example: "When the German military and political leaders drew up their plans for the invasion of Russia, they made a number of errors in relation to the control and administration of the rear areas of the armies. These mistakes had a very positive and direct effect on the rise and growth of the Soviet Partisan Movement." It also had to kept in mind that "The Soviet Partisan Movement had a certain measure of success, perhaps as much as a resistance movement can have when opposed by a first-class military power. But this success was definitely limited."[198] Even so, it was pointed out that the study of guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare had gained in importance with the "increase in range and destructiveness of weapons" and was worthy of study to staffs and schools.

While the discussion continued as to the pros and cons of this type of warfare, progress in doctrine occurred. A concrete result was the doctrinal definition of "special warfare" during the Cold War: the interrelated actions of counterinsurgency (counter guerrilla operations and civic action), unconventional warfare (guerrilla warfare, resistance, escape and evasion), and psychological warfare.[199] And it was along these lines that Special Forces (*Fernspaher*) and doctrine developed, were organized, trained, and employed by the *Bundeswehr* in the Federal Republic of Germany from the 1950s as well as developments in the German Democratic Republic with the *Nationale Volksarmmee*. One point was that both these armed forces were specifically intended for internal security, border control, and employment within their respective treaty organization for North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the Warsaw Pact rather than independent national deployments.[200] A thread found was that the Communist German Democratic Republic, despite Soviet influence, had fewer filters to previous warfighting heritage and sustained the traditions of Imperial and N-S armed forces. Interest in German conventional warfighting experience was again generated with the maneuver warfare

debate in the United States in the post-Vietnam era, but there seemed little attention to applying *Auftragstaktik* (mission tactics) or *Schwerpunkt* (point of main effort) principles to fighting terrorists or guerrillas.[201]

With the reunification of Germany's East and West the evolution continued without Warsaw Pact or North Atlantic Treaty Organization authority. Researcher Noetzel noted that the post-Cold War German armed forces changed from a force designed for conventional warfare on its own borders into being an element of civilian-led stabilization and reconstruction efforts overseas.[202] This evolved through humanitarian, peacekeeping, or observer experience in the Balkans, Africa, Southwest and Southeast Asia were these efforts took place while others provided security (excluding combat air and naval forces under joint international auspices).

It was with these changes in NATO after the 1990s and with the 2001 Global War on Terrorism, that the German government solicited American advice on its role in counter-terrorism that was predicated on not having either the budget or popular support for the effort.[203] Called for was a fundamental requirement to find a common sense and a common use of the term counterinsurgency for all civil and military actors involved and how to resolve the "doctrinal" problem as the civil side seems to regard counterinsurgency as a solely military problem.[204] As early as 2003 the German government called for a specific strategic approach that integrated military and non-military measures in Afghanistan. The Germans assumed that the doctrine used by the NATO Allies would suffice as outlined by the American 2006 field manual and warfighting publication *Counterinsurgency*.[205] In time, joint service in Afghanistan changed the previous criticism, providing the Germans a basis of experience to apply and understand this doctrine. This was made easier by the previous 70 years of training and combined service in the United States and Western Europe by German military and police personnel. An American observation was that the German experiences in Kosovo and Afghanistan did not permit a wide-ranging application of counter-guerrilla doctrine by its deployed forces.[206]

For the German military the situation in Afghanistan's Kunduz city provided an impetus to moving forward to face the existing problem. Because of an increase in insurgent activity that threatened reconstruction efforts, Operation *Harekate Yolo II* (Front Straightening) was planned and launched in autumn 2007 led by International Security Assistance Force Regional Commander North BGen Dieter Warnecke. Taking place over several months, it involved American and Norwegian combat forces supported by German advisor, reconnaissance, logistics, and medical support. It was intended to defeat and disperse insurgents to re-establish government control, but the success of the military effort was not consolidated by non-military efforts. In addition, the civilian leadership in Berlin failed to support

the operation politically: "Political nervousness about the reception of *Harekate Yolo II* caused German political leaders to downplay the significance of their original goals as much as possible."[207] Yet despite this, German forces continued to expand their participation in direct combat and the evolution of required doctrine.

German defense commentators had at first decried the lack of any formal consideration of the problem and the acceptance of a NATO solution without the needed insights for a post-Cold War military mission structure and institutions.[208] But by 2010, Germany again had adapted a doctrinal solution to the problem of dealing with insurgency in current circumstances.[209] It was a departure from previous pacification or security warfare involvement and was based as much on social science as experience. Insurgency was now defined as a "process of destabilization caused by political, economic, and/or civil grievances, which affects both the effectiveness and legitimacy of the governmental system; this process is exacerbated by insurgent activity." In turn, counterinsurgency is seen as the "establishing security and state order in crises areas."[210] This is through the 1) Shape, 2) Clear, 3) Hold, and 4) Build strategy that spans both the military through civil effort. To accomplish these key objectives the considerations found were: "An insurgency cannot be countered by military means alone; Establishing security and state order is a long-term, interagency and usually multinational strategy … in which the government of the country affected by insurgency has the lead while the other nations and international organizations perform a supporting role; The military's contribution to implementing this strategy is, in principle a cross-service support task for the *Bundeswehr*."[211] This doctrine found German general officers with the International Security Assistance Force leading 4,000 German troops, and on occasion up to 11,000 NATO forces in Afghanistan. This was with a responsibility for over 900 kilometers east to west, 400 kilometers north to south, including 14 cities and 9,000 villages bordering five neighboring countries. It was reported that German officers used artillery against a foreign opponent for the first time since World War II.[212] Now commentators complained that the doctrine published is too kinetic in its approach.

This certainly was a different approach than that taken in previous conflicts, as recognized in the German guerrilla war classics presented here. Whether this was solidly based on a review of earlier history, existing NATO sensitivities, or current social and political sciences remains to be seen and whether it will succeed in different circumstances remains to be proven.[213]

NOTES

Preface

1 Charles D Melson. "German Counter-Insurgency Revisited," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 24, March 2011 or *Journal of Strategic & Military Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 1, Fall 2011.

Chapter 1

2 Military Intelligence Service, *Intelligence Bulletin* Number 1, September 1942, pp. 19–20.

3 One professor of history at the US Naval Academy began the discussion of guerrillas using the Book of Maccabeus. See Franklin Mark Osanka, ed., *Modern Guerilla Warfare* (New York: Free Press, 1962); Peter Paret and John W Shy, *Guerillas in the 1960s* (New York: Praeger, 1962); Andrew R Molnar, *Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1966); Lewis Gann, *Guerillas in History* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971); Anthony James Joes, *Guerilla Warfare: A Historical Biographical, and Bibliographical Sourcebook* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996); Ian FW Beckett, ed., *Encyclopedia of Guerilla Warfare* (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1999); Ian FW Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerillas and their Opponents Since 1750* (New York: Routledge, 2001); and William R Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerilla Warfare from the American Revolution to Iraq* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).

4 V der Heydte pointed out that *Guerilla* meant small war, while *guerillero* was an individual participant, not to change the use of term in its excepted sense. Other terms that can cause confusion were the use of *Jagdeinheiten* for both guerrilla and special assault detachments, *Jagdkommando* for army hunter units, and *Jagdverbaende* for SS hunter formations (patrol might be more a more useful term for these). Similar confusion exists with the Office of Strategic Services "Operational Groups" and current US Army Special Forces operational detachment "A" Teams.

5 SS-Fuehrungshauptamt, *Werwolf, Winke fur Jagdeinheiten* (Berlin: January 1945), p. 5ff; or Michael C Fagnon, ed. and trans., *SS Werwolf: Combat Instruction Manual* (Boulder: Paladin Press, 1982), p. ixff.

6 SS-FHA, *Jagdeinheiten*, pp. 6–7.

7 Bruce Condell and David T Zabecki, eds. and trans., *On the German Art of War: Truppenfuehrung* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2001), pp. 171–172, pp. 171–172.

8 Most recently put forward in Jon T Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), passim.

9 Matthew Bennett, and "The German Experience," in *The Roots of Counter-Insurgency: Armies and Guerilla Warfare, 1900–1945*, by Ian FW Beckett, ed. (New York: Blandford Press, 1988), pp. 72–73; Peter Lieb, "A Few Carrots and a Lot of Stick: German Anti-Partisan Warfare in World War Two," in *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, eds. (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008), p. 269.

10 For instance, Philip W Blood, *Hitler's Bandit Hunters: The SS and the Nazi Occupation of Europe* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006); Richard Rhodes, *Masters of Death: The SS-Einsatzgruppen and the Invention of the Holocaust* (New York: Vintage Books, 2002); Colin D Heaton, *German Anti-Partisan Warfare in Europe, 1939–1945* (Atglen: Schiffer Publishing, 2001); Daniel J Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York: Vintage Books, 1997); Christopher R Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York: HarperPerennial, 1993). Books by Edward B Westerman, Geoffrey P Megargee, Ben Shepherd, and Waitman Beorn are examples of more recent scholarship.

11 For Americans, this includes Andrew J Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations, 1942–1976* (Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History, 2006), the recent US Army and Marine Corps *Counterinsurgency Field Manual, FM 3–24, MCWP 3–33.5* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), and Stephen S Evans, ed., *US Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1898–2007* (Quantico: Marine Corps University Press, 2008).

12 Clausewitz (1780–1831): See Hans Rothfels, "Clausewitz," Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), pp. 93–113; Michael Howard, *Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Hew Strachan, *Clausewitz's On War: A Biography* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2007); and Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz.*

13 Arming the people or the nation, *Volksbewaffnung*. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. (New York: Everyman's Library, 1993), pp. 578–584.

14 Strachan, pp. 186ff; the German General Staff later cited examples from the Vendee 1793–1796, Spain in 1808–1814, Tyrol in 1809, Germany in 1813, France in 1814, the German-French War of 1870–1871, and various European colonial wars.

15 Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 579.

16 See the writings of Henri de Jomini (1779–1869) for the 18th and 19th century; Charles E Callwell (1859–1928) for the modern era.

17 Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 580. Peter Paret, "Clausewitz: Half Against My Will, I have Become a Professor," *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 75, no. 2, April 2011, pp.

591–601, covers in detail small wars as taught by Clausewitz.

18 Paret and Shy, pp. 11–15, 40–51.

19 Robert M Citino, *The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years War to the Third Reich* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), passim; although not specifically stated by him. It was discussed with him at the University of Calgary conference as a consideration, which he acknowledged as plausible.

20 Deserters, renegades, and spies were separate categories; drafted in 1902, these customs and laws of war were used through the World War; John H Morgan, ed. and trans., *War Book of the German General Staff* (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2005), pp. 8–15, 54–57

21 Isabel V Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), passim; Lieb, pp. 72–74; Bennett, pp. 61–66. Alan Kramer, "German War Crimes 1914/1941: Continuity or Break?," *34th Congress of the International Commission of Military History*, Trieste, 31 August-5 September 2008.

22 See Charles E Callwell, *Small Wars* (London: HMSO, 1906, reprinted 1976), passim.

23 Lieb, pp. 72–73.

24 Martin Gutmann, Syracuse University, ABC-Clio research grant, Society of Military History Meeting, 3 April 2009.

25 Bennett, p. 80.

26 Context is provided by Richard J Evans, *The Third Reich in Power* (New York: Penguin Books, 2005) and Richard Bessel, *Nazism and War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004).

27 While comprehensive background is by Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961), this point was well made in Robert Jay Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

28 Alfons Illinger. *Die Polizeifibel* (Eichstätt, 1932). See *The Gestapo and SS Manual.* Translated and edited by Carl Hammer (Boulder: Palladin Press, 1996).

29 Condell and Zabecki, *Truppenfuehrung*, pp. 171–172; for an explanation of the development of these regulations see Robert M Citino, *The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920–1939* (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2008).

30 Arthur Ehrhardt. *Kleinkrieg: geschichtliche Erfahrungen und kuenftige Moeglichkeiten*. Potsdam: Ludwig Voggenreiter Verlag, 1935. Reprinted in 1942 and 1944.

31 Andrew J Birtle, *US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860–1941* (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 2009), for its relation to US Army developments.

32 Walter Laqueur. *Guerilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976), p. 199; Walter Laqueur. *The Guerilla Reader: A Historical Anthology*. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1977), pp. 144–148.

33 Christian Ingrao. *Believe and Destroy: Intellectuals in the SS War Machine*

(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p. 73.

34 Relevant German viewpoints are found in: Oberkommando des Heeres. Besondere Anweisungen fur die Jagereinheiten [Special Instructions for Hunter Units]. Berlin: August 1942; Oberkommando des Heeres (FHO). No. 650/43, Guerilla-Kriegsfuhrung Handbuch [Guerilla Manual]. Berlin: July 1944; Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. Merkblatt 69/2, Bandenbekaempfung [Warfare against Bands]. Berlin: May 1944; and SS-Fuehrungshauptamt. Werwolf: Winke fur Jagdeinheiten [Werwolf, Hints for Guerrilla Units]. Berlin: January 1945.

35 Friedrich August v. der Heydte. *Modern Irregular Warfare: In Defense Policy and as a Military Phenomenon* (New York: Franklin House, 1986), for a deeper intellectual context than Ehrhardt provides.

36 "Arthur Ehrhardt," http://memim.com, accessed 31 March 2015; "Arthur Ehrhardt," Personalakten, *Fuehrerliste der Waffen-SS*; *Germany's New Nazis* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952), pp. 38–39. Ehrhardt worked with the RFSS, SS-HA, or SS-FHA formulating training and doctrine for the *Chef der Bandenkampfverband* and the *Generalinspekteur Spezialabweher*. Ehrhardt earned both classes of the Iron Cross, Wound Badge in Silver, and the War Service Cross. After British captivity, Ehrhardt became a leading figure in the post-war politics of Karl Heinz Priester's European Social Movement, was the editor of *Nation Europa*, and a regular contributor to *Western Destiny*. Married, he had three children. He died in Coburg, Bavaria on 16 May 1971.

Chapter 2

37 Provided by the US Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle Barrack, PA.

38 Georg Heinrich von Behrenhorst (1733–1814), Prussian officer and writer.

39 Johann Adolf von Thielmann (1765–1824); Alexander Ivanovich Tschernitscheff (1786–1857); Freidrich Karl von Tettenborn (1778–1845); Freidrich Ludwig August von der Marwitz (1777–1837); and August Peter von Colomb (1775–1854). Prussian or allied generals.

40 German war of 1813, also known as the War of Liberation or Independence.

41 A von Boguslawski. *Der Kleine Krieg* (Berlin: Friedrich Luckhardt Verlag, 1881). Papers read at the Military Society of Posen. Prussian general and writer (1834–1905).

42 Austrian general and writer (1872–1949).

43 Joseph Radetzky von Radetz (1766–1858), Austrian Count and field marshal.

44 Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), Prussian general and historian.

45 Napleon Bonaparte (1769–1821), Emperor of France.

46 A von Schepeler. *Histoire de la Revolution d'Espagne et de Portugal ainsi de Guerre Qui en Resulta* (Liege: J Desoer, 1831).

47 Von Schepeler, passim, no further reference.

48 Joachim-Napoleon Murat (1767–1815), Marshal of France.

49 Von Schepeler, passim.

50 Francois-Joseph Lefebvre (1755–1820), Marshal of France.
51 Jose de Palafox (1780–1847), Spanish Duke of Saragossa and general.
52 Louis Gabriel Suchet (1770–1826), Marshal of France.
53 Joseph Bonaparte (1768–1844), French King of Naples, Sicily, and Spain.
54 Arthur Wellesley (1769–1852), British Duke of Wellington.
55 Ludwig Adolf Wilhelm von Lutzow (1782–1834), Prussian general.
56 Johann Adolf von Thielmann (1765–1824); Alexander Ivanovich Tschernitscheff (1786–1857); Freidrich Karl von Tettenborn (1778–1845); Freidrich Ludwig August von der Marwitz (1777–1837); and August Peter von Colomb (1775–1854). Prussian or allied generals.
57 Eugene de Beauharnais (1781–1824), French Viceroy of Italy.
58 Alexander Carl Wilhelm Christoph Benckendorf (1781 or 1783–1844), Russian general.
59 Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst (1755–1813), Prussian general.
60 C von Widdern. *Die Streifkorps im deutschen Freiheitskrieg* (Eisenschmidt Verlag, 1895).
61 Semjon Mikhailovich Budjonny (1883–1973), Soviet field marshal.
62 Charles Antoine Morand (1771–1835), French general.
63 Louis-Nicolas Davout (1770–1823), Marshal of France.
64 August Neidhardt von Gneisenau (1760–1831), Prussian field marshal.
65 Gebhard Leberecht Blucher (1742–1819), Prussian field marshal.
66 Leon-Michel Gambetta (1838–1882), French politician.
67 Clausewitz, passim, no further reference.
68 E Thiébault. *Riccioti Garibaldi et la 4. brigade 1870–71* (Paris: n.p., 1872).
69 H Cavaniol. *Invasion de la Haute Marne* (Chaumont: Delbos, 1873).
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71 Erlass aus dem Grossen Hauptquartier von 3 December 1870.
72 C Hubka. "Bandenkaempfe," *Strefflers Militarischer Zeitschrift*, Vol. 2, No. 10, 1909.
73 Kerchnawe, no further reference.
74 H Kerchnawe. *Militärwissenschaftliches Mitteilungen*, Vol. 60, January-February and March-April 1929.
75 H Kerchnawe. *Militärwissenschaftliches Mitteilunged*, Vol. 60, March-April, 1929.
76 R Oswald. *Der Streit um den belgischen Franktireur-krieg* (Koln: Guild Verlag, 1931). A critical study of the events of August 1914 and pertinent writings from that date up to 1930, with the help of hitherto unpublished material, by the chief councilor and member of the Reich Archives. See also: *Belgische Landesverteidigung und Burgerwacht, 1914* (Berlin: Reimer Hobing, 1920); *Die deustsche Kriegsfuhrung und das Volkerrecht. Beitrage zur Schuldfrage*_(Berlin: Kriegsministeriums und der Obersten Heeresleitung, 1919); *Die Grundlagen des belgischen Franktireurkrieges, 1914*. (Berlin: 1920); A Gallinger. "Gegenrechnung," *Süddeutsche Monatsheft*, June, 1921; R Grasshoff. *Belgiens Schuld. Der belgische Volkskrieg von Rich*.

(Berlin: 1918); H Witte and C Schutt. "Die belgische Schuld. Unveroeffentlichte Dokumente zur Geschichte des belgische Volkskrieg 1914," *Süddeutsche Monatshefte*, June, 1931. In addition to these, further articles on this subject in the *Berliner Monatsheften*.

77 From a memorandum by Matzke, quoted in Oswald.

78 Regulation relative to the rules and practices of land war, 4th Hague Convention of 18 October 1907. Abridged Hague *Land War Regulation*:

> Article 1. The laws, rights and duties implicated in war apply not only to the army but also to militias and free bodies of volunteers if they meet the following conditions:
>
> (a) That someone is at their head, who is responsible for them.
> (b) That they wear predetermined insignia, easily recognizable at a distance.
> (c) That they bear arms openly and-
> (d) That in their operations, they observe the laws and practices of war.
>
> In countries in which militia or volunteer formations constitute the army or a fraction of the army, these are included in the term army.

79 The prophesized redeemer in Islam, but referring in this case to the Mahdi uprising in the Sudan in the 19th century.

80 *Militar-Wochenblatt*, Vol. 115, No. 46 [n.d].

81 *Militar-Wochenblatt*, Vol. 115, No.46 [n.d.].

82 F Rydeberg, C Kempf and G Gardin. *Russlands Ruestung* (Potsdam: Ludwig Vonggenreiter Verlag, 1935).

83 C Wagner. "Oestliches Partisanwesen," *Deutsche Wehr*, No. 28, 1934.

84 E Dwinger. *Zwischen Weiss und Rot* (Jena: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1930). Edwin Erich Dwinger (1898–1981), German soldier and writer.

85 Nazi Germany invaded the Communist Soviet Union on 22 June 1941.

86 Basil Henry Liddell Hart (1895–1970), British military officer and writer.

87 B Liddell Hart. *Infanterie von morgen* (Potsdam: Ludwig Voggenreiter Verlag, 1934).

88 Rudolf Hans Bartsch (1873–1952), Austrian military officer and writer.

89 C de Gaulle. *Franksreichs Stossarmee* (Potsdam: Ludwig Voggenreiter Verlag, 1935).

90 Clausewitz, passim, no further reference.

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91 Recent references include Bob Carruthers, ed. *German Anti-partisan Combat* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword Books, 2013); Philip Cooke and Ben H Shepherd, eds. *Hitler's Europe Ablaze: Occupation, Resistance, and Rebellion During World War II* (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2014); Ben Shepherd and Juliette Pattinson, eds. *War in a Twilight World: Partisan and Anti-Partisan Warfare in Eastern Europe, 1939–1945* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

92 Christopher R Browning, *The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi*

Jewish Policy, September 1939–March 1942 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2004), p. 309.

93 Bands or gangs, bandits or gangsters were terms standardized by the SS and Police in 1942 to cover all manner of resistance.

94 Blood, p. 77ff; Lieb, pp. 76–77; Arvo L Vercamer, "German Rear Area Security in World War II," www.feldgrau.com, accessed 31 March 2006.

95 Army-colonel general.

96 1 December 1942; Walter Warlimont. *Inside Hitler's Headquarters, 1939–45* (Novato: Presidio, 1991), pp. 289–291.

97 Perhaps referring to reprisal killings after the fact as opposed to executing hostages taken before hand; Helmut Heiber and David M Glantz, eds., *Hitler and His Generals: Military Conferences* (New York: Enigma Books, 2003), p. 773.

98 Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. *Warfare Against Bands* (Berlin: 6 May 1944), eds. and trans. by C Aubrey Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn, in *Communist Guerilla Warfare* (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1955), pp. 201–223. A complete copy of this directive is the one present in Part Four.

99 Hilberg, *Destruction,* pp. 179–180, 228; War Department, *Handbook on German Military Forces TM-E 30–451* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. 43–45. Based upon several Heydrich-Wagner agreements which regulated the organization, function, and relations between the German armed forces in the East and elsewhere, finalized with Hitler's Directive 46 of August 1942; subsequent Nuremberg Trials and modern scholarship questions whether there was a distinct break between the German armed forces and party formations; see Wolfram Wette, *The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 2006), passim; Hamburg Institute for Social Research, *The German Army and Genocide* (New York: New Press, 1999), passim. Front and rear need to be defined in the circumstances of occupation found in the Southeast.

100 For example the SS-Death Head formations in the campaign in Poland in 1939.

101 In September 1941, Himmler briefed his senior field commanders that while Aryan people would be brought into the German Reich, others would be excluded through "relocation," "permanent removal," and "racial purification" (double-talk for killing); Heaton, p. 106; Karl Wolff, interview by Colin D Heaton, et al., 1980, 1985.

102 An earlier definition of "special operations."

103 Martin van Creveld, *Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939–1949* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 166, 171–173.

104 Prof Romeo v. Thun, personal communications, 7 March 2008.

105 Condell and Zabecki, van Creveld, Citino, and Hull, opcit; it can be argued as well that the German anti-guerrilla tactics were counter-productive; Edward Luttwak, etal, H-War, personal communication, 29 May 2007.

106 Condell and Zabecki, *Truppenfuehrung*, pp.172, 243, 258–259.

107 OKW, *Bands*, pp. 203–204.
108 OKW, *Bands*, pp. 203–204.
109 At the time Henschel, Fieseler, or Flettner-type aircraft.
110 OKW, *Bands*, pp. 202–204.
111 According to v. der Heydte, imagination seems to be a deciding factor for both guerrilla and anti-guerrilla leaders. Dixon and Heilbrunn, p. 147.
112 Army-colonel general, field marshal, general, and major general.
113 Perry Biddiscombe, *The Last Nazis: SS Werewolf Guerilla Resistance in Europe, 1944–1947* (Stroud: Tempus Publishing, 2004), pp. 52–55. Eleventh Army under General Eric von Manstein issued its Army Order for the "Organization and Carrying Out of the Combating of Partisans" on 29 November 1941; Dixon and Heilbrunn, passim.
114 SS-major general; Kumm was the third and surviving Prinz Eugen Division commander. Held by the Allies, he provided post-war interviews and division histories. He also felt there were some, like Juergen Stroop, who lacked intellect or tactical knowledge and "tended to create more problems" than resolve them and had to be replaced as commander of the Higher SS and Police in Greece by Walter Schimana.
115 Otto Kumm, interview by Colin D Heaton, et al., 1980, 1985.
116 SS-general.
117 21 June 1943; Heiber and Glantz, pp. 773–774.
118 Wolff, interview.
119 Blood, passim; Warlimont, p. 392; Leo Goldensohn, *The Nuremberg Interviews* (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), pp. 265–278.
120 SS-general.
121 Roland Kaltenegger, *The Mountain Troops of the Waffen-SS, 1941–1945* (Atglen: Schiffer Publishing, 1995) 10; Himmler to Phleps, 22 May 1944 in Carl Kosta Savich, "Vojvodina and the Kama SS Division," www.pogledi.co.yu, accessed 1 March 2006.
122 OKW, *Bands*, pp. 209–212.
123 OKW, *Bands*, p. 212.
124 SS-FHA, *Jagdeinheiten*, p. 58.
125 OKW, *Bands*, pp. 205–208.
126 Leon Degrelle, a Belgian SS-brigadier, interview by Colin D Heaton, et al., 1984, 1993.
127 OKW, *Bands*, pp. 205–208.
128 Heaton, pp. 6, 219–228.
129 16 December 1942; Heiber and Glantz, pp. 771–772.
130 TWCN, Vol. XI, p. 827.
131 OKW, *Bands*, pp. 222–223.
132 OKW, *Bands*, p. 203.
133 SS-FHA, *Jagdeinheiten*, p. 59.
134 Condell and Zabecki, *Truppenfuehrung,* p. 243.

135 SS-FHA, *Jagdeinheiten*, p. 59.
136 SS-FHA, *Jagdeinheiten*, pp. 60–61.
137 SS-FHA, *Jagdeinheiten*, pp. 61.
138 SS-FHA, *Jagdeinheiten*, pp. 61.
139 OKW, *Bands*, p. 212–222; Dixon and Heilbrunn, pp. 113–163.
140 OKW, *Bands*, p. 203.
141 Dixon and Heilbrunn, pp. 126–128.
142 Fagnon, *Werwolf,* p. ix. The German special forces and reconnaissance school was a sought after posting for North Atlantic Treaty Organization special operations personnel.
143 OKW, *Bands*, p. 221.
144 SS-FHA, *Jagdeinheiten*, pp. 58–59.
145 Anna M Wittman with Friedrich Umbrich. *Balkan Nightmare: A Transylvanian Saxon in World War II* (Boulder: East European Monographs [Columbia University Press], 2000), pp.113–118. Other than those cited in Kumm, Umbrich, Lallier, and Boschet were the only junior rank accounts found.
146 OKW, *Bands*, p. 203.
147 Dixon and Heilbrunn, pp. 122–123.
148 OKW, *Bands*, pp. 219–220.
149 Kumm, interview.
150 OKW, *Bands*, p. 203.
151 OKW, *Bands*, pp. 212–219.
152 Lieb, p. 267.
153 OKW, *Bands*, pp. 212–219.
154 OKW, *Bands*, pp. 212–219.
155 SS-FHA, *Jagdeinheiten*, p. 59.
156 Recent papers on these operations include Nicolas G Virtue, Occupation Duty in the Dysfunctional Coalition: The Italian Second Army and its Allies in the Balkans; Alberto Becherelli, Counterinsurgency in Yugoslavia: Operation Weiss in the Records of the Italian General Staff; and Gaj Trifkovic, "A Case of Failed Counter-Insurgency," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 24, March 2011, pp. 314–336.
157 The resistance was fractured as well between royalist chetnik and communist partisan guerrillas supported by the Allies.
158 The 700-series divisions were lighter-equipped security forces of older soldiers; the 300-series were German-lead Croat legions.
159 References for Operation White include CNM Blair, *Guerilla Warfare* (London: HMSO, 1957), pp. 30–34; Robert M Kennedy, *German Anti-guerilla Operations in the Balkans, 1941–1944* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1954), pp. 34–37; Otto Kumm, *Prinz Eugen* (Winnipeg: JJ Fedorowicz, 1995), pp. 30–55; Fitzroy MacLean, *The Heretic* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), pp. 163–191; Josip Broz Tito, *Selected Military Works* (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavacki

Zavod, 1966), pp. 131–137, 226–231; Mark C Yerger, *Waffen-SS Commanders* (Atglen: Schiffer, 1999), pp. 151–153; HL de Zeng IV, "Anti-Partisan Operations in Croatia," from www.axishistory.com, accessed 29 July 2008.

160 Operation Black took place between May and June 1943 and was a better example of encirclement than the more complex White.

161 Kumm, p. 37.

162 Kumm, pp. 35, 36.

163 Kumm, p. 41.

164 Yerger, pp. 151, 153.

165 Kumm, p. 34.

166 Heiber and Glantz, pp. 75–76.

167 Heiber and Glantz, p. 504.

168 Heaton, p. 93; Kumm, p. 22.

169 Heaton, p. 94.

170 OKW, *Bands*, pp. 203–204.

171 Russell F Weigley. *The Partisan War: The South Carolina Campaign of 1780–1782* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970), p. 3; written about the American War of Independence.

172 Professor Adalbert Lallier, personal communications, 27 May 2009.

Chapter 4

173 Provided by the US Army Center for Military History, Washington, DC.

174 *Reichsarbeitdienst*, *Organisation Todt.*

175 The terms "bands" and "bandits" (more like gangs and gangsters) were the official wartime nomenclature mandated for use rather than the more commonly used guerrillas or partisans.

176 The term *Nachrichten* can be used either for intelligence or communication in different context.

177 For example, Drvar, Bosnia in May 1944 or Vassieux, France in July 1944.

178 The German Army used a variety of armored railroad trains in a number of standard or improvised categories: a 100-series armored trains, a 200-series heavy reconnaissance trains for direct combat, a 300-series light reconnaissance trains for escort, command trains, and track protection trains.

179 Before satellite communications, but technical concerns still arise.

180 Either by electronic or mechanical means; i.e. Enigma devices.

Chapter 5

181 SS-FHA, *Jagdeinheiten*, pp. 5ff. The British GS(R)'s 1939 guerilla warfare pamphlets were similar to the 1945 German exposition. Both these had been written when the possibility of having to resist German occupation was a reality.

Related Allied views on the subject are found in Dixon and Heilbrunn or Blair. German guerrilla resistance warfare has been well documented by Perry Biddiscombe, *Werewolf: The History of the National Socialist Guerilla Movement, 1944–1946* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), and *The SS Hunter Battalions: The Hidden History of the Nazi Resistance Movement, 1944–1945* (Stroud: Tempus Publishing, 2006). In addition, German special forces were described in James Lucas, *Kommando: German Special Forces in World War Two* (London: Cassell, 1985); Antonio J Munoz, *Forgotten Legions: Obscure Combat Formations of the Waffen-SS* (Boulder: Paladin Press, 1991); and Franz Kurowski, *The Brandenburger Commandos* (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2005).

182 SS-FHA, *Jagdeinheiten*, p. 5.

183 An appendix in one 1945 SHAEF reference detailed the discovery of a "Werewolf" cell composed of staff and students of a German Army combat school of about 200 to 300 men and women near Schonsee, Germany.

184 War Department, *TM-E 30–451*, pp. 257–261.

185 Lester Grau and Michael Gress, ed., *The Partisan's Companion: Updated and Revised Edition, 1942* (Philadelphia: Casemate Publishers, 2011), pp. 38–43; "German Tactics of Combating Guerillas." *Military Review*, Vol. 24, No. 3, June 1944, pp. 104–106; General Staff, Intelligence Division, USA Translation, F-1598. OKW no. 03268/44, Pamphlet 69/2, "Fighting the Guerilla Bands," 6.5.1944; Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, *Combating the Guerilla* (n.p.: Imprimerie Nationale, 1 May 1945), p. 2.

186 SHAEF, *Guerilla*, p.8.

187 War Department, *TM-E 30–451*, p. 257.

188 SS-FHA, *Jagdeinheiten*, p. 5.

189 SS-FHA, *Jagdeinheiten*, p. 11.

190 German Army Office (Divisions I-Army Development and II-Army Training), *Preliminary Basics for the Role of Land Forces in Counterinsurgency* (Cologne: June 2010), pp. i-ii.

191 LtCol (GS) Marc U Cropp, The Value of the German Concept of Leadership Development and Civic Education – Innere Fuehrung – in Counterinsurgency Operations (Thesis, Marine Corps University, 2008–2009).

192 Robert W Hutchinson, "The Weight of History: Wehrmacht Officers, the U.S. Army Historical Division, and U.S. Military Doctrine, 1945–1956," *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 78, No. 4, October 2014.

193 Andrew J Birtle, *US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942–1976* (Washington, DC: USA Center of Military History, 2006), pp. 131–171.

194 For example Edgar M Howell, *The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941–1944* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1956); Charles v. Luttichau, *Guerilla and CounterGuerilla Warfare in Russia during World War II* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1963).

195 In line with German tradition and for whom "inner-leadership" ethical or moral concerns might have been less.

196 Michael A Palmer, *The German Wars: A Concise History, 1859–1945 (*Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2010); Friedrich August v. der Heydte, *Modern Irregular Warfare: In Defense Policy and as a Military Phenomenon* (New York: Franklin House, 1986).

197 Slavko N Bjelajac, "Guerilla-Warfare," n.d.

198 Howell, *Partisan Movement*, pp. 203, 209.

199 US Army, "Use the Right Word," 1962.

200 Andrew J Birtle, Rearming the Phoenix: American Military Assistance to the Federal Republic of Germany, 1950–1960 (Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1985).

201 David Stone, *Fighting for the Fatherland: The Story of the German Soldier from 1648 to the Present Day* (Washington, DC: Potomac Press, 2006), pp. 369–405.

202 Timo Noetzel, "Germany's Small War in Afghanistan: Military Learning amid Political-Strategic Inertia," *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 31, No. 3, December 2010, p. 486ff.

203 Dr Conrad Crane, US Army War College, personal communication.

204 German Army, *Land Forces in Counterinsurgency*, pp. 1–3.

205 US Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (London and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). This was the commercial version of USA FM 3–24 and USMC WP 3–33.5 with additional commentary.

206 Col Douglas E Nash, USA (Ret), Marine Corps University, personal communication.

207 Noetzel, "Germany's Small War," pp. 493–495.

208 Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, "The German Army and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan," *SWP [Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik] Comments 1*, February 2008;

Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, "Missing Links: The Evolution of German Counter-Insurgency Thinking," *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 154, No. 1, February 2009.

209 Rainer Glatz, "ISAF Lessons Learned: A German Perspective," *Prism,* Vol. 2, No. 2, March 2011, pp. 169–176; German Army, *Land Forces in Counterinsurgency,* pp. i–ii.

210 German Army, *Land Forces in Counterinsurgency*, pp. i–ii, 1–6.

211 See also Annex C1, Guiding principles on the conduct of military measures to establishing security and state order in German Army, *Land Forces in Counterinsurgency*, pp. i–ii, 1–6, 48.

212 German-Foreign-Policy.com, accessed 19 September 2014; referring to MajGen Hans-Warner Fritz and MajGen Markus Kneip.

213 A critical interpretation was presented by Ron Fraser, "Germany's Bold New Counterinsurgency Ideas," 5 May 2013, www.philadelphiatrumpet.com, accessed 19 September 2014; Kenneth B Brown, "Counter-Guerilla Operations: Does the Law of War Proscribe Success?," *Naval Law Review*, Vol. 44, 1997.